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Understanding Figurative Language:  
Studies on the Comprehension of Metaphors and Similes 
Carlos Roncero, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2013 
 At least since Aristotle, scholars have contrasted the more “literal” simile (e.g., lawyers 
are like sharks) with the more "figurative" metaphor (e.g., lawyers are sharks) to better 
understand how people deduce non-literal interpretations when comprehending figurative 
language such as metaphor. This thesis presents four manuscripts that investigated the 
comprehension of metaphors and similes to better understand this literal-figurative divide. The 
study reported in the first manuscript, employing off-line ratings and property-listing tasks, 
examined how metaphors and similes are interpreted, and how such statements are used on the 
Internet. Property lists generated for metaphors and similes were equivalent, although connotative 
properties seemed more salient for metaphors. The same study also found that similes on the 
Internet were used more often before an explanation. The study reported in the second manuscript 
examined the comprehension of metaphors and similes using self-paced reading, while the study 
reported in the third manuscript used eye-tracking. Results of the two studies were inconsistent: 
the self-paced reading study suggested similes were more difficult to process (longer reading 
times), while the reverse was suggested by the eye-tracking study (shorter saccade lengths for 
metaphors). Because first-pass reading measures such as saccade length are most immune to 
extra-linguistic variables, taken together results from both studies favor viewing metaphors as 
more difficult to comprehend than similes. Finally, the fourth manuscript presents a study that 
examined how people living with Alzheimer's disease interpret metaphors and similes using 
paraphrase and interpretation tasks. Interpretations for metaphors and similes were equivalent, but 
more apt statements (music is (like) medicine) were easier to interpret than less apt ones (e.g., life 
is (like) a bottle) highlighting the role of aptness in metaphor and simile interpretation. The final 
chapter presents a theoretical discussion in light of the results obtained in the four studies. In 
summary, the results suggest metaphors and similes activate a similar set of properties, but that 
connotative properties might receive increased activation when a metaphor is presented. This 
additional activation for connotative properties could make metaphors require more processing 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Discussions regarding metaphor date back to at least Aristotle (trans. 1926) and 
have generated debate across a wide range of disciplines (e.g., linguistics, philosophy, 
psychology, and neuroscience). The puzzle posed to scholars of metaphor is unraveling 
how the intended meaning of a statement can be deduced when that particular meaning is 
different from the lexical meaning of the sentence. For example, the meaning of the 
sentence Hammerheads are sharks carries the propositional content that hammerheads 
are fish based on the content of the individual lexical items—or their entailments—and 
how they are put together. In contrast, the sentence Lawyers are sharks would not imply 
that lawyers are fish. Most people stating this sentence would be expressing the sentiment 
that lawyers can be ruthless and egocentric.  How individuals are able to determine this 
intended meaning, despite the fact it does not match the lexical meaning, has been a 
central topic in theories of metaphor. 
 Several metaphor researchers (e.g., Glucksberg, 2003; Miller, 1993; Morgan, 
1993; Ortony, 1993; Rumelhart, 1993; Searle, 1993) have noted that metaphors violate 
maxims of conversation (Grice, 1975; Sadock, 1993). More specifically, a metaphor 
violates the principle of quality, that people should be truthful in their statements, and the 
principle of quantity, that people should be informative in their statements (Grice, 1975). 
For example, the metaphor Lawyers are sharks violates the principle of quality because 
lawyers are not sharks. Meanwhile, statements such as Boys will be boys violates the 
maximim of quantity because the statement seems to provide the redundant information 
that boys are boys, like saying a tautology such as books are books or couches are 





while literally true, often have an associated connotative meaning that extends beyond the 
literal meaning (i.e., that the dog is somewhat dangerous, and that man can not live in 
isolation).These sentences, like Boys will be boys, violate the maxim of quantity because 
the information they provide, while valid, seems non-informative. Consequently, people 
interpret these sentences as carrying a meaning beyond what is explicitly said. 
 People also have the expectation that others will try to communicate with them in 
an effective manner (Miller, 1979 Searle, 1993). Consequently, when people hear 
metaphors that seem to violate maxims of conversation, they will try to deduce the 
intended meaning that is being asserted by the metaphor. Searle (1979) defined this 
intended meaning as speaker's meaning in contrast to the meaning asserted only by the 
words in the sentence (i.e., lexical meaning). Thus, although a person states S is P, the 
listener is aware that the speaker is actually asserting that S is R (Searle, 1993). For 
example, hearing the sentence lawyers are sharks, most native speakers of English would 
readily interpret this sentence as meaning that lawyers are aggressive rather than meaning 
that lawyers are fish.  The subsequent theoretical question is how individuals are able to 
deduce the speaker's intended meaning from the sentence actually articulated. 
 Searle (1979) put forward a three-stage model of metaphor interpretation that is 
commonly referred to as the standard pragmatic model or Searle's Three-Stage model. In 
this model, interpretation begins with a literal interpretation of the sentence that is 
actually articulated, but quickly rejected when seen as violating maxims of conversation 
such as quality or quantity. Whether a particular statement violates these maxims, 
however, will depend on context. For example, hearing Bill is a snake would not violate 





knowledge that Bill is a human being, and not a lizard, would force the listener to reject 
the literal interpretation of the sentence and interpret the sentence as a metaphor. 
Similarly, the statement It's hot in here is ironic only when the room is actually cold. 
Therefore, when the literal meaning obtained is a good fit within the sentential context or 
a person's knowledge of the world, then interpretation is predicted to proceed fluidly. 
However, when this lexical meaning doesn’t fit the context—as can occur for 
metaphors—then extra processing will be required to determine the speaker's intended 
meaning. As stated by Searle (1993): "where the utterance is defective if taken literally, 
look for an utterance meaning that differs from sentence meaning" (p.103). 
 To my knowledge, the first empirical test of Searle's three-stage model was Clark 
and Lucy (1975), who set out theoretical predictions that would become highly influential 
in later studies of metaphor. Relevant to the present thesis was their prediction that: "The 
listener should take longer whenever the intended meaning is different from the literal 
meaning" (p.58). This prediction is based on the assumption that deducing the conveyed 
meaning from a literal meaning takes time. Therefore, interpreting the sentence Bill is a 
lizard will be faster when Bill is in fact a lizard as opposed to a human being.1 This 
prediction would later be central to many studies of metaphor. In the study by Clark and 
Lucy, they found support for Searle's three-stage model because indirect requests (can 
you pass the salt) took longer to read and verify than direct statements (you can pass the 
salt). 
                                                          
1 Note that Searle and Grice never asserted this empirical prediction themselves, and the prediction 
can only be true if one assumes that the stages suggested by Searle occur serially, in real time, during 
sentence interpretation. However, many researchers make these assumptions when they examine 
Searle's three-stage model and predict that metaphors will take longer to process and interpret than 
comparable literal sentences (e.g., Blasko & Connine, 1993). Lepore and Stone (2010) also note that 
Searle offers no argument for his assumptions other than his arguments that the few other accounts he 





 Ortony, Shallert, Reynolds, and Antos (1978) criticized Clark and Lucy's (1975) 
results because the sentences had been read in isolation. Rather than adopting the three-
stage model of metaphor processing, and the associated argument that figurative meaning 
is obtained only after the rejection of a literal interpretation, Ortony et al. argued that 
metaphor processing involves elaboration processes that are refined by the context. To 
test this hypothesis, Ortony et al. (and later, Inhoof, Lima, & Carroll (1984) using eye-
tracking) compared reading times for comparable figurative and literal sentences. In both 
studies, participants took longer to interpret a sentence figuratively when the supporting 
context was short, but there were no time differences when the supporting context was 
long. For example, in sentences (1a) and (1b), the preceding context is short and it took 
participants longer to interpret the sentence the hens clicked noisily in (1a) where a 
figurative interpretation is required. 
1.a. At a meeting of the women’s club, the hens clucked noisily 
1.b. In the back of the barn, the hens clucked noisily 
When the preceding context was longer, however, as seen below in (1c) and (1d), then 
the reading times for the hens clucked noisily were comparable. 
1.c. At a meeting of the women's club the youngest member requested the floor and brought up the 
issue of supporting the equal rights amendment. The importance of the issue outweighed her 
discomfort in speaking before the group. They reacted as she expected. The hens clucked noisily. 
1.d. In the back of the barn, the farmer's youngest child gathered pebbles and skipped them deftly 
across a puddle by the chicken coop. He knew that he was supposed to be feeding the animals but 
he kept on flicking at the birds. The hens clucked noisily. 
Both Ortony et al. and Inhoff et al. viewed their results as inconsistent with the prediction 
that literal meaning should always be activated faster than a figurative meaning because 





Ortony et al. argued that contextual support rather than the "literalness" of a sentence 
would determine comprehension time. More specifically, comprehension involves using 
…an already constructed representation of what has gone before (the context) as a conceptual 
framework for interpreting a target sentence, or any other linguistic unit . . . whether or not a target 
sentence requires a relatively large amount of processing time is a function of how easily it can be 
interpreted in light of contextually determined expectations rather than a function of its non 
literalness (p. 467). 
This view of metaphor processing is sometimes called the interactionist view, as 
comprehension is viewed as an interaction between the sentence being read and the 
accompanying linguistic context (Giora, 2008).  
 The study by Clark and Lucy (1975) had presented sentences in isolation. In light 
of the results found by Ortony et al. (1978), some researchers argued that the three-stage 
model of metaphor processing is true only when sentences are presented in isolation (e.g., 
Rumelhart, 1979). To test this hypothesis, Janus and Bever (1985) compared reading 
times for literal sentences and metaphors presented in context, using the same paragraphs 
and sentences employed by Ortony et al. Consistent with other studies, there were no 
significant differences in reading times for the literal and figurative conditions. However, 
Janus and Bever (1985) also measured reading times for the initial phrases of target 
sentences (e.g., the hens in the hens clucked noisily) and found the initial phrases had 
significantly longer reading times when read after contexts that primed for a figurative 
interpretation. Janus and Bever interpreted this result as reflecting an initial "recognition 
problem" (Miller, 1979) in that participants required extra reading time upon realizing a 
literal interpretation wasn't appropriate and needed to be rejected in favor of a 
metaphorical representation; an interpretation of the results which is consistent with the 





equivalent for producing a literal or figurative representation. Participants rated the literal 
phrases as more predictable after context than their figurative counterparts. The lower 
predictability of figurative sentences after context could have contributed to the initial 
phrases in the figurative condition having longer reading times. In other words, the result 
could reflect a predictability effect rather than a literality effect. Viewed in this manner, 
the results are consistent with Ortony's argument that processing time is more related to 
the amount of contextual support than the literality of the sentence. 
 These initial studies of metaphor cast doubt on the hypothesis that obtaining the 
figurative meaning for a given sentence is always slower and subsequent to obtaining its 
literal meaning. Even in the study by Janus and Bever, reading times differences 
disappeared when the reading times were measured for the entire sentence. Therefore, if a 
figurative meaning is acquired only once a literal meaning is obtained, the process itself 
appears to be completed very rapidly (Blasko & Connine, 1993). Some researchers have 
extended this argument to propose that literal and figurative meanings are accessed 
simultaneously, and the acquisition of a sentence's "figurative meaning" is as automatic a 
process as obtaining a literal meaning, and does not depend on first rejecting a sentence's 
literal meaning once it is viewed as nonsensical for the current context. As Gluckserg, 
Gildea, and Bookin (1982) have argued: 
Intuitively, it seems quite difficult, if not impossible, to inhibit our understanding of simple and 
transparent statements such as some salesmen are bulldozers or some hearts are closets, even 
though such statements are literally false. Furthermore, it seems to matter not at all whether such 
statements are plausible in context or not. Both the literal and nonliteral meanings seem to be 
apprehended without conscious effort or explicit inference (p. 87).  
In other words, Glucksberg et al. argue that obtaining a figurative meaning is not an 





Regardless of whether a sentence has a literal meaning that conforms to maxims of 
conversation, according to Glucksberg et al., people will automatically attempt to derive 
a non-literal meaning for a sentence.  
 To test their hypothesis, Glucksberg et al. (1982) asked participants to read 
sentences and judge them as being literally true or false. Four sentence types were 
presented: (1) literally true statements (e.g., some fish are trout); ( 2) literally false 
statements (e.g., some fish are eagles); (3) metaphors ("sentences were literally false 
category-membership statements, but they were readily interpretable if taken 
nonliterally" (p.88); e.g., some birds are flutes); (4) scrambled metaphors ("sentences 
were also literally false, but were not readily interpretable" (p.88); e.g., some jobs are 
birds). Glucksberg et al. predicted that people would be unable to inhibit an available 
metaphorical meaning even when instructed to judge sentences only as being literally true 
or false, causing metaphors to have longer response times than scrambled metaphors:  
If people can ignore metaphorical meanings, then literally false class-inclusion sentences such as 
some jobs are jails should pose no particular difficulties . . . On the other hand, if metaphorical 
meanings leap out-- i.e., cannot be inhibited or ignored-- then it should take longer to judge such 
sentences as false. The "true" metaphorical interpretation, if it is made at all, should conflict with 
the "false" literal interpretation and so should slow up response latencies (p.87).  
In support of their predictions, Glucksberg et al. found a metaphor interference effect: 
although literally true sentences had faster response times than all other sentence types, 
metaphors had slower response times than both scrambled metaphors and literally false 
statements (which were not significantly different from each other).  
 Glucksberg et al. (1982) interpreted these results as participants being unable to 
inhibit a possible metaphorical meaning when it was readily perceived: "When these 





meanings were false, the nonliteral true. This conflict, in turn, delayed or slowed down 
the final response." (p.90).In other words, participants could not avoid obtaining a 
figurative meaning for these statements despite being told to verify the literal truth of the 
statements. If figurative meanings are obtained only once a literal meaning is perceived 
as nonsensical within a given context, then only the sentence's literal meaning should be 
activated when there is no conflict. The results from Glucksberg et al., suggest that 
incongruence between context and literal meaning is not the only condition that triggers 
the activation of a non-literal meaning. 
 An alternate interpretation of Glucksberg et al. (1982)'s results is possible if 
figurative interpretations were activated as a result of task demands rather than the 
automatic activation of additional figurative meanings. More specifically, when 
participants were asked to verify the literal truth of the statements, this procedure may 
have invoked participants to consider figurative meanings that would have otherwise not 
been activated. Sentences with only a literal interpretation would have less interpretations 
to consider than a sentence with both a literal and figurative interpretation, leading to 
these sentences having shorter verification times. However, further studies have 
suggested that the activation of a figurative meaning can be automatic and not the 
consequence of task demands. 
 People may also readily activate the non-literal meaning of a metaphor if they are 
already familiar with that metaphor's non-literal meaning. Blasko and Connine (1993), 
for example, found comparable activation times for figurative and literal meanings. They 
used a cross-modal priming lexical decision task where participants heard metaphors 





the screen that was related to either the figurative meaning of desert in the metaphor (e.g., 
isolate), a literal property of desert (e.g., sand), or a control property not related to desert 
(e.g., moustache). They found that lexical decision times—deciding if the string of letters 
was an English word or not—were comparable for both figurative and literal properties, 
and faster than the response times found for control properties. Therefore, both the literal 
and metaphorical meanings appear to be activated equally fast, rather than faster 
activation occurring for the literal meanings. Interestingly, Blasko and Connine (1993) 
found this result not only for metaphors that were familiar, but also unfamiliar metaphors 
that had been rated as highly apt. Aptness being operationalized as how well a metaphor 
"expresses its specific non-literal meaning" (p.297). Therefore, these results suggest that 
the aptness level of a metaphor, in addition to familiarity, can affect how quickly a 
metaphor's non-literal meaning is activated. For highly apt metaphors, it is possible that 
the associated literal and figurative meanings can be activated equally fast. 
 In a follow-up study, Blasko and Briihl (1997) used eye-tracking to compare 
participants reading low- and high-familiar metaphors. Similar to earlier studies by 
Oronty et al. (1978) and Inhoff et al. (1984), metaphors were sometimes read after a 
context that "primes" (p.262) the metaphor's figurative meaning. For example, for the 
metaphor to the sailor, the stars are a map to his destination, the metaphor-related 
context was Billboards are the yellow pages of the highway, whereas the metaphor-
unrelated context was all good scientific research is mountain climbing. Consistent with 
Blasko and Connine (1993), high-familiar metaphors were read faster than low-familiar 
metaphors, and the context results were consistent with Ortony et al.'s (1978) results 





 These results have often been taken by some researchers to represent the demise 
of Searle's three-stage model (Blasko, 1999; Glucksberg, 2003). More specifically, the 
assumption that a figurative meaning is obtained only after an obtained literal meaning is 
deemed defective given the present context.2 The results from Glucksberg et al. (1982), 
as well as Blasko and Connine (1993), suggest that a sentence's metaphorical meaning 
might be activated as quickly as a statement's literal meaning when the metaphors are 
either highly apt or familiar. Furthermore, processing speed can be increased when the 
metaphor is read after a supportive context (Blasko & Briihl, 1997; Inhoff et al., 1984; 
Janus & Bever, 1985; Ortony et al., 1978). Consequently, there is an increasing number 
of researchers who now predict that "the figurative meaning of a highly apt and familiar 
metaphor is rapidly available in parallel with the literal meaning of the vehicle" (Blasko, 
1999, p.1677).  
 Some researchers even argue that the difference between processing a metaphor 
or a literal statement is perhaps quantitatively different, in that metaphors are more 
difficult to process, but not qualitatively different, in that they used the same underlying 
cognitive processes. Coulson and Van Petten (2002), for example, have argued that 
metaphors and literal statements are not distinguished by the cognitive processes 
involved. They argue that metaphors and literal statements are both understood through a 
process called mapping3: a selection and alignment of shared attributes and relations. The 
                                                          
2 Searle (1979) does allow for the direct processing of metaphors (i.e., without the rejection of a literal 
meaning) in the case of "dead metaphors", where the original literal meaning has been lost and replaced 
with a new meaning: "the original sentence meaning is bypassed and the sentence acquires a new literal 
meaning identical with the former metaphorical utterance meaning" (p.110). Such sentences do not require 
first rejecting a literal interpretation to obtain a metaphorical interpretation because the literal meaning first 
accessed is the correct metaphorical interpretation.  






mapping process is considered more difficult for metaphors because the topic and vehicle 
terms within a metaphor often come from distantly related domains. Consequently, 
Coulson and Van Petten argue that metaphors typically require more comprehension 
effort than comparable literal statements because of the increased semantic distance 
rather than a notion of literalness. To support this prediction, Coulson and Van Petten 
used ERP to compare participants’ processing of three item types: literal statements (he 
knows whisky is a strong intoxicant), literal mapping statements (he has used cough syrup 
as an intoxicant), and metaphors (he knows that power is an intoxicant). Larger N400 
amplitudes were predicted to correlate with the amount of mapping required (metaphors 
requiring the most, literal statements the least). Coulson and Van Petten found that the 
waveforms for the three expression types were similar, but that metaphors elicited larger 
N400s magnitudes than did the literal sentences, while the literal mappings were in-
between. This N400 effect supports the argument that metaphors and comparable literal 
statements are understood using one general cognitive process (i.e., mapping), but the 
ability to select and align the correct relevant properties is more difficult for metaphors. 
 Pynte, Besson, Robichon, and Poli (1996) reached a similar conclusion in their 
ERP study on the time comprehension of metaphors. Pynte et al. assumed that if a literal 
meaning is activated prior to activating a figurative meaning, then the waveforms for 
literal and comparable figurative sentences (e.g., those animals are lions vs. those 
fighters are lions) should be different. More specifically, "if the literal meaning does not 
need to be rejected before the metaphorical meaning is accessed . . . one can expect the 
processes responsible for accessing both the literal and metaphorical meanings to be 





and figurative language processing used similar cognitive processes then their individual 
ERP waveforms should be similar. If a literal meaning is activated prior to activating a 
figurative meaning, however, then the N400 effect should begin later in time than the 
N400 for literal sentences. Pynte et al., however, did not find support for this prediction 
because the two sentence types had similar wavelengths. A larger N400 effect for 
metaphors, however, was found; suggesting metaphors required more cognitive "effort" 
to be processed. Because the wavelengths were similar, however, Pynte et al. concluded 
the difference was quantitative rather than qualitative: similar processes for both sentence 
types, but more demanding of metaphors:    
"All attempts to isolate two distinct processing stages were totally unsuccessful. The manipulation 
of context led to late effects on the LPC, as expected, thus suggesting that the search for the 
metaphorical meaning indeed lasted for at least 1000 ms. However, whenever such a late effect 
was observed, an effect was also observed on N400. This suggests that the search for a 
metaphorical meaning actually began early in the comprehension process, apparently while the 
literal meaning was being accessed. This pattern of results seems to argue against the hierarchical 
hypothesis of metaphor comprehension" (p.312). 
 While such results do suggest metaphors and literal statements use the same 
cognitive processes, note that the interpretations of the ERP results presented in this 
chapter are the conclusions put forward by the researchers (i.e., Coulson & Van Petten, 
2002; Pynte et al., 1996), and there is currently debate regarding whether the N400 effect 
reflects anomaly, inhibition processes, mapping, or different interpretation processes (for 
a review, see Kutas & Federmeir, 2011). Similarly, some researchers have questioned 
whether comparable reading times or reaction times are inconsistent with Searle's original 
postulate that a figurative meaning is obtained subsequent to determining the literal 
interpretation is defective.  De Almeida, Manouilidou, Roncero, and Riven (2012), for 
example, note that comparable reading times could reflect a speed-up effect in the 





context produced a facilitative effect such that the search for a figurative interpretation 
was as fast as activating a literal interpretation, leading to comparable reading times.  
Therefore, while there may be consensus that certain studies have found similar results 
for metaphors and comparable literal statement, there is still debate surrounding how 
these results should be interpreted.  
 Broadly speaking, different theories of metaphor can be placed in 3 categories: 
indirect, parallel, and direct theories of metaphor processing. While the terms direct and 
indirect are common when describing theories of metaphor (e.g., Glucksberg, 2003), I 
have chosen to use the term "parallel" in this thesis to refer to theories where the given 
word and the context are predicted to activate their own related meanings, which are then 
both used in a subsequent interpretation stage.  As can be expected, theories within these 
broad categories also have their own theoretical disagreements, and the theories presented 
in this chapter are only a sample of the numerous theories of metaphor currently in 
existence. Nevertheless, most theories can be generally classified in terms of how they 
view lexical access and the role of context. Indirect theories of metaphor generally take 
the position that lexical access is always initially literal and not impacted by context, 
whereas direct theories of metaphor predict lexical access can be affected by context, 
such that context can select the correct figurative meaning without first accessing a literal 
meaning. Parallel theories present a compromise position where context does not affect 
lexical access, but can activate meanings that are perhaps not activated by the word just 
read. In addition to disagreements regarding what semantic information is initially 
activated, these theories also disagree on whether a literal interpretation will need to be 





indirect theories of metaphor often predict that an obtained literal meaning will be 
replaced with a meaning that allows for a figurative interpretation, whereas direct 
theories predict a figurative meaning can already be available for a subsequent 
interpretation stage because it was selected by the context during lexical access. Finally, 
parallel theories of metaphor would predict that the meaning activated by the word, and 
any additional meanings activated by context, will both be available in a subsequent 
interpretation stage.  A diagram displaying these three general theoretical predictions is 
presented in Figure 1A.  In this thesis, the stage where lexical access occurs will be 
referred to as the "access stage", while the subsequent stage where this accessed material 
is used to derive an interpretation will be referred to as the "interpretation stage." Also 
note that this figure assumes meaning is decompositional. More specifically, activating a 
particular meaning is predicted to activate properties related to the word read. 














 Special attention will be given to two theories of metaphor because they will be 





Gentner, 2005; Gentner & Bowdle, 2008), and Categorization Theory (Glucksberg, 2003, 
2008). Career of Metaphor theory and Categorization theory are especially relevant to the 
current thesis because they disagree on whether metaphor processing is ever indirect, and 
make predictions regarding the processing of metaphors (e.g., time is money) and 
comparable simile expressions (e.g., time is like money). For metaphors and similes, one 
object, hereafter called the topic (e.g., lawyers), is compared to or predicated by a second 
object, hereafter called the vehicle (e.g., sharks). While metaphors express this 
relationship using a categorical structure (e.g., lawyers are sharks), similes create 
comparisons by adding a word such as like (lawyers are like sharks). These types of 
expressions are the ones examined in the subsequent chapters because they can test 
predictions regarding the nature of figurative language processing, while also controlling 
for lexical effects because the words in each expression are the same. Furthermore, some 
researchers have argued that understanding a metaphor involves mentally converting that 
metaphor into a simile prior to interpretation (a position often referred to as the 
comparison view (Black, 1955)). Whereas Categorization theory predicts both types 
metaphors and similes can be processed directly, Career of Metaphor theory predicts 
unfamiliar metaphors can be processed only indirectly. Furthermore, whereas 
Categorization theory predicts metaphors will elicit a figurative meaning, but similes a 
literal meaning, Career of Metaphor theory predicts metaphors and similes will have the 
same meaning. Finally, Career of Metaphor theory predicts that vehicle conventionality is 
related to faster processing times, whereas Categorization Theory predicts that more apt 





 During the discussion of parallel theories of metaphor, special attention will be 
given to the Graded Saliency hypothesis (Giora, 2003). Although this theory will be 
discussed less in the subsequent chapters, we will return to this theory when discussing 
the experimental results, in the final chapter. The theoretical predictions laid out by this 
theory could be beneficial if results are not consistent with either Career of Metaphor 
theory (Bowdle & Genter, 2005) or Categorization theory (Glucksberg, 2008). 
Indirect Theories of Metaphor and Career of Metaphor Theory 











 Indirect theories, as can be observed in Figure 1B, generally take the position that 
lexical access is unaffected by context and activates a literal meaning. For example, 
previously we discussed Searle's claim that a literal meaning would first have to be 
activated before deducing the correct figurative interpretation. Certain theorists have 
further argued that this initially activated literal meaning is also the only meaning ever 
activated.  Davidson (1979), for example, rejects the idea of 'metaphorical meaning' in 





meaning. Instead, Davidson argues that metaphorical statements such as love is a 
snowmobile are no different from other thought-provoking incidents like a bump on the 
head, taking a drug, or bird song; where hearing a bird in the woods will provoke people 
to interpret the source of that sound. In this manner, metaphor interpretation is open-
ended because it reflects the inferential processes of the person interpreting the sentence: 
"We imagine there is a content to be captured when all the while we are in fact focusing 
on what the metaphor makes us notice . . . in fact there is no limit to what a metaphor 
calls to our attention" (p.44). In case of similes (e.g., love is like a snowmobile), Davidson 
argues such statements overtly instruct a person to consider the similarities between two 
objects to correctly interpret the sentence (see Lepore and Stone (2010) for similar 
arguments).  
 My main difficulty with theorists who argue against metaphorical meaning is two-
fold. First, theorists leave vague what processes take place once a literal meaning is 
activated beyond general inferential processes. Thus, it remains unclear in these models 
how the entire interpretation process from activation to interpretation takes place. 
Second, metaphor does not seem as open-ended as Davidson (1979) would predict. As 
noted by Black (1955), it would be quite surprising if anyone with some knowledge of 
men and wolves would interpret the sentence men are wolves to mean men are 
vegetarians. Instead, the ultimate interpretation of a sentence does appear to reflect 
properties related to the lexical items in the given metaphor. Similar to Searle (1979), 
Black argues that a speaker stating the metaphor M means in fact L, where L is 
semantically equivalent to M. Thus, when someone states Lawyers are sharks, they 





viciousness. In contrast, Davidson would argue that viciousness in one of many potential 
interpretations that could come to mind because words carry no meaning beyond their 
literal interpretation (i.e., there is no clear path from the literal meaning of the word to its 
alternate figurative meaning other then general inferential processes). I disagree with 
Davidson's conclusion and agree with Camp's (2006) argument that: "We regularly use 
metaphors to make assertions and other speech acts with more or less determinate 
contents, but the non-cognitivist is committed to denying this" (p.155). In other words, 
when people state a metaphor such as lawyers are sharks, they intend for their audience 
to interpret the sentence as meaning lawyers are vicious (and similar negative 
connotations) rather than simply have the audience consider an array of possible 
interpretations. Also, while Davidson may see no clear path from a literal meaning to a 
different figurative meaning, people nevertheless show incredible consistency in their 
interpretations of metaphors; as will be observed in the subsequent chapters. Rarely, if 
ever, would an English speaker in North America interpret the sentence lawyers are 
sharks to mean lawyers are good swimmers. 
 Black (1955) discusses what processes might take place when someone deduces 
the meaning of a figurative statement. He argues that understanding a metaphor such as 
men are wolves involves a consideration of what properties are true of both men and 
wolves to determine in what manner men could be considered wolves. Clearly, not all 
aspects of wolves are also true of men, thus properties such as living in caves or having 
fur would be quickly dismissed. As Black notes:  
a speaker who says 'wolf' is normally taken to be implying in some sense of that word that he is 
referring to something fierce, carnivorous, treacherous, and so on . . . the effect, then, of 





man is a wolf, he preys upon other animals, is fierce, hungry, engaged in constant struggle . . . any 
human traits that can without undue strain be talked about in 'wolf-language' will be rendered 
prominent, and any that cannot will be pushed into the background. The wolf-metaphor suppresses 
some details, emphasises others-- in short, organizes our view of man (p.288). 
Therefore, in contrast with Davidon, Black assumes that speakers intend to convey a 
particular meaning about a subject when they express a metaphor. When someone states 
men are wolves, they intend to express the sentiment that men are fierce, whereas stating 
men are butterflies would convey a sentiment of men based on properties shared by both 
men and butterflies.  
 While Black (1955) laid out certain principles for how metaphors could be 
processed, the exact cognitive processes involved were not outlined. In contrast, Career 
of Metaphor theory (Bowdle & Gentner, 2006; Gentner & Bowdle, 2008) is an indirect 
theory of metaphor processing which agrees with Black's principles regarding metaphor 
processing, while also outlining the exact processes involved. Similar to Black (1955), 
Bowdle and Gentner assume that interpreting a metaphor involves a comparison of the 
two objects within a sentence (e.g., men and wolves in the metaphor men are wolves). 
Bowdle and Gentner also predict, however, that understanding a metaphor will involve 
interpreting the metaphor as a simile; a theoretical position commonly referred to as the 
comparison view. 
 In comparisons theories (e.g., Miller, 1979), metaphors are understood as 
comparisons (i.e., similes) to derive the correct interpretation. In other words, to 
understand the metaphor men are wolves, a person would understand the statement as a 
simile (i.e., men are like wolves) to derive the speaker's intended meaning. While earlier 
comparison theories were less explicit about the cognitive processes involved in 





assuming that novel metaphors are understood as similes through a process called 
structure mapping (Gentner & Wolf, 1997, Bowdle & Gentner, 2005). In structure 
mapping, understanding a metaphor such as men are wolves involves comparing and 
contrasting the properties associated with the topic (men) and the vehicle (wolves). For 
example, to understand the metaphor men are wolves, people would convert the statement 
to men are like wolves and compare the salient properties for men and wolves. Those 
properties common to both words would then be aligned with associated properties. For 
example, the property prey on could be seen as true for both wolves and men, in that 
wolves prey on animals while men prey on women. In this manner, the metaphor can be 
understood as an analogy: men are wolves is understood to mean that men prey on 
women like wolves prey on animals (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005). Thus, by comparing and 
contrasting the properties of the two words, people can deduce the correct interpretation 
for an unfamiliar metaphor. 
 Because Career of Metaphor theory predicts that vehicles will first have a literal 
meaning only, and no associated figurative meaning, Career of Metaphor theory is similar 
to literal-first theories (e.g., Searle, 1979), which assume all words initially have only a 
literal meaning and extra cognitive processes are needed to then derive the figurative 
interpretation from this activated literal meaning. Unlike Searle, however, Career of 
Metaphor theory predicts that if a vehicle term is frequently used over time in a non-
literal manner, then it can gain an associated figurative meaning that is directly 
retrievable from semantic memory. Once a vehicle has gained an associated figurative 
meaning, it is considered conventional. This progression towards conventionality is what 





refer to movies as being blockbusters, while the actual term blockbuster originally 
referred to a bomb that was capable of exploding a city block, and had no figurative 
representation. The scenario put forward by Career of Metaphor theory is that individuals 
began using the term blockbuster in comparative form, as a simile, to express a particular 
meaning (i.e., that movie is like a blockbuster). Because the literal meaning of 
blockbuster was not correct in this context, however, people needed to engage in 
comparative processes to derive the correct figurative meaning (i.e., structure-mapping). 
Over time, from people constantly deriving the same figurative meaning from hearing 
and using blockbuster to predicate this figurative meaning (e.g. that show is like a 
blockbuster, that toy is like a blockbuster, that event is like a blockbuster), the vehicle 
acquires a conventional figurative meaning that is stored in semantic memory. Later, this 
conventional meaning can be retrieved from semantic memory whenever blockbuster is 
read and heard.  
 When metaphors contain conventional vehicles (e.g., love is a drug), Career of 
Metaphor predicts structure mapping will no longer be initiated. Instead, people can 
retrieve the conventional figurative meaning directly from semantic memory, and project 
this meaning from the vehicle to the topic.  For example, drug is related to the 
conventional figurative meaning of addiction. When someone reads a metaphor such as 
love is a drug, they project addiction onto love to understand the metaphor as meaning 
love is addictive. Gentner and Bowdle (2008) call this form of processing “categorical” to 
contrast it with the “comparative processing” used for metaphors with non-conventional 
vehicles (i.e., structure-mapping). For this reason, some people have called Career of 





processing (e.g., Camp, 2006) because Career of Metaphor theory assumes indirect 
processing for most metaphors, but direct processing (i.e., direct retrieval of the 
associated figurative meaning from semantic memory) when the vehicle has a 
conventional figurative meaning. I have chosen to classify Career of Metaphor theory as 
an indirect theory of metaphor processing because it assumes all words begin with only a 
literal meaning, and predicts the meaning initially activated will be determined more by 
the word itself than the associated context. In contrast, parallel and direct theories of 
metaphor often predict that context itself will activate a particular meaning. 
 The role of conventionality, and the metaphor-simile conversion stage predicted 
by Career of Metaphor theory for unfamiliar metaphors, leads the theory to predict that 
metaphors and similes will have the same interpretation. To better understand this 
prediction, consider the following analogy. When a child first learns the basic 
multiplication tables, the process can be laborious, but over time, the process quickens to 
the point where answers can simply be retrieved from memory. However, the obtained 
answer does not change, rather the process shifts from a more difficult process to a 
simpler one. Career of Metaphor theory predicts a similar transition for vehicles. The 
shift from no figurative meaning to a conventional one is predicted to change the type of 
processing initiated (categorical rather than comparative), but the meaning obtained is 
predicted to remain the same. For this reason, if metaphors and similes are not found to 
have similar interpretations, then it places into question Career of Metaphor theory’s 
prediction that unfamiliar metaphors are understood as similes to produce an 
interpretation, as well as the more general prediction that vehicles historically begin their 





 Career of Metaphor theory also predicts that metaphors that initiate categorical 
processing will be read faster than metaphors that require comparative processing 
because they no longer undergo a conversion stage to understand the metaphor as a 
simile. Bowdle and Gentner (2005) found results supporting this prediction. They 
compared reading times for metaphors with different levels of conventionality and found 
that metaphors whose vehicles had higher conventionality levels were read faster than 
those with less conventional vehicles. Similarly, Career of Metaphor theory predicts 
metaphors with conventional vehicles can be read as fast as comparable literal statements 
(e.g., similes) because they use categorical processing. To support this prediction, 
Bowdle and Gentner (2005) compared the reading times for metaphors and similes at 
different levels of conventionality. At low levels of conventionality, the sentence reading 
times were slower for the metaphor statements—reflecting the need to convert the 
metaphor into a simile to initiate structure-mapping. In contrast, at high levels of 
conventionality, the sentence reading times for metaphors and similes were comparable.  
 Lastly, Career of Metaphor theory predicts that the shift from comparative to 
categorical processing will be reflected in people’s preferences for reading a topic-
vehicle pair (e.g., life-journey) as a metaphor (life is a journey) or as a simile (life is like a 
journey). More specifically, topic-vehicle pairs with more conventional vehicles are 
predicted to be preferred as metaphors, while those pairs with less conventional vehicles 
will be preferred as similes. These preference predictions are assumed to reflect the type 
of processing used at different conventionality levels. Because metaphors whose vehicles 
have low conventionality are predicted to be understood using comparative processing, 





the comparative form of the simile (X is like Y) better reflects the type of processing that 
is initiated and used for comprehending these statements. In contrast, because metaphors 
with conventional vehicles can be understood using categorical processing, where the 
figurative meaning is retrieved from semantic memory and projected onto the topic, the 
metaphor form (X is Y) is predicted to be preferred because its form better reflects the 
type of processing used for expressions with conventional vehicle terms. Supporting 
these predictions, Bowdle and Gentner (2005) found that conventionality ratings were 
positively correlated with participants’ metaphor preference ratings. More specifically, 
participants reported preference for reading a topic-vehicle pair as a metaphor when the 
vehicle had a high conventionality level, but as a simile when the conventionality level 
was low.  
Parallel Theories of Metaphor Processing: Graded Saliency Hypothesis 















two key manners. First, the literality continuum, which predicts literal meanings will be 
activated faster than figurative meanings, is replaced with a saliency continuum, such that 
reading a given word will activate salient properties. Crucially, these salient properties 
are not necessarily "literal". The saliency of a specific property for a given word is 
predicted to develop over time and be related to variables such as frequency, 
conventionality, familiarity, and prototypicality. 4 In this manner, the graded-saliency 
hypothesis is like direct theories because it does not make the assumption the initially 
activated meaning will activate related literal properties. Unlike direct theories of 
metaphor, however, the graded saliency hypothesis does not predict context will impact 
lexical access. Instead, as demonstrated in Figure 1C, lexical access is predicted to be 
modular (Fodor, 1983). Contexual information, however, is predicted to activate 
meanings (i.e., salient properties) that are not necessarily the same ones activated by a 
given word in one of two possible manners. For example, context could activate a salient 
property through priming within the lexical module (i.e., intralexical priming between 
words in the lexicon). Thus, when someone reads the sentence lawyers are sharks, the 
word lawyer would activate the salient property viciousness, and this property would be 
available when the person reads the word shark and forms an interpretation of the 
sentence. Context can also activate certain properties through cloze probability. For 
example, when reading a sentence such as Mary went outside to water the __________, it 
is possible the word flowers or lawn would be activated prior to reading the final word, 
and salient properties related to possibly flower or lawn would be active while the final 
                                                          
4 The variables affecting saliency, such as familiarity and conventionality, can be different for two 
individuals, due to factors including age and culture; thus, it is also possible for two individuals to have 
distinct salient meanings stored in the lexicon for a particular word. For example, for one individual the 





word is read, and all of these activated salient properties would be considered during the 
interpretation stage. Therefore, the graded saliency hypothesis assumes that both sources 
of information (lexical and contexual) are predicted to be used in parallel to generate the 
correct interpretation:  
Following Fodor's modular assumptions (1983), the Graded Salience Hypothesis (...) assumes that 
comprehension involves two distinct mechanisms that run in parallel, without interacting initially. 
One is bottom-up, sensitive only to (domain specific) linguistic stimuli; another is top-down 
involving inferential and integrative processes, susceptible to both linguistic and nonlinguisitc 
information. (Giora, Kotler, Shuval, & Fein, accepted, p.2). 
 Words stored within the lexicon are predicted to activate salient properties faster 
than less salient meanings, while a rich context can also activate a particular property 
which makes that interpretation itself salient within that context. Processing is expected 
to be fast whenever the correct interpretation matches either the salient properties that 
were activated by either the given words or the context. For example, in the results found 
by Ortony et al. (1978), the salient interpretation for the hens clucked noisily was 
presumably interpreting hens as referring to actual birds; thus, needing to interpret hens 
as people might be confusing and require longer processing time. When contextual 
support is rich, however, such that it readily primes a salient interpretation that would 
normally not be derived out of context, then that interpretation can be as fast as that 





Direct Theories of Metaphor Processing and Categorization Theory 











 Some researchers have argued that the context itself is what determines how 
lexical access will occur, as demonstrated in Figure 1D. Similar to the arguments made 
by Ortony et al. (1978), contextual support rather than literality itself is what determines 
ease of comprehension. Furthermore, rather than assuming extra processes are required 
for obtaining a metaphorical meaning, a single comprehensive mechanism is assumed to 
be sensitive to both linguistic and non-linguistic information for determining the correct 
meaning of any given sentence. Context is able to "selectively access appropriate 
meanings while blocking incompatible albeit salient ones" (p.145, Giora, 2008). When 
the context is rich and supportive, comprehension is expected to be fast and easy, 
whereas an unsupportive context would cause comprehension to be slower and more 
difficult.  
 The Underspecification Model (Frisson & Pickering, 2001), for example, assumes 





the word's associated established senses.5 For example, the verb to paint has one sense 
where it refers to applying paint to surface, and another sense where painting is being 
done artistically. When the word "paint" is read within a sentence, both of these senses 
would be activated simultaneously. Similarly, different literal and metaphorical 
interpretations (e.g., Vietnam the country in the sentence I went on vacation last summer 
to Vietnam versus the war movement in I protested last summer about Vietnam are 
assumed to also reflect different senses that are activated when a given word (e.g., 
Vietnam) is read. When a particular word is read, it is assumed to activate an unspecified 
meaning that subsequently activates all related senses (both literal and figurative).6 
Context is subsequently able to determine which sense is appropriate for the given 
context. Therefore, similar to Ortony's interactionst approach, the underspecification 
model assumes that context indicates which sense is most valid for interpretation: "the 
processor is subsequently able to refine this meaning on the basis of contextual 
information so that it can ultimately correspond to a particular sense" (p.159).  
 The Underspecification model leaves vague how context does determine the 
correct sense, and how the lexicon is able to hold a large number of related senses for 
each word. The main piece of evidence is the finding that words with a single salient 
sense (e.g., Finland) take longer to read in non-supportive contexts (A lot of Americans 
protested during Finland, but in the end this did not alter the president's decision) than 
contexts that prime a salient related sense (e.g., During my trip, I hitchhiked around 
                                                          
5 The Underspecification Model deals only with "established senses" rather than novel interpretations 
of a word. Established senses have been conventionalized and are part of a person's lexical knowledge 
(Frisson & Pickering, 2001). 
6 Words with multiple meanings are different from words with multiple senses. Words with multiple 
meanings are homonyms, such as bank, where it can refer to either the lakeside or a financial institution. In 
contrast, words with multiple senses are words such "to paint" which can refer to painting for the 





Finland, but in the end I decided to rent a car for a couple of days.), whereas words with 
multiple salient senses (e.g., Vietnam) have similar reading times when the context 
support either of these salient senses (e.g., During my trip, I hitchhiked around Vietnam, 
but in the end I decided to rent a car for a couple of days vs. A lot of Americans protested 
during Vietnam, but in the end this did not alter the president's decision). While such 
results do suggest that words are read faster when the context primes a salient sense 
related to a given word, they do not demonstrate evidence for the presence of 
underspecified meanings in the lexicon, nor, as mentioned, explain how the process itself 
selects the correct sense for a given context, nor how the process handles multiple words 
have a larger number of senses. Instead, the results are simply consistent with the idea 
that processing a word with multiple senses is easier when the context is supportive, or 
when the related sense for the correct interpretation of a given sentence is salient.    
 Relevance theories (c.f. Carston, 2002; Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 2008) also 
assume that how a particular word or sentence is interpreted largely depends on the 
context (e.g., relevance) and knowledge of the speaker and hearer. For example, the 
sentence The soup is boiling could be an indication to someone that the soup is too hot to 
try (assuming the person was just asked to try some); or, if someone was busy and not 
watching their soup, then the sentence the soup is boiling could be interpreted as a 
warning to the individual about the soup becoming overcooked. Crucially, it is not the 
words themselves that determine how a phrase or word will be interpreted: "the 
communicator produced a piece of evidence of her meaning - the ostensive stimulus - and 
the addressee infers the meaning from this piece of evidence and context" (Carston, 2002, 





personal knowledge and context, which determines how a sentence is ultimately 
interpreted.  
 Relevance theory assumes two central inferential processes: broadening and 
loosening. In broadening, a word with a restrictive sense is extended to refer to large 
number of items (e.g., kleenex for all types of tissue papers), whereas in narrowing, 
literalness is in some sense preserved (e.g., stating this is a kleenex to refer to tissue of the 
actual brand name). Note that broadening and loosening depend not on the words 
themselves, nor whether a phrase should be interpreted literally or figuratively (i.e., 
metaphors are not simply a special case of broadening). For example, if someone says 
their chiropractor is a magician to someone seeking a magician for their birthday party, 
then the sentence would be interpreted literally and the narrow sense of magician (the 
actual occupation) would be inferred. In contrast, if someone was complaining about 
back pain to a friend, and the friend replied my chiropractor is a magician, then the 
listener would be expected to broaden magician to include the sense of individuals who 
are able to do amazing feats.  
 Similar to other direct theories, relevance theory also does not consider metaphor 
processes to be particularly special. Instead, the processes of broadening and loosening 
are assumed for all forms of language: "the same inferential procedure is used in 
interpreting all these different types of utterance" (p.95). Therefore, relevance theory is a 
general theory of how people interpret language, rather than specifically how figurative 
language is processed. As remarked by Sperber and Wilson (2008): "when you compare 
metaphors to other uses of words, you find a bit more of this and a bit less of that, but 





 Glucksberg and colleagues in articulating their Categorization theory of metaphor 
similarly argue that no special processes are needed for metaphors other than those 
normally used for any given sentence. Also, unlike Career of Metaphor theory and other 
indirect theories of metaphor, Glucksberg and colleagues predict that obtaining a 
figurative meaning will not first require accessing the literal meaning. Instead, 
Glucksberg and Keysar (1979) argue that metaphors act like substitutes for categories 
without a lexical label. They note that basic-level units are commonly used to stand for 
categories: "all languages have names for basic level objects, but some do not have 
names for superordinate categories . . . the strategy of using the name of a prototypical 
category member to refer to a superordinate category that does not have a conventional 
name of its own appears in spoken languages" (p.409).  
 Glucksberg and Keysar (1979) argue metaphors such as my job is a jail function 
in a similar manner: "the category referred to as 'a jail' can be described by a list of 
distinguishing features, but it is difficult to enumerate these features exhaustively . . . by 
naming the category 'jail', 'my job' inherits those properties of 'jail' that can plausibly be 
attributed to 'my job. The words 'a jail' can refer either to a specific instant, 'jail', or to the 
class, 'jail'" (p.410). In other words, a word such as shark, when used in a nominal 
metaphor (i.e., X is Y), could refer to either the actual animal, or serve as an exemplar for 
the category of dangerous things because the vehicle is present in the "category" position 
(i.e., the vehicle position). Therefore, Categorization theory assumes vehicles are capable 
of attributing properties, even when they are not conventional category labels, because 
vehicles are assumed to have dual-reference: they can refer to either the literal 





has not been lexicalized (Glucksberg, 2003).  When a given vehicle is read, both 
meanings (the basic-level word and the category) would be activated in parallel, and 
context would determine if the literal entity or the abstract category is the more 
appropriate meaning for interpretation. For example, when reading great whites are 
sharks, the literal representation would be more appropriate, whereas the abstract 
category meaning would be the correct one for the metaphor lawyers are sharks.   
 Dual-reference allows Categorization theory to explain why previous studies 
found figurative language could be processed as fast as literal language (as discussed 
earlier). Because the literal and abstract representations are activated in parallel, the 
processing times needed for forming a literal or figurative interpretation are the same. 
Categorization Theory predicts, however, that people will inhibit certain properties when 
processing a metaphor. For example, the properties gills and dorsal fin would be 
inhibited when interpreting the metaphor lawyers are sharks. Categorization theory also 
predicts that ease of comprehension will be determined by how easily one can perceive 
the properties of the vehicle (i.e., the category being represented) as also being true of the 
topic in the metaphor. More specifically, determining the relevant topic-vehicle 
relationship is predicted to be easier when the metaphor is apt. Chiappe and Kennedy 
(1999) define aptness as the extent to which the vehicle term captures salient properties 
of the topic. For example, people generally consider the sentence politics is a jungle as 
more apt than politics is a beach because the salient properties of jungle (i.e., difficulty, 
trouble, danger) are considered truer of politics than the salient properties associated with 
beach (i.e., relaxation, fun, enjoyment). Support for Categorization theory’s prediction 





earlier, for example, Blasko and Connine (1993) reported that related figurative 
properties were activated as fast as related literal properties when the metaphors were 
highly apt, even if the metaphors themselves were not highly familiar.  
 Jones and Estes (2006) noted that studies finding support for conventionality as a 
significant predictor of reading times (e.g., Bowdle & Gentner, 2005) had not controlled 
for the aptness levels of the statements, which is problematic because higher 
conventionality ratings are often positively correlated with higher aptness ratings (e.g., 
Chiappe, Kennedy, and Chiappe, 2003; Thibodeau & Durgin, 2011). Therefore, it can be 
difficult to determine whether faster processing times is more related to higher levels of 
aptness or if they are related to conventionality when one of the variables is not included 
in the study. To circumvent these problems, Jones and Estes compared the processing 
times for statements that were similar in conventionality, but different in aptness. For 
example, both beavers are lumberjacks and termites are lumberjacks would be assumed 
to have the same conventionality level because the vehicle term in both sentences is 
lumberjacks. Beavers are lumberjacks is a more apt statement, however, because 
properties associated with lumberjacks (e.g., cutting down wood) is more salient for 
beavers than for termites. By comparing the reading times for these types of expressions, 
Jones and Estes were able to carefully control for the effects of conventionality and 
aptness in their reading times. 
 Whereas Career of Metaphor theory would predict no processing time differences 
for metaphors with the same vehicle term, Jones and Estes (2006) found that more apt 
metaphors were read faster than less apt metaphors. Glucksberg and Haulght (2006a) 





that many of the items labeled as non-conventional by Bowdle and Gentner were also not 
very apt. In summary, these results suggest that previous studies which attributed faster 
processing times to higher conventionality levels may have reflected an actual aptness 
effect that had not been examined in the study.  
 The metaphor preference results found by Bowdle and Gentner (2005) may have 
also reflected an aptness effect. Chiappe, Kennedy, and Smykowsky (2003) found a 
significant positive correlation between aptness ratings and participants’ metaphor 
preference ratings—similar to the results found by Bowdle and Gentner (2005) for 
conventionality ratings. Participants reported preferring reading topic-vehicle pairs as 
metaphors when the topic-vehicle relationship was viewed as apt (e.g., time is money), 
but preferred the topic-vehicle pair as a simile when the relationship was not considered 
apt (e.g., a tree is an umbrella). Chiappe, Kennedy, and Chiappe (2003) used 
commonality analysis to compare conventionality and aptness ratings as predictors of 
metaphor preference ratings. Aptness ratings were found to explain more unique variance 
than conventionality ratings, which suggests that aptness as opposed to conventionality is 
a better predictor of participants’ metaphor preference ratings.  
 Finally, regarding how metaphors and similes are interpreted, Glucksberg and 
colleagues (e.g., Glucksberg & Haught, 2006a, 2006b) have argued that the vehicle refers 
to a literal representation in similes, but a more abstract category in metaphors. In this 
manner, both Categorization theory and Career of Metaphor theory predict that similes 
will be interpreted as literal comparisons. Categorization theory, however, predicts that 
even metaphors whose vehicles have no conventional figurative meaning will produce a 





predicts that all metaphors will produce figurative interpretations, whereas similes are 
predicted to produce literal interpretations. Glucksberg and Haught (2006a) presented 
evidence supporting this prediction. They found that participants listed more figurative 
properties (e.g., brilliant) for metaphors (e.g., ideas are diamonds), but more literal 
properties for the simile (e.g., shiny for ideas are like diamonds). Glucksberg and Haught 
also wrote paragraphs reflecting more literal or figurative properties for a particular 
vehicle term (e.g., old shark), and asked participants whether the paragraph reflected 
more the metaphor or simile version of the topic-vehicle pair (e.g., my lawyer is an old 
shark vs. my lawyers is like an old shark). Participants reported that the paragraph with 
more figurative properties better matched the metaphor statement (e.g., cunning in the 
paragraph for my lawyers was an old shark), whereas the paragraph with more literal 
properties was viewed as better matching the simile sentence (e.g., slow in the paragraph 
for my lawyer was an old shark because being more slow is a tendency of older animals). 
 In summary, numerous theories have discussed what sort of meaning might be 
initially activated when a metaphor is read, and the consequences of this initially 
activated meaning for metaphor comprehension. More specifically, the hypothesis is that 
metaphors should be require more processing than comparable literal statements. Note 
also that this discussion of metaphor comprehension has often focused on a comparison 
of metaphors to similes: whether metaphors are understood as similes to obtain the 
intended figurative meaning. Few studies, however, have examined what specific 
properties are actually brought to mind when metaphors are read compared to similes. In 
Chapter 2, we asked participants to produce property lists to examine to what extent 





studies have examined whether metaphors or comparable literal sentences take longer to 
read, most of these results reflect full sentence reading time. An examination focused at 
the vehicle position could be more sensitive to differences in metaphor-simile processing. 
We did so using a moving window paradigm in Chapter 3, and with eye tracking in 
Chapter 4 to produce results reflecting the vehicle region only. Finally, the study of 
metaphor in a population known to have impaired cognitive abilities could provide 
insight into which specific processes are used for metaphor, and what abilities become 
impaired or preserved in different cognitive impaired populations. Towards this goal, 
Chapter 5 asked probable Alzheimer’s Disease patients to interpret metaphors and 
similes, while also also examining which factors influence metaphor and simile 
comprehension. 
The Present Thesis 
 The series of studies presented in this thesis are used to test predictions from 
Career of Metaphor theory and Categorization theory regarding the processing and 
interpretation of metaphors and similes. Specifically, to what extent are metaphors 
processed and interpreted like equivalent similes (i.e., when the topic and vehicle terms 
are the same); and second, what variables (aptness or conventionality) best predict 
metaphor comprehension ease and processing time. The results found will help us 
examine whether figurative language processing is occasionally an indirect process, as 






Outline of the Chapters 
 Chapter 2 compares participants’ interpretations of metaphors and similes, and 
collects data for multiple variables thought to affect metaphor processing (e.g., aptness 
and conventionality). This study informs us to what extent metaphors and similes are 
semantically distinct, and more specifically, whether any differences observed can be 
considered a figurative-literal distinction. In Chapter 2, we also compared the frequency 
of metaphors and equivalent similes written by individuals on the Internet. The collected 
ratings were correlated with the Internet data to examine whether aptness, 
conventionality, interpretive diversity, or familiarity ratings could predict when people 
preferred writing a topic-vehicle pair as a metaphor or as a simile. Career of Metaphor 
theory predicts the metaphor form will be preferred when the vehicle term has a high 
conventionality rating, while categorization theory predicts the metaphor form will be 
preferred when the aptness level of the expression is high.  
 Chapters 3 and 4 both compare the online processing of metaphor and simile 
statements. Chapter 3 did so using self-paced reading in a moving-window paradigm, 
while Chapter 4 used eye tracking. One advantage to using eye tracking is the ability to 
record measurements other than processing time (e.g., number of regressions, saccade 
lengths). These measurements could suggest that distinct processing takes place, even 
when processing times for the two expressions are comparable. The self-paced reading 
studies also examined whether expressions rated more apt or conventional would have 
faster vehicle reading times. Whereas Career of Metaphor theory predicts that higher 
conventionality ratings will be associated with faster reading times, Categorization theory 





 Lastly, Chapter 5 examines metaphor and simile comprehension in people with 
Alzheimer’s Disease (AD). It has been reported that people diagnosed with AD have 
difficulty understanding figurative language, although variables related to the statement 
(e.g., familiarity) can impact whether interpretation is good or poor (Amanzio, 
Geminiani, Leotta, & Cappa, 2008). In this study, we examined aptness, in addition to 
familiarity, as a predictor for when people with AD would provide good interpretations of 
metaphors. Categorization theory predicts that more apt expressions will be more easily 
interpreted; thus, AD patients could show good interpretation for metaphors rated apt. We 
also examined whether participants’ interpretations would be similar or different for 
comparable metaphors and similes (e.g., music is medicine vs. music is like medicine). 
 Because the topic-vehicle pairs in metaphors and similes are the same, lexical 
effects are controlled when comparing these expressions. Also, because Categorization 
theory and Career of Metaphor theory predict that similes will be understood as literal 
comparisons, comparing the processing and interpretation of metaphor and simile 
statements allows us to examine processing for comparable figurative and literal 






Chapter 2: Ratings, Frequency Counts, and Interpretations for 84 Metaphors and Similes 
 









Interpretive diversity scores and ratings of aptness, familiarity, and conventionality were 
determined for 84 topic-vehicle pairs (e.g., life-journey) as metaphors (life is a journey) 
and as similes (life is like a journey). Participants also provided properties elicited by 
these statements, as well as the topic and vehicle terms in isolation. Metaphors were 
found to activate more salient properties than similes. We also tested the ratings as 
theoretical predictors for when participants preferred reading topic-vehicle pairs as 
metaphors and when they appeared more often as metaphors on the Internet. In both 
cases, aptness was found to be the most important predictor. These different results have 
implications for theories of metaphor, as they are more consistent with Categorization 
theory (Glucksberg, 2008) than with Career of Metaphor theory (Gentner & Bowdle, 
2008). Collected Norms might be used in psycholinguistic studies to investigate the 





 Metaphors and similes relate a topic (such as lawyers) to a vehicle (such as 
sharks). In contrast to metaphors (e.g., lawyers are sharks), similes include a word such 
as like before the vehicle (e.g., lawyers are like sharks). Examining whether these 
expressions are interpreted and processed similarly has been a major question in multiple 
theories of figurative language (Gibbs, 2008). In addition to type of expression (metaphor 
or simile), psycholinguistic studies have found that multiple variables are important 
factors for how a metaphor is comprehended (Giora, 2003) and when a metaphor is used 
(Pierce & Chiappe, 2008). We collected ratings of aptness, conventionality, and 
familiarity for 84 topic-vehicle pairs when written as metaphors, and when written as 
similes. We also collected norms on what properties were brought to mind when 
participants read these metaphors and similes. A similar procedure was done for the topic 
and vehicle terms in isolation. Our main goal was to provide ratings and property norms 
that could facilitate future studies that include metaphor or simile sentences in their 
studies. We begin by briefly reviewing how these variables have been discussed by 
different metaphor theories.  
Career of Metaphor Theory and the Role of Conventionality  
 The so-called Standard Pragmatic Model (e.g., Grice, 1975; Searle, 1979) 
proposes a possible serial model of language processing, whereby figurative meaning is 
obtained after a statement is identified as being literally false.  Such a model reflects the 
assumption that metaphors violate conversational maxims (Grice, 1975) and trigger 
processes not used for the interpretation of literal language. For example, a metaphor 
(cities are jungles) would be processed in three stages. First, there would be an attempt to 





followed by a realization that the statement is false (i.e. not literally true) because cities 
are not actually jungles. After it is realized that the expression’s sentence meaning is not 
literal, a search for an alternative meaning begins (speaker’s meaning; Searle, 1979). A 
commonly proposed strategy was to understand a metaphor as a comparison (i.e., simile; 
Davidson, 1979). For example, to understand the metaphor cities are jungles, someone 
would understand the statement as a simile (cities are like jungles) and subsequently 
engage in a thought process of which properties of jungles are also true of cities.
 Gentner and Bowdle extended the arguments that metaphors engage comparative 
processes in their Career of Metaphor theory (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Genter & 
Bowdle, 2008; Gentner & Wolff, 1997). Gentner and Bowdle argue that novel metaphors 
also initiate a comparative process, whereby novel metaphors are also understood as 
similes as defined by the computational structure-mapping theory (Gentner, 1983).  First, 
an alignment stage determines what properties are shared between the topic and the 
vehicle. For example, to understand a sentence such as rage is a volcano, the different 
predicates (associated properties) of rage and volcano would be matched and placed in 
parallel correspondence in a symmetric alignment process. Next, properties related to the 
vehicle are projected onto the topic. In this manner, the metaphor rage is a volcano 
would be understood as an analogy: rage is explosive just as volcanoes are explosive. In 
this case, rage and volcano are understood as having the shared relation explosive.  
 According to Career of Metaphor theory, vehicle conventionality is the most 
important predictor for how easily a metaphor is comprehended (Bowdle & Gentner, 
2005). Vehicle conventionality is defined as the strength of association between a vehicle 





mind that Jim is unique because the term snowflake is related to the concept uniqueness. 
In contrast, Jim is a binder is harder to interpret because binder has no strongly 
associated figurative meaning (Gentner & Bowdle, 2008).  
 Vehicles are thought to acquire their conventional figurative meanings from being 
used in comparative statements. For example, a term such as blockbuster, as in the 
sentence that movie was a blockbuster, would have originally acquired its figurative 
meaning from speakers often expressing the vehicle within a simile (i.e., that movie is 
like a blockbuster). From people engaging in this comparative process for similes, a 
particular figurative meaning for the vehicle eventually becomes dominant (i.e., 
conventional). This dominant meaning is then lexicalized and stored in memory. It is at 
this stage that a vehicle is considered to have an associated conventional meaning.  
 One processing consequence for conventional vehicles is that the comparative 
processing required for vehicles with no conventional meaning can now be replaced with 
categorical processing where the vehicle simply predicates a figurative meaning onto the 
topic. This figurative meaning is retrieved directly from memory, and the projection of 
this meaning onto the topic is considered easier than the alignment of properties that 
occurs during comparative processing. Consistent with this argument, studies have found 
that conventional metaphors are read faster than less conventional metaphors (Blank, 
1988, Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Gentner & Wolff, 1997; Giora, 1997).  
Categorization Theory and the Role of Aptness 
 A major alternative to Career of Metaphor theory is Categorization theory 





must be interpreted literally first, and as a simile, it is argued that metaphors are 
understood as categorization statements. Also, whereas Career of Metaphor theory views 
categorization processing as possible only for metaphors with conventional vehicles 
(Gentner & Bowdle, 2008), Categorization theory predicts that all metaphors—
conventional or not—are understood as categorizations (Glucksberg, 2008). As 
mentioned above, a possible obstacle for interpreting a metaphor as a categorization 
statement is that the statement is literally false: lawyers are not sharks. Categorization 
theory’s solution is to view the vehicle not as the category label, but as an exemplar of a 
category whose label has not been lexicalized. In the case of lawyers are sharks, the 
vehicle term shark is used to refer to a category of predatory creatures. In turn, people 
comprehend lawyers are sharks as meaning that lawyers belong to the category of 
predatory creatures whose exemplar in this sentence is sharks. Therefore, how easily 
people comprehend metaphors is related to how easily they can construct this taxonomic 
relationship between a topic and a vehicle (Thibodeau & Durgin, 2011).  
 Categorization theory predicts that constructing the taxonomic relationship 
between the topic and vehicle is easier when metaphors are apt (Glucksberg, 2008). 
Chiappe and Kennedy (1999) defined aptness “as the extent to which a comparison 
manages to capture salient properties of the topic” (p.671). In other words, apt metaphors 
are taken to be those whose vehicle term by hypothesis activates many properties from 
memory that are also true of the topic. Activating properties that are salient for both the 
topic and the vehicle aids with establishing the categorical relationship, and makes 
comprehending metaphors easier. Specifically, categorization is easier when the created 





properties being attributed to the topic by the vehicle (Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990; 
Glucksberg, 1993; Jones & Estes, 2006). Supporting this prediction, multiple studies 
have found that the more apt a metaphor is, the faster its processing and comprehension 
(Blasko & Connine, 1993; Chiappe & Kennedy, 1999, Chiappe, Kennedy, & Chiappe, 
2003; Chiappe, Kennedy, & Smykowski, 2003; Glucksberg & McGlone, 1999; Jones & 
Estes, 2005; 2006).  
 Categorization theory also assumes that vehicles have dual-reference: serving as 
an exemplar of a superordinate category in metaphors, but referring to the literal 
representation in similes. For example, while shark would refer to a category of predatory 
creatures in a metaphor, it would refer to the literal fish in a simile. Hasson, Estes, and 
Glucksberg (2001) found support for this prediction when they asked participants to write 
paraphrases of metaphor and simile statements. Paraphrases for similes such as ideas are 
like diamonds elicited more literal properties related to the vehicle (e.g., shiny). 
Glucksberg and Haught (2006a) found further support when they asked participants 
whether a paragraph, written to reflect more literal properties of a vehicle term (e.g., 
shark), was closer to the meaning of the metaphor lawyers are sharks or the simile 
lawyers are like sharks. Participants generally chose the simile form as better reflecting 
the paragraph. 
Familiarity 
 Familiarity with a given metaphor would presumably make processing easier, 
reflecting the general effect that practice with any particular task typically leads to faster 
processing; thus, shortening the time required for that particular task. Consistent with this 





metaphors (e.g., Blasko & Briihl, 1997, Blasko & Briihl, 1997; Blasko & Connine, 
1993). For example, Blasko and Briihl’s eye tracking study found faster reading times for 
familiar metaphors compared to less familiar ones. This difference suggests the novel 
metaphors required more effortful processing than the familiar metaphors. Gentner and 
Bowdle (2008) and Glucksberg (2008), however, argue that aptness and conventionality 
are actually more important variables than familiarity because they make metaphor 
comprehension permissible even when the expressions are novel.  
 Familiarity and conventionality are not the same variable; thus, more familiar 
metaphors are not necessarily more conventional. Familiarity ratings refer to a specific 
expression (e.g., time is money) whereas conventionality ratings refer to the vehicle word 
only (money). Gentner and Bowdle (2008) argue that conventionality is more important 
than familiarity. For example, one may not be familiar with the metaphor computers are 
drugs, however, because drug has the conventional figurative meaning of addiction, the 
metaphor computers are drugs can be interpreted as meaning that computers are 
addictive. 
Glucksberg (2003, 2008) has argued that aptness is more important than 
familiarity for metaphor comprehension. Similar to arguments made by Gentner and 
Bowdle (2008), Glucksberg argues that metaphors, even when not familiar, can be 
correctly and easily interpreted if the statements are apt. For example, the metaphor 
music is medicine is perhaps not very familiar, but participants typically find this 
metaphor apt and easy to comprehend (i.e., that music is soothing). Blasko and Connine 
(1993) also found results supporting the argument that aptness is more important than 





access figurative meanings as quickly as literal meanings after viewing a metaphor prime 
when the primes were familiar. This result held, however, even when the metaphors were 
not familiar, if the metaphors were particularly apt.  
Interpretive Diversity 
 Interpretive diversity is calculated using Shannon’s (1948) formula for estimating 
the entropy of a given source, that is, the amount of information (and thus, uncertainty) 
that a source generates: 
H () =-Σ p (xi) log2 p (xi) 
where H(X) is the entropy value at source X, and p(xi) is a range of possibilities (x1, x2, 
x3…) not all of which have the same probability of occurrence. The formula then, serves 
to calculate the overall probability of a given event (in fact, a message), when there are 
several possible outcomes, each with its own probability of occurrence. While discussion 
of the specifics of the mathematical equation goes beyond the scope of the present article, 
it provides us with the means for calculating how properties elicited in the present 
Normative study may shed light on how metaphors and similes might be interpreted. 
 Utsumi (2005, 2007) was the first to apply this formula to the study of metaphor 
by calculating the values associated with properties (thus, the probability values 
associated with each possibility x1, x2, x3…), which supposedly are activated from 
memory when people process a particular expression. Values of interpretive diversity 
take maximal value when there are many equally salient properties, while taking a 
minimum value 0 if one salience is dominant to all others (i.e., only one dominant 





greater values of interpretive diversity would reflect a larger amount of equally salient 
properties being activated. Therefore, if a topic-vehicle pair evokes three salient 
properties, while only one is activated for another topic-vehicle pair, the first pair would 
have a larger interpretive diversity score. If two expressions evoke an equal number of 
properties, however, then the expression whose salient properties are more similarly 
salient would be the one greater in interpretive diversity. These scores can be informative 
regarding the number of properties an expression activates and the saliency differences 
among these properties.  
 To date, only two studies by Utsumi have investigated the role of interpretive 
diversity in metaphor interpretation. Utsumi (2005) collected interpret-diversity ratings 
for a small set of topic-vehicle pairs, and found that pairs with greater interpretive 
diversity were comprehended more easily, especially when the metaphors produced a 
poetic effect (i.e., an appreciation for the meaning of the metaphor). In the second study, 
Utsumi (2007) found that metaphors rated more apt and familiar had higher interpretive 
diversity scores, but the vehicle words in these metaphors did not have higher 
conventionality ratings.  Therefore, these results suggest that metaphors with higher 
levels of interpretive diversity are also more apt and more easily comprehended. It should 
be noted, however, that Utsumi’s studies used Japanese metaphors. This is the first study 
to collect interpretive diversity ratings for English metaphors.  
Normative Study 
 The purpose of this study is to report ratings of aptness, conventionality, 
familiarity, and interpretive diversity on 84 topic-vehicle pairs when read as metaphors (x 





when read in isolation. We also examined to what extent metaphor and simile expressions 
were similar on the different ratings and property lists collected. Categorization theory 
and Career of Metaphor theory make different predictions for the property lists of 
metaphors and similes. Career of Metaphor theory (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Gentner & 
Bowdle, 2008) assumes that metaphor vehicles gain their figurative meaning from the use 
of the vehicle word in simile expressions. Therefore, this theory predicts metaphors and 
similes with the same vehicle word should elicit the same properties because the vehicle 
consistently activates the same salient properties from memory. Support for this 
prediction was found when Chiappe and Kennedy (2000) asked participants to list the 
number of properties they felt each metaphor and simile statement was expressing. 
Consistent with Career of Metaphor theory, metaphors and similes were found to activate 
a similar number of properties.  
 A different prediction is made by Categorization theory because dual-reference 
predicts that the vehicle activates literal properties in similes, but figurative and literal 
properties in metaphors (Hasson, Estes, & Glucksberg, 2001; Glucksberg & Haught, 
2006a; Glucksberg & Haugh, 2006b). Evidence supporting this prediction in the present 
study would be a larger number of properties for metaphors compared to similes. To test 
the prediction that similes would activate more literal features, we attempted to measure 
the degree to which elicited properties were literal or figurative by asking participants to 
rate the property’s connotativeness.  
 Connotative properties are seen as reflecting more emergent properties, whereas 
denotative properties are those that reflect more literal properties (Danesi, 1998). For 





Participants rated each of the salient properties elicited from metaphors and similes on 
the extent to which it reflected a denotative or connotative property of the vehicle. From 
these ratings, we were able to measure to what extent metaphor and simile expressions 
evoked connotative or denotative properties. If similes do activate more literal properties 
than metaphors, then higher ratings of connotativeness would be expected for the 
properties written for metaphor versions of topic-vehicle pairs.  
Method 
Participants 
 A total of 280 Concordia University undergraduate students received credit 
towards a Psychology course or monetary compensation for participation in the study. All 
participants were native speakers of English.  
Stimuli 
 The stimuli consisted of 84 topic-vehicle pairs written as metaphor and simile 
sentences. Sixty-six of these topic-vehicle pairs have been used in previous research 
(Chiappe, Kennedy, & Chiappe, 2003; Roncero, Kennedy, & Smyth, 2006). An effort 
was made to collect further expressions not previously investigated in empirical research. 
Consistent with the method used by Roncero et al. (2006), the search phrases common 
metaphor, common simile, an example of a metaphor is, and an example of a simile is 
were typed into the Google search engine. Possible topic-vehicle pairs were then 
accepted if they produced a minimum total of three metaphor and simile statements 





Collection of Properties  
 Sixty participants were given a booklet that contained the metaphors, similes, or 
the topic and vehicle terms in isolation. Twenty participants received a booklet 
containing metaphors, and 20 participants received a booklet containing similes only. For 
each expression listed in the booklet, participants were asked to list three properties that 
they felt the vehicle word was expressing about the topic. For example, participants could 
have written the properties soothing, healing, and enjoyable for the metaphor music is 
medicine. Three separate lines were written below each expression, and participants were 
asked to list each property on a separate line. This manipulation allowed us to measure 
whether a property had been written first (on the top line), second (on the middle line), or 
third (on the final line).  
 An additional 20 participants received a booklet containing a list of words, which 
were a topic or vehicle words written in isolation (e.g., money from the metaphor time is 
money). Participants were asked to list properties related to the each word. For example, 
for the word money, participants could have written the properties valuable and green. 
However, because these words presented in isolation may be interpreted more literally 
than when presented in metaphors and similes, we were concerned that participants might 
only write literal properties (e.g., green for money) if they were restricted to listing only 
three properties. To obtain a wide range of properties for each topic and vehicle term in 
isolation, we allowed and encouraged participants to list up to 10 properties for each 
word listed in the booklet.  
 For each expression, we tabulated how often a property was listed for each 





example, although strong and powerful might reflect similar meanings, there are also 
semantic differences between these words. Collapsing the ratings for semantically similar 
words can reduce the amount of variation inherent in the set of properties elicited. We 
restricted collapsing responses to when words shared the same morphological root (e.g., 
sleep and sleepiness). By tabulating how often the different properties were listed, we 
were able to determine the most commonly listed properties for each metaphor and 
simile, as well as for each topic and vehicle words in isolation. An associated saliency 
rating was also determined for each property by checking if the property was listed first, 
second, or third by the participant. A property was given a score of one, if written first, 
two if written second, and three if written third. Therefore, properties more often written 
first would have an associated saliency rating average closer to one. These associated 
saliency ratings were used to calculate the interpretive diversity score of each expression, 
and which properties would be used for the conventionality and connotativeness ratings.  
Conventionality Ratings 
 The property listed most frequently for each expression was the one used for 
determining the conventionality rating of a metaphor and simile expressions. When 
several properties were equally the most frequent, we chose the one with the lower 
associated saliency rating (i.e., the one whose average was closer to one). Twenty 
participants then rated the conventionality of the most frequently generated property for 
each vehicle when read within metaphors, while another twenty participants received the 
same list of vehicle words, but the properties generated most frequently for vehicles when 
read within similes.  Consistent with past studies (e.g., Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Gentner 





association between a concept (the vehicle word) and a specific figurative meaning (the 
most frequently listed property for that vehicle). More specifically, participants received 
a booklet that contained the vehicles and an associated property from either the metaphor 
or simile, and were asked how common it was to use that vehicle to express the listed 
property. For example, addiction was found to be the most salient property for love is a 
drug, and thus in the conventionality booklet participants were asked to what extent the 
word drug is used to convey addiction is statements such as x is a drug. A scale was then 
presented asking participants to give a rating from one (not at all conventional) to ten 
(very conventional). 
Connotativeness Ratings 
 In order to examine whether metaphors or similes elicit more literal properties, we 
examined to what extent properties reflected connotative features. We considered 
properties salient when they were reported by at least 25% the participants sampled, and 
will hereafter refer to such properties as salient properties. Eight metaphors (9.5%) and 
13 similes (15.4%) had no properties reaching this salience level. Therefore, connotative 
ratings were collected for only 68 metaphors and similes.  
 We created a booklet containing, for each vehicle word, a list of the associated 
salient properties produced for the metaphors and similes. Participants were asked to rate 
to what extent each property reflected either a connotative or denotative property of that 
vehicle on a scale ranging from one to five, where one was labelled strictly denotative, 
two as more denotative than connotative, three as both denotative and connotative, four 





 Because connotativeness can be a difficult variable to rate, we used a large sample 
size of 100 participants to collect these ratings. Furthermore, the difference between a 
denotative and a connotative property was explained to the participants by means of a 
short quiz, to ensure they understood the distinction. In the quiz, they were asked if 
rectangular and artistic were connotative or denotative properties of painting, and if fur 
and playful were connotative or denotative properties of cat. Participants who correctly 
stated rectangular was a more denotative property for painting, while artistic was more 
connotative, and that fur was more denotative for cat, whereas playful was more 
connotative, were allowed to give connotative ratings for the different properties. If a 
participant did not answer these quiz questions correctly, the concepts of connotativeness 
and denotativeness were explained again and they were given a third quiz question where 
they were asked if hairy and aggressive were more denotative or connotative properties 
of people. Participants who correctly answered hairy as more denotative, but aggressive 
as more connotative, were then allowed to give ratings for properties. If an incorrect 
answer was again given, the participant was excused from the study. Four participants 
were excused from the study because they failed this final quiz.  
Aptness and Familiarity Ratings 
 In order to collect aptness ratings, two booklets were created: one that presented 
topic-vehicle pairs as metaphors (life is a journey), and one presenting topic-vehicle pairs 
as similes (life is like a journey). There was a scale ranging from one to ten beneath each 
statement with one labelled as not all apt and ten labelled very apt. Twenty participants 
received booklets that listed metaphors, while another 20 participants received booklets 





relationship between two terms, a topic and a vehicle, and their task was to rate how apt 
they found each statement by circling the number that reflected their rating. Participants 
were told that apt expressions were those where the second term, the vehicle, captured 
salient properties of the first term, the topic. Politics is a jungle was given as an example 
of an apt statement, whereas politics is a beach was given as an example of a less apt 
statement.  
 A similar procedure was used for collecting familiarity ratings. However, rather 
than presenting scales for aptness, scales were created for familiarity from one to ten, 
with one labelled not at all familiar and ten labelled very familiar. Forty additional 
participants received booklets that contained either metaphors or similes and were asked 
to circle the number that reflected how familiar they found each expression. Specifically, 
they were asked to report to what extent they had heard or read this statement in the past.  
Results 
Ratings 
 The metaphors had aptness ratings ranging from 1.65 to 9.22, with an average 
aptness rating of 5.95 (SD = 1.80). Aptness ratings for similes ranged from 2.04 to 9.52, 
with an average aptness rating of 5.69 (SD = 1.66). The aptness difference was significant 
(t (83) = 2.27, p < .05, r = .24), although the correlation between these ratings was also 
significant and large (r (84) = .82, p < .001). This result suggests that the aptness level 
for a given expression depends more on the topic and vehicle in that expression, rather 





 Familiarity scores for metaphors ranged from 1.1 to 10, with an average 
familiarity score of 4.2 (SD = 2.09). Familiarity scores for similes ranged from 1.12 to 
9.68, with an average rating familiarity score of 4.58 (SD = 2.23). The distribution for 
metaphor familiarity ratings was positively skewed (z = 2.49, p < .05), and metaphor 
familiarity ratings were significant on Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of normality (D (84) = 
.09, p < .05). Therefore, non-parametric tests were used for analyses that used metaphor 
familiarity ratings (i.e., Spearman correlations for correlations, and the Wilcoxon Signed-
rank test for comparisons). The correlation between metaphor and smile familiarity 
ratings was large and significant (rs (84) = .85, p < .001), although participants were 
found to give higher familiarity ratings for simile statements than for metaphor statement 
(T = 1154, p < .01, r = -.31).  
 Metaphor conventionality scores ranged from 1.70 to 9.85 (M = 7.20, SD = 1.87), 
while simile conventionality scores ranged from 2.12 to 9.94 (M = 7.40, SD = 1.86). Both 
conventionality ratings were found to be negatively skewed (metaphor ratings, z = -3.37, 
p < .01; simile ratings, z = -3.47, p < .01) and both were significant on tests of normality 
(metaphors, D (84) = .16, p < .05; similes, D (84) = .16, p < .05); thus, we again used 
non-parametric tests for conventionality ratings. Conventionality ratings for metaphors 
and similes were not found to be significantly different (T = 1444, p = .13, r = -.17). A 
significant correlation was also found between the ratings (rs (84) = .34, p < .001). 
 To calculate interpretive diversity, we used the method outlined by Utsumi (2005, 
2007), placing  values into Shannon’s equation for entropy (H(X)=-Σ p(xi) log2 p(xi)). We 
counted the number of times a property was listed for a vehicle to create a list of 





with Utsumi (2007), we excluded those properties listed only once. All values were then 
plugged into Shannon’s entropy equation to determine an interpretive diversity value for 
each metaphor and simile. Metaphors were found to have interpretive diversity scores 
ranging from 3.10 to 5.52, with an average score of 4.49 (SD = .48). Similes were found 
to have interpretive diversity scores ranging from 2.89 to 5.52, with an average score of 
4.55 (SD = .47). The metaphor interpretive diversity ratings were positively skewed (z = 
2.01, p < .05) and significant on test of normality (D (84) = .11, p < .05). We used non-
parametric tests for analyses with interpretive diversity ratings. The difference between 
metaphor and simile interpretive diversity scores was not significant (T = 1559, p = .31, r 
= -.11), but the values for metaphors and similes were significantly related (rs (84) = .61, 
p < .01). 
 To allow for a theoretical discussion on how these measures could relate to each 
other, we collapsed the ratings across sentence type. This decision was motivated by the 
significant correlations (> .8) found for measure of aptness and familiarity, and the non-
significant differences found between metaphor and simile expressions on 
conventionality and interpretive diversity ratings. Spearman correlations were run on the 
mean ratings for each expression. The correlation between conventionality ratings and 
aptness ratings was not significant (rs (84) = .19, p = .09), but a significant correlation 
was found between conventionality and familiarity (rs (84) = .30, p < .05). The 
correlation between interpretive diversity scores and conventionality ratings was 
significant, but negative (rs (84) = -.36, p < .001). Therefore, the higher the 
conventionality rating for a vehicle, the lower the level of interpretive diversity 





diversity ratings (rs  = .09, p = .41), but a positive correlation was found with averaged 
familiarity ratings (rs (84) = .73, p < .001). Thus, more familiar expressions were also 
considered more apt. Lastly, there was no significant correlation between interpretive 
diversity ratings and familiarity ratings (rs = .19, p = .09).  The different ratings for 
metaphors and similes are presented in Table 2A of the Appendix. 
Properties 
 Participants wrote numerous properties for each metaphor and simile, as well as 
each topic and vehicle word in isolation (See Tables 2B and 2C in the Appendix). The 
average number of properties listed for metaphors per topic-vehicle was 8.15 (SD = 2.20), 
while the mean number of properties per topic-vehicle for similes was 7.93 (SD = 2.32). 
Both distributions were significant on tests of normality (metaphors D (84) = .11, p <.05; 
similes D (84) = .10, p < .05); thus, we compared these distributions using non-
parametric tests. The difference between metaphors and similes was not significant (T = 
37.11, p = .27). It is possible, however, that this lack of difference reflects participants 
being always encouraged to list three properties for metaphors and similes. Therefore, as 
was done for the connotativeness ratings, we restricted our comparison to salient 
properties: those listed by at least five individuals. Thus, only the salient properties for 68 
metaphor and simile expressions were compared to see whether metaphors or similes 
activated more salient properties. Metaphors elicited a mean of 1.95 salient properties (sd 
= .94), while the mean for simile elicited properties was 1.62 (sd = .84). The distribution 
of simile salient properties was positively skewed (z = 3.91, p < .01), and significant on 
tests of normality (D (68) = .23, p < .05); thus, non-parametric tests were used to 





metaphors did elicit more salient properties than similes (T = 176, p < .001, r = .39). We 
next examined whether the salient properties elicited by similes were more denotative 
than those written for metaphors. Salient properties for metaphors had a mean 
connotative rating of 3.05 (SD = .82), while salient properties for similes had a mean 
connotative rating of 3.01 (SD = .88). These distributions were found to be normal, and 
the difference was found to be not significant (t (70) = .64, p = .53). Therefore, the 
properties activated by similes were not found to be more denotative than those 
properties determined as salient for metaphors.  
 A significant correlation was found between the number of salient properties for 
metaphors and similes (rs (84) = .47, p < .001). Therefore, whenever a simile was 
associated with many salient properties, a large number was also found for the metaphor. 
To determine to what extent metaphor and similes had similar salient property lists, we 
gave metaphors and similes with the same topic-vehicle pair a match score. For example, 
if a simile had three salient properties, while the metaphor had four salient properties, 
three of which were those determined salient for the simile expression, then the 
comparison was given a match score of one. In contrast, if a simile had two salient 
properties, while the metaphor had three, and only one of these properties was also salient 
for the metaphor, then the comparison would receive a match score of 0.5 because only 
half of the salient properties in one were also present in the other. The same procedure 
was done for comparisons where the simile had more salient properties. If a metaphor 
had two salient properties, while the simile had three, but two of those three properties 
were the ones found salient for the metaphor, then the match score was one. In this 





elicited completely different salient properties, whereas an average match score closer to 
one would suggest the metaphors and similes activated a similar set. This procedure is 
similar to that used by Roberts and Kruez (1994) and Graeasser (1981). Comparing the 
salient properties for metaphors and similes in this study, the mean match score was 
found to be quite high: 0.83 (SD = .35), indicating that the salient properties activated by 
our metaphors and similes were very similar. Indeed, high match scores were found when 
the number of salient properties was low or high. For example, only one salient property 
was found for love is a drug and love is like a drug, but in both cases this property was 
addiction. Similarly, three salient properties were found for both Clouds are cotton and 
clouds are like cotton, and for both expressions these properties were round, soft, and 
fluffy.  
 Finally, we examined whether the properties activated by the metaphors and 
similes were more related to the properties related to the topic or the vehicle. The three 
most listed properties for each topic and vehicle term in isolation were compared to the 
three most listed properties for metaphors and similes. In cases where there was a tie for 
the third most frequent property, the property with the lower associated saliency rating 
was selected. Comparing the properties listed for each metaphor and simile, to those 
listed for each topic and vehicle term in isolation, a match score out of three was given 
for how many of the properties were common between the term (topic or vehicle) and the 
metaphor or simile. Therefore, scores closer to three represent 100% overlap, while 
scores closer to zero reflect minimal match. The mean match score between properties 
listed for metaphors and vehicles was 0.65 (SD = .63), and 0.40 (SD = 56) between 





.001; topics, D (84) = .40, p < .001). The Wilcoxon test found the match with vehicle 
properties was greater than that found for topics in metaphors (T (84) = 271, p < .05, r =-
.29). A similar pattern emerged for similes. The average match score between properties 
listed for similes and vehicles was 0.60 (SD = .68), and 0.39 (SD = .54) between similes 
and topics. The distributions were not normal (vehicles, D (84) = .31, p < .05; topics, D 
(84) = .40, p < .001). The comparison between simile-vehicle overlap scores to simile-
topic overlap scores was significantly different (T (84) = 240.50, p < .05, r =.25). 
Therefore, both metaphors and similes appear to activate properties more related to the 
vehicle term than to the topic.  
 The low overlap scores (< 1) between expressions and topic-vehicle terms in 
isolation suggest metaphor and similes activate properties not elicited by the topic and 
vehicle terms in isolation. To examine this hypothesis, we computed overlap scores 
between the three most frequent properties for each topic-vehicle pair as a metaphor to 
the three most frequent properties for similes. This comparison produced an averaged 
overlap score of 1.46 (SD = .84) for metaphors to similes, while the overlap score for 
similes to metaphors was 1.38 (SD = .83). These overlap scores were significantly larger 
than those found in comparison to vehicle properties (metaphors, T (84) = 200, p < .01, r 
= -.63; similes, T (84) = 112, p < .01; r = -.62). Therefore, both metaphors and similes 
produced emergent properties: properties not elicited when the topic and vehicle terms 






Metaphors versus Similes  
 We collected ratings for aptness, conventionality, and familiarity for topic-vehicle 
terms as metaphors and similes. We also collected property lists for each of these 
expressions, and from these property lists calculated interpretive diversity scores and 
collected connotativeness ratings. For the different ratings, metaphors and similes were 
highly comparable. While similes were rated significantly less apt than metaphors, and 
similes were rated significantly more familiar, the correlations between these ratings were 
high (>.8). Neither conventionality ratings nor interpretative diversity ratings were 
significantly different for metaphors and similes.  
 The lack of a conventionality difference between metaphors and similes is 
consistent with Career of Metaphor theory (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005), as we would 
expect expressions with the same vehicle term to have the same levels of vehicle 
conventionality. The null difference between metaphors and similes for interpretive 
diversity scores, however, is somewhat surprising. One might have predicted that similes, 
being interpreted as comparisons, would activate more properties than metaphors. One 
possible explanation is that the procedure of encouraging participants to list three 
properties for both metaphors and similes may have led participants to overly produce 
properties, even when the given properties were not promptly activated. Indeed, 
comparing property totals for metaphors and similes, no significant difference emerged. 
Because asking participants to always list three properties could have made the metaphor 
and simile properties totals similar, we narrowed our property comparison to those listed 





connotativeness ratings on these salient properties to see whether one expression 
produced a list of more connotative properties—which, by hypothesis, are more 
figurative. Metaphors were found to have produced more salient properties, but the levels 
of connotativeness were similar.  
 In summary, these results suggest that metaphors and similes are highly 
comparable. Finding more salient properties for metaphors, however, is consistent with 
Categorization theory’s argument that metaphor vehicles have dual-reference: the vehicle 
word is predicted to encode the literal base-term in similes, but both the base-term and an 
associated figurative category in metaphors (Glucksberg, 2003).  Although finding 
similar levels of connotativeness is inconsistent with the prediction that similes will elicit 
more literal properties (Glucksberg & Haught, 2006). Furthermore, the salient properties 
for metaphors and similes were often equivalent.  
 We did note specific examples, however, where the simile does seem to activate 
more literal properties, as predicted by Glucksberg and Haught (2006). For example, 
processors was the most frequent property for minds are like computers, but complicated 
was the most frequent property for minds are computers; and while red was a salient 
property for love is like heart, this property was less salient (<5) for love is a heart. We 
also observed cases where properties that were less frequent for the simile expression 
showed more saliency and frequency for the metaphor expression. For example, powerful 
was not very frequent for god is like fire, but was the most frequent property listed for 
god is fire. In summary, while there does appear to be a large amount of similarity 
between metaphors and similes, consistent with Career of Metaphor theory (Bowdle & 





to activate properties that are either not activated or have a lower saliency value for 
similes. In other words, reading a metaphor rather than a simile seems to make certain 
properties more salient.   
Ratings 
 Three significant correlations were found between the ratings: a positive 
relationship between conventionality and familiarity, a positive relationship between 
aptness and familiarity, and a negative relationship between conventionality and 
interpretive diversity. The positive correlation between conventionality and familiarity is 
consistent with Career of Metaphor theory’s argument that a figurative meaning 
attributed to a particular vehicle word becomes stronger the more often a vehicle word is 
used to convey that meaning over time.  
 Because interpretive diversity reflects to what extent a metaphor or simile is 
associated with many equally salient properties, the negative correlation between 
conventionality and interpretive diversity has implications for how vehicle 
conventionality could develop. Specifically, a vehicle word will be less likely to build a 
strong association with a specific property when there are other salient properties that 
compete to be associated with that vehicle term. For example, the property lists show 
examples of conventional vehicles where one property is dominant over all others: 
absorbent for memory is a sponge; addictive for love is a drug, slow for time is a snail, 
opening for Christ is a door, complex for minds are computers; protecting for trees are 
umbrellas, and hard for heart is a stone. But there are also several expressions where 





cotton; colourful and beautiful for love is a rainbow; flows and long for memory is a 
river. Therefore, while it is possible for one salient meaning to become associated with a 
vehicle term, some vehicles can bring many salient properties to mind.  
 The significant correlation between aptness and familiarity replicates the one 
found by Thibodeau and Durgin (2011). They interpreted their results as reflecting the 
fact that participants’ ratings for familiarity and aptness might not be fully independent. 
More specifically, familiar expressions are those that are presumably activated faster, and 
participants that view certain expressions as apt may be influenced by how easily 
properties related to that expression come to mind. However, it is also possible that 
certain expressions become familiar because they are considered good metaphors 
(Chiappe & Kennedy, 2000). People tell other individuals the metaphors they find apt, 
and in this manner, aptness breeds familiarity. Consequently, it can be generally expected 
that apt metaphors will also be familiar, and the positive correlation found here and in 
previous studies (e.g. Chaippe, Kennedy, & Chaippe, 2003) will be the typical finding. 
For these reasons, it can be difficult to determine to what extent ratings such as aptness 
and familiarity reflect different variables.  
 In order to further tease apart the variables collected in the present ratings, we 
conducted another study on the nature of metaphors and similes. More specifically, we 
were interested in evaluating our variables as predictors for the preference and production 
of metaphor or simile versions of particular topic-vehicle pairs. We reasoned that 
particular variables (e.g., familiarity and aptness) might predict the choice of a given pair 





Metaphor Preference Study 
 It has been suggested that metaphors convey more “force” than similes (Bowdle 
& Gentner, 2005; Chiappe & Kennedy, 2001; Ortony, 1979; Roberts & Kreux, 1994). 
Compare the metaphor I think Richard is a lion and the simile I think Richard is like a 
lion. The metaphor seems to express greater fortitude as it says that Richard is a lion. 
Chiappe and Kennedy (2001) argue that metaphors convey more strength because they 
are read as categorization statements. Stating that x is y conveys that x has all of the 
properties that are true of y, whereas stating x is like y implies that some, but not all of the 
properties related to y are also related to x. For example, a chemist would label something 
as water if it has all the necessary properties of water, whereas something like water 
would mean certain necessary properties might be absent. Therefore, people may choose 
to use a metaphor rather than a simile when they want to implicate that several salient 
properties are shared between the topic and the vehicle (Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990, 
1993).  
 As previously mentioned, Chiappe and Kennedy (1999, 2001) define the degree 
of salient properties shared by a topic and vehicle term as aptness. Because people are 
predicted to prefer the metaphor when they believe the topic and vehicle share many 
properties, more apt topic-vehicle pairs are predicted to be preferred as metaphors. That 
is, Chiappe and Kennedy predict more apt topic-vehicle pairs, it is predicted that the 
metaphor’s categorical form will be preferred because the categorical structure (x is y) 
suggests more topic-vehicle similarity than a comparison structure (x is like y). 
Consistent with this prediction, Chiappe and Kennedy (1999) found that the higher the 





Chiappe, Kennedy, & Chiappe, 2003; Chiappe, Kennedy, & Smykowski, 2003). Chiappe 
and Kennedy (2001) also found that the more participants judged the topic and vehicle 
words within a pair as similar, the more participants reported preferring those topic-
vehicle pairs as metaphors. These results are consistent with the argument that the 
metaphor is preferred when the topic and vehicle are seen as sharing many salient 
properties.  
 The major competitor to aptness as a predictor of metaphor preference has been 
vehicle conventionality as outlined by Career of Metaphor theory (Gentner & Wolff, 
1997, Bowdle & Gentner, 2005, Gentner & Bowdle, 2008). Bowdle and Gentner (2005), 
for instance, presented participants with topic-vehicle pairs and asked them whether they 
preferred the terms within a metaphor or a simile. Bowdle and Gentner assumed that 
participants would prefer the form that matched the categorical or comparative 
processing participants had used to interpret that topic-vehicle pair. Thus, if people 
comprehend more conventional metaphors as categorizations rather than comparisons, 
then they should also prefer reading the topic-vehicle pair as a metaphor because its 
categorical structure initiates categorical processing (“grammatical concordance”, 
Bowdle & Gentner, 2005). In contrast, when categorization is not possible because the 
vehicle is not conventional, a comparative process is needed and participants are 
predicted to prefer the simile structure because its structure initiates comparative 
processing. Consistent with the above predictions, topic-vehicle pairs with more 
conventional vehicles were preferred as metaphors rather than similes.  
 More recent studies, however, have cast doubts on Bowdle and Gentner’s (2005) 





induced more categorical processing. Participants first read a literal or figurative prime 
(that librarian is/saw a mouse) and then immediately asked participants whether the topic 
(librarian) was a non-, partial, or full member of the vehicle category (mouse). Category 
attribution was larger after figurative than literal primes, and also greater for more 
conventional metaphors than less conventional ones. However, this effect disappeared 
when aptness ratings were included as a covariate. Repeating the study with aptness 
ratings, category attribution was larger for more apt metaphors. These results suggest that 
aptness, rather than conventionality, promotes categorization and a preference for a 
metaphor rather than a simile.  
 It has also been determined that the novel metaphors used by Bowdle and Gentner 
(2005) were less apt than the conventional metaphors (Glucksberg & Haught, 2006a, 
Jones & Estes, 2006).  Therefore, the findings attributed to conventionality, could also be 
attributed to aptness, as the more conventional metaphors were also more apt than the 
less conventional metaphors (Glucksberg, 2008). In a follow-up study, Jones and Estes 
(2006) contrasted aptness and conventionality using items that carefully controlled for 
these variables. Metaphors had similar vehicles, but different topics (e.g., a rooster is an 
alarm clock versus a robin is an alarm clock). Because the vehicle is the same, the 
conventionality level is the same, but aptness is reduced when the salient meaning 
associated with the vehicle is a less salient property for that topic. For example, rooster is 
an alarm clock is more apt than a robin is an alarm clock because the relevant property 
(the sound of birds waking people in the morning) is a more salient property of roosters 
than of robins. Jones and Estes found aptness, not conventionality, predicted preference 





 Metaphor preference is generally collected from participants by presenting a 
metaphor along with an adjacent comparable simile statement, and asking participants to 
what extent they prefer the metaphor or the simile expression. Such metaphor preference 
ratings, however, could lack ecological validity because they may not capture how people 
actually use metaphors and similes on a general basis. More specifically, preference for 
reading a topic-vehicle pair as a metaphor may not predict whether someone will actually 
later produce that topic-vehicle pair as a metaphor when given the chance to do so. In 
order to circumvent these methodological problems, we decided to collect preference 
ratings using the classic method of gathering ratings from participants, but also used an 
additional source to determine when people prefer a topic-vehicle pair as a metaphor or a 
simile: Google search results. We counted how often people used a topic-vehicle pair as a 
metaphor or as a simile on the Internet to determine frequency counts for each topic-
vehicle pair as a metaphor and as a simile, and subtracted topic-vehicle counts from each 
other to create frequency difference scores. These scores served as our Internet version of 
the metaphor preference ratings from participants. We then examined if the metaphor 
preference ratings collected from participants could predict these frequency difference 
scores, and also ran regressions with both the metaphor preference ratings and frequency 
difference scores using the ratings collected in the Normative study (aptness, 
conventionality, familiarity, interpretive diversity). Running regressions with comparable 
data, one from participants and one with Internet frequency counts, allows us to examine 
to what extent our ratings collected in the laboratory can predict actual real world use.  
 Lastly, we were interested in extending the results reported by Roncero, Kennedy, 





metaphors. This result is consistent with participants’ reports that similes more often than 
metaphors are used to clarify an expressed relationship (Roberts & Kreuz, 1994). We 
checked for that result in the present study, but also ran correlations to see what type of 
expression was more likely to be followed by an explanation. We also checked if the 
explanations were being used to highlight salient or non-salient properties. To do this, we 
compared the properties expressed by explanations on the Internet to the properties 
collected in the Normative study.  
Method 
Participants 
 A total of 104 Concordia University students, all native speakers of English, were 
recruited to participate in the present preference ratings task. They all received course 
credit for participation. 
Stimuli 
 The same 84 topic-vehicle pairs from the Normative study were used in the 
present study.  
Ratings   
 For metaphor preference ratings, the 104 participants were presented with 
metaphors and similes beside each other and asked to what extent they preferred the form 
as a metaphor or as a simile. In the rating scale, 1 was labelled simile only, 2 was labelled 
simile more than metaphor, 3 was labelled no preference, 4 was labelled metaphor more 





averaged aptness ratings, averaged conventionality ratings, averaged familiarity ratings, 
and the averaged interpretive diversity ratings collected in the Normative study. 
Internet Productions and Explanations 
 The frequency counts for 84 metaphors and similes were obtained employing the 
method used by Roncero et al. (2006). Topic-vehicle pairs were written as metaphors 
(e.g., rage is a volcano) and similes (e.g., rage is like a volcano). Each sentence was then 
searched on Google, which displayed a list of websites containing each sentence and its 
linguistic context. A count of distinct websites containing the searched item constituted 
the frequency count for that sentence.  
 Thibodeau and Durgin (2011) used Google search totals as their frequency counts. 
The problem with such counts is that it does not capture unique productions and often 
overestimates the number of productions. For example, Google may list many counts for 
wisdom is an ocean because there is a book with this title and the search engine is 
counting all the times this book title appears on any web page. Such counts also do not 
reflect the spontaneous use of metaphor on the Internet; for example, when people are 
using metaphor in conversations (e.g., blogs and posts on message boards). To ensure our 
counts reflected unique and spontaneous sentences, constraints from Roncero et al. 
(2006) were used to determine whether a specific production could be included in the 
frequency count. For example, one constraint is that repetitions of the same production 
listed within the same website were recorded as a single production. This procedure 
ensures no single website can dominate the recorded frequency. Furthermore, we 





productions of metaphors and similes. Repetitions were not included in our frequency 
counts. We also ensured that all instances with the same pattern would be recorded as one 
production. For example, all instances of the mind is an umbrella – best when open 
would be recorded as a single production because the same linguistic context (i.e. best 
when open) is repeated in every production. Recording such statements as a single 
production prevents a few uses of the same expression dominating the results. Finally, 
any examples from academic discussions or journal articles on metaphor were not 
included to help ensure only spontaneous productions were included in the counts. 
 It is true, however, that Google can potentially yield many thousands of 
occurrences for a particular topic-vehicle pair as a metaphor or simile (Thibodeau & 
Durgin, 2011). Therefore, we chose a cut-off point that was feasible for collecting our 
data. Consistent with Roncero et al. (2006), only the first 30 legitimate productions of 
each metaphor and simile were counted. This cut-off was reached by 21 of the topic-
vehicle pairs (25%).  
 We also coded whether the metaphor or simile was followed by an explanation. 
The sentence after a metaphor or simile was accepted as an explanation if it didn’t violate 
the constraint of no elaboration from Roncero et al. (2006). This constraint separates 
actual explanations from elaborations. More specifically, a sentence after a metaphor or 
simile was accepted as an explanation if it was introduced with the word because. When 
the subsequent sentence was introduced with a different conjunction, or no conjunction, 
the word because replaced the conjunction (or was simply inserted if none was present). 
After inserting the word because, the sentence was accepted as an explanation when it 





you take on a boat would not be accepted because the section after the metaphor does not 
have the meaning of an explanation after inserting the word because (i.e., life is a journey 
because you take on a boat). In contrast, a sentence such as music is medicine as it is very 
soothing would be accepted because the section after the metaphor works an explanation 
when the word because replaces the word as (i.e., music is medicine because it is very 
soothing). We also followed the constraint of no repetition to ensure that only unique 
explanations were included in the count. For example, finding time is like money because 
it is valuable several times would only be counted as one in the explanation count. 
Therefore, the number of explanations found reflects the number of different explanations 
that were found.   
Results 
Internet Frequency Counts 
 A total of 1004 metaphors and 780 similes were collected. The average frequency 
count per topic-vehicle pair was 11.95 (SD = 12.52) for metaphor sentences and 9.29 (SD 
= 10.51) for simile sentences. Both distributions were significant on tests of normality 
(metaphors, D (84) = .24, p < .01; similes, D (84) = .19, p < .01); thus, we used non-
parametric tests for analyses that included these scores. The average for metaphors was 
found to be significantly greater than that found for similes (T = 409.50, p < .01, r =.31). 
However, there was also a strong positive correlation between metaphor and simile 
frequency counts (rs = .84, p < .05). Therefore, when a metaphor form is frequent, the 
simile form is also frequent. To better examine when the different variables predict topic-
vehicle frequency on the Internet, we collapsed the frequency scores across sentence 





aptness (rs = .36, p < .01) and familiarity ratings (rs = .56), but not with conventionality 
ratings (rs = .20, p = .07), or interpretive diversity scores (rs = .18, p = .11). However, 
because aptness and familiarity were found to have a significant correlation in the 
Normative study, we ran a backwards stepwise multiple regression to control for 
suppression effects to examine which variable was a better predictor of the averaged 
frequency scores. The removal criterion for each step was p > .10. For the averaged 
frequency scores, aptness was removed after step 1 (t = -.604, p = .55). The final model 
was significant (F (1,82) = 37.8, p < .01, Adj. R2 = .31) with familiarity as the only 
significant predictor (t = 6.15, p < .01,  = .56). We also compared the zero-order 
correlations to the semi-partial correlations for aptness and familiarity with the averaged 
frequency scores, partialling out the variance attributed to the other variable. While the 
semi-partial correlation with familiarity was slightly reduced (.56 to .42), there was a 
much larger reduction for aptness ratings (.36 to -.05). These results suggest that much of 
the correlation between aptness ratings and the averaged frequency scores comes from its 
shared variance with familiarity. These results also indicate that our familiarity ratings, 
while collected from participants, are a good reflection of general frequency as they 
correlated significantly with the averaged Internet frequency scores. 
Predicting Metaphor and Simile Use 
 Frequency difference scores were created by subtracting the number of similes 
found for a topic-vehicle pair from the number of metaphors found. We then correlated 
these scores with the metaphor preference ratings to examine if the preference ratings 
could predict when people prefer using a metaphor construction. A significant correlation 





(rs = .50, p < .001). Therefore, those topic-vehicle pairs preferred as metaphors were also 
those that appeared more often on the Internet as a metaphor rather than a simile. The 
frequency difference scores were significant on test of normality (D (84) = .25, p < .01). 
Thus, we used Spearman correlations to examine if different variables were significant 
predictors of frequency difference scores. Aptness was a significant predictor (rs  = .34, p 
< .01), as was interpretive diversity (rs = .23, p < .05), and familiarity (rs = .26, p < .05), 
but not conventionality (rs = -.04, p = .45). Running these ratings with the metaphor 
preference ratings from participants produced a similar pattern of results. Aptness was a 
significant predictor (aptness, rs = .61, p < .001), as well as interpretive diversity (r = .26, 
p < .05) and familiarity (r = .47, p < .001); but not conventionality, (rs = .04, p = .72). 
 To better understand the importance of these different predictors for each set of 
preference ratings, we ran backward stepwise regressions to control for possible 
suppression effects The removal criterion for each step was p > .10. For the metaphor 
frequency difference scores, familiarity was removed after step 1 (t = .02, p = .98), and 
conventionality after step 2 (t = .10, p = .92). The final model was significant and 
included aptness and interpretive diversity as predictors (F (2,81) = 6.40, p < .01, Adj. R2  
= .12). Aptness was a significant predictor (t =3.01, p < .01,  = .31), while marginal 
significance was found for interpretive diversity (t = 1.80, p = .08,  = .19). Aptness was 
also found to have a larger semi-partial correlation (.31) than interpretive diversity scores 
(.19). The larger standardized beta score for aptness, as well as the larger semi-partial 
correlation, suggest aptness was a more important predictor than interpretive diversity for 





 For the metaphor preference ratings, the results were similar. Conventionality was 
removed after step 1 (t = .44, p = .66), and familiarity after step 2 (t = .76, p = .45). The 
final model was significant, and included aptness and interpretive diversity as predictors 
(F (2, 81) =  28.63, p < .01, Adj. R2 = .40). Aptness was a significant predictor (t = 6.74, p 
< .01,  = .57), as was interpretive diversity (t = 3.16, p < .01,  = .27). The semi-partial 
correlation was larger for aptness (.57) than for interpretive diversity (.27). Therefore, the 
regression for both types of metaphor preference indicators produced similar results, and 
in each case, aptness was found to be the most important predictor. 
Explanations 
 A total of 234 explanations were found with similes compared to only 53 found 
with metaphors. The average explanation count per topic-vehicle pair was 0.63 (SD = 
1.23) for metaphor sentences compared to 2.79 (SD = 3.40) for simile sentences. Tests of 
normality were also significant for these distributions (metaphors, D (84) = .38, p < .01; 
similes, D (84) = .21, p < .01). The average for similes was found to be significantly 
greater than that found for metaphors (T = 35.5, p < .01, r = .64). This finding replicates 
the result found by Roncero et al. (2006) that explanations occur more often with simile 
expressions than with metaphor expressions. We next ran correlations between simile 
explanation counts and ratings of aptness, conventionality, interpretive diversity, and 
familiarity. The correlation with familiarity scores was significant (rs = .38) but not with 
any of the other ratings (conventionality rs = .19, p = .28; aptness rs = .19, p = .11; 
interpretive diversity, rs = .18, p = .11). Therefore, the statements considered the most 





 We were concerned that different explanations for the same expression were in 
fact expressing similar ideas. For example, the statement Lawyers are like sharks because 
they seek blood and Lawyers are sharks because they are blood-thirsty both express the 
property blood for lawyers are like sharks. In order to verify that simile explanations 
were expressing more ideas than metaphor explanations, we identified the properties 
written in the explanations. Thus, the property blood would be recorded as one of the 
expressed ideas for lawyers are like sharks because they are blood-thirsty. Using this 
procedure for explanations with metaphors and similes, we found metaphor explanations 
expressed a total of 44 properties, while simile explanations expressed 129 different 
properties. Non-parametric tests were used to compare metaphor and simile expressions 
as both lists were significant on tests of normality (metaphors, D (84) = .38, p < .001; 
similes, D (84) = .19, p < .001). The topic-vehicle pair average was found to be larger in 
similes (M = 1.54, SD = 1.75) than in metaphors (M = .52, SD = 1.0; T = -5.74, p < .001). 
Thus, explanations of the similes expressed more properties than those found in 
explanations after metaphors. Running correlations with the different ratings, a 
significant correlation was again found with familiarity (rs = .38, p < .01), but not with 
the other ratings (aptness, rs = .14, p = .19; conventionality, rs = .16, p = .14; interpretive 
diversity, rs = .18, p = .10). 
 To examine whether the properties being expressed by similes were salient 
properties of the expressions, we compared the property lists from the Normative study 
for simile expressions to the properties list found in this study for simile explanations. 
For every expression, we gave a count of one when the listed idea matched a property 





total, 51 of the 130 properties (i.e., 39%) were found to express properties participants 
had written in the Normative study. Therefore, the majority of the properties expressed in 
simile explanations were not properties listed by at least two individuals in the Normative 
study.  
Discussion 
 Our first goal in this study was to examine our ratings from the Normative study 
as theoretical predictors of metaphor preference. We collected metaphor preference 
ratings from participants to determine to what extent participants preferred using a topic-
vehicle pair as a metaphor. We also counted the number of times a topic-vehicle pair 
appeared as a metaphor and as a simile on the Internet. From these counts, we subtracted 
the simile frequency counts from the metaphor frequency counts to determine to what 
extent a topic-vehicle pair was used more often as a metaphor (frequency difference 
scores). We then examined whether the ratings from our Normative study, as well as the 
new metaphor preference ratings, could predict when people prefer using a metaphor or 
simile on the Internet. Finally, we compared how people use metaphors and similes on 
the Internet to test the prediction that explanations would occur more often with simile 
expressions than with metaphor expressions.  
 Metaphor preference ratings positively correlated with preference for using the 
metaphor form on the Internet. Therefore, participants' preference ratings can predict 
which topic-vehicle pairs will be used more often as a metaphor on the Internet. 
Furthermore, the ratings from our Normative study were found to have predictive value. 
The familiarity ratings alone were able to predict Internet frequency scores, while aptness 





frequency difference scores. Therefore, our ratings do appear to have ecological validity 
and can predict how metaphors and similes will be used beyond the laboratory setting. 
These results also allow us to address the concern raised by Thibodeau and Durgin 
(2011), and better differentiate our ratings of aptness and familiarity. Whereas familiarity, 
but not aptness, was a significant predictor of frequency on the Internet, aptness, but not 
familiarity, was a significant predictor of metaphor preference. These results suggest our 
familiarity ratings do reflect the general prevalence of these statements (i.e., the 
expression’s frequency).  
 The finding that aptness is the most important predictor of metaphor preference 
ratings replicates previous studies that have also reported this finding (Chiappe, Kennedy, 
& Chiappe, 2003; Chiappe, Kennedy, & Smykowski, 2003; Jones & Estes, 2006). This 
study also extends those results by finding that aptness can predict when people prefer 
writing a given topic-vehicle pair as a metaphor on the Internet. Meanwhile, the finding 
that conventionality ratings were not significant predictors of either metaphor preference 
ratings or frequency difference scores casts further doubt regarding vehicle 
conventionality as a better predictor than aptness of metaphor preference. It should also 
be noted that in this study our ratings of aptness and conventionality were not correlated. 
 Interpretive diversity was also found to be a significant predictor of metaphor 
preference ratings. Like aptness, interpretive diversity scores are larger when topic-
vehicle pairs share a larger number of important properties. Pairs with higher interpretive 
diversity scores have previously been found to be preferred as metaphors (Utsumi, 2007); 
however, whereas Utsumi found interpretive diversity scores were a better predictor of 





Possible explanations for this difference include the fact that the present study and that of 
Utsumi’s used different languages (English vs. Japanese), and that the present study used 
a much larger sample of topic-vehicle pairs than did Utsimi (30 in Utsumi’s study vs. 84 
in the present study). Both variables, nevertheless, have now consistently been found to 
be good predictors of metaphor preference ratings. Further research is needed to 
determine whether aptness or interpretive diversity is the better predictor of metaphor 
preference and people’s use of a metaphor on the Internet. 
 Lastly, we replicated and extended the results found by Roncero et al. (2006) that 
similes, more often than metaphors, are followed by explanations. Furthermore, we found 
that the most frequent expressions were also the ones that were most often explained. We 
also examined the meanings being expressed by the explanations, and found that a larger 
number of properties were being expressed by explanations of the similes. Comparing 
these properties to those properties collected in the Normative study, we found that the 
majority of the Internet properties were not salient. Therefore, when people choose to use 
an explanation, they often highlight properties low in saliency (i.e., ones that do not 
easily come to mind). For example, an Internet writer would be unlikely to state the bible 
is like a sword because it can be used as a weapon or be protective—salient properties 
found in the Normative study for bible is like a sword—because such statements would 
be considered redundant (Grice, 1975). Instead, explanations allow individuals to express 
more clearly their opinion of a particular topic, and evoke properties that may have 
otherwise not been entertained in thought by the reader.  
 When Roberts and Kreuz (1994) asked participants to list pragmatic goals being 





listed for similes, but not metaphors. While we did not directly test for this hypothesis, 
we did observe examples consistent with these goals for similes. For example, no 
explanations were given for men are fish, but several explanations were given for men 
are like fish that stressed men as being stupid or easily caught. For example, men are like 
fish because they are dumb and will bite anything shiny. We interpret such explanations 
as attempts to be humorous. Meanwhile, examples of to deemphasize were also found, in 
that the property highlighted by the explanation was the opposite of what is generally 
seen as the salient meaning for the statement. For example, for memory is a sponge, the 
salient properties reported by participants in the Normative study were absorption and 
retentiveness. In contrast, an explanation for memory is like a sponge made reference to 
memory being leaky and full of holes just as water leaks from a sponge.  
General Discussion 
 The data collected across the present two studies provide a rich variety of 
information for our corpora of topic-vehicle pairs as metaphors and similes. In the 
Normative study, we collected ratings of aptness, conventionality, interpretive diversity, 
connotativeness, and calculated interpretive diversity scores (see Table 2A in the 
appendix). We also collected property interpretation norms for these expressions, as well 
as the topic and vehicle terms in isolation (see Table 2B and 2C in the appendix). In the 
metaphor preference study, we collected metaphor preferences ratings, frequency counts, 
explanation counts, as well as the properties that the produced explanations expressed. 
The familiarity ratings collected from participants were found to be a significant predictor 
of these Internet Frequency counts, validating our familiarity ratings as reflecting the 





ratings, were found to be a more important predictor of the Internet frequency counts; 
whereas aptness, but not familiarity, was a significant predictor of when people preferred 
reading a topic-vehicle pair as a metaphor and when a topic-vehicle pair was found more 
often as a metaphor on the Internet. Therefore, we believe these results address the 
concerns raised by Thibodeau and Durgin (2011) about the cross-contamination of 
aptness and familiarity ratings, and conclude that our aptness and familiarity ratings do 
reflect different variables.  
 In the Normative study, we examined the semantic similarity of metaphor and 
simile expressions by comparing the property lists produced from participants. 
Categorization theory predicts a semantic difference between these expressions 
(Glucksberg, 2003; Glucksberg & Haught, 2006) as the metaphor vehicle has dual-
reference reflecting both the figurative category and the literal referent, whereas the 
simile vehicle refers only to the literal referent. In contrast, Career of Metaphor theory 
(Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Gentner & Bowdle, 2008) predicts that metaphors and similes 
are semantically equivalent because metaphor vehicles derive their meaning from having 
been understood as comparison statements (i.e., similes). We found that the property lists 
for metaphors and similes were comparable, yet different. First, there does not appear to 
be a strict dichotomy whereby metaphors activate figurative properties, but similes 
activate literal properties, because the property lists were not different on ratings of 
connotativeness. Metaphors and similes also had comparable interpretive diversity 
scores, and the match score between metaphors and simile properties was high (>.8). We 
also observed a greater “clustering” of properties for metaphors. When we compared only 





properties), we found that metaphors elicited more of these salient properties than 
similes. Also, some properties were found to be salient for the metaphor expression, but 
not for the equivalent simile expression. One could interpret these results as consistent 
with the argument that a metaphor vehicle represents both the figurative category and the 
literal referent, whereas the simile vehicle represents only the literal referent. 
Specifically, the similarity across the property lists would reflect the literal referent, while 
the additional salient properties found for the metaphor could reflect the figurative 
category. It should be noted, however, that the salient properties found for metaphors 
were sometimes also found for the simile expression, but at a lower frequency level (i.e., 
< 25% of the sample). Thus, metaphors do not seem to activate different properties than 
similes; rather, they seem to strengthen the activation of certain properties.  
 The Internet production study provides greater ecological validity for the ratings 
collected in the Normative study, and has implications for past studies investigating 
metaphor preference. First, the metaphor preference ratings did correlate with the Internet 
frequency difference scores. Second, the regressions for the ratings and the two forms of 
metaphor preference both reported aptness as the most important predictor, with 
interpretive diversity as a marginal predictor. Neither familiarity nor conventionality 
emerged as significant predictors of metaphor reference. This parallelism suggests our 
ratings predict both when people prefer reading a metaphor and when they prefer using a 
metaphor on the Internet. Moreover, aptness was the best predictor of these preferences. 
Finding that aptness, but not conventionality, could predict both metaphor preference in 
participants and which topic-vehicle pairs appeared more often as metaphors on the 





and lends additional evidence that aptness, not conventionality, is the better predictor of 
when people prefer a topic-vehicle pair as a metaphor (Jones & Estes, 2006). 
 One important caveat to the above conclusion is that people may choose to use a 
simile for certain pragmatic reasons. In the Internet production study, we found that 
people tend to highlight a non-salient property about a topic by using a simile followed 
by an explanation with that property. Consistent with results found by Roberts and Kreuz 
(1994), people will sometimes use such explanations to add humour or deemphasize an 
expression (i.e., express the opposite of the dominant meaning). We also found the more 
frequent statements were the ones most often written as similes followed by explanations. 
Comparing the properties found in explanations to the property lists collected in the 
Normative study, we found most of the properties written in explanations were not 
salient. Therefore, people prefer to use an explanation to highlight a property other than 
the one expected to be salient from the metaphor alone. This finding is consistent with 
Grice’s (1975) maxim of quantity, in that people should contribute no more information 
than is required. Thus, when people expect the statement alone to be sufficient, they will 
typically use a metaphor, but use a simile with an explanation when they want to say 
something novel.  
 The finding from the Normative study that metaphors produce more salient 
properties than similes might also explain why in the Internet production study we found 
people preferred using a simile followed by an explanation more often than a metaphor 
followed by an explanation. The metaphor makes certain properties more salient, whereas 





reduce the saliency of that property and then highlight a different property in their 
subsequent explanation.   
Conclusions 
 The results found in the Normative study were supportive of arguments 
suggesting little distinction between metaphor and simile expressions, as the two 
expression types were comparable for the ratings and property lists collected. However, 
there was a trend for metaphors to yield more salient properties. The metaphor preference 
study suggests that this saliency difference may represent a key distinction between 
metaphors and similes. More specifically, this study found that people tend to produce 
metaphor expressions with no explanations with the expectation that salient properties 
will be activated, but produce simile expressions with explanations to express a less 
salient or even novel property. The ratings and preference norms collected in the present 
study also provide researchers with a rich source of information on key variables said to 
influence how metaphors and parallel similes containing the same topic and vehicle 
words are produced and comprehended. This resource, beyond serving for the preparation 
of experimental materials, represents a snapshot of how metaphors—a most pervasive 









Chapter 3: Self-Paced Reading of Metaphors and Similes 
While studies 1 and 2 of Chapter 2 produced numerous results, perhaps the 
most interesting outcome was the property lists for metaphor, similes, and vehicle 
terms in isolation. These data allowed us to examine to what extent the property lists 
reflected the target word itself or the structure presented (metaphor or simile). The 
larger amount of overlap between metaphors and similes compared to the list written 
for the vehicle in isolation suggests metaphors and similes do activate “emergent 
properties”. These properties also have similar levels of connotativeness. One key 
difference found, however, was that metaphor property lists often had certain 
properties listed with higher frequency.  
Based on the results found in Chapter 2, it is possible that reading a metaphor 
leads to increased activation for certain properties, whereas a similar process does not 
take place for similes. In turn, this activation difference could make connotative 
properties more salient for metaphors. This hypothesis is refuted by past studies that 
have compared metaphor reading times to more literal statements and reported 
differences between the two sentence types. It is possible, however, that previous 
studies missed such differences because they examined full sentence reading times. 
We hypothesized that using a paradigm that isolated reading times to the vehicle 
would produce significantly different vehicle reading times if a processing difference 
between metaphors and similes existed. In Chapter 3, we present studies that 
employed a self-paced moving-window paradigm, while Chapter 4 presents a study 





In Chapter 3, then, we ran two experiments using a self-paced moving-
window paradigm to compare the reading times for vehicles (e.g., sharks) when read 
in metaphors (e.g., lawyers are sharks) and similes (e.g., lawyers are like sharks). 
The second experiment is a novel study comparing the processing of metaphors and 
similes written using a negative structure (e.g., lawyers are not sharks). Furthermore, 
we tested the prediction that metaphors would prime figurative properties, whereas 
similes would show greater priming for literal properties. Two key results emerged 
from these experiments. First, in both experiments the simile vehicles were actually 
found to have a longer reading times. We provide a possible explanation for this 
result, but revisit this result and compare it to the opposite results found in Chapter 4 
where eye-tracking was used. It is possible that the result found in this chapter 
reflects the use of a moving-window paradigm (among other possible reasons for the 
conflicting results found here and chapter 4). The second key result was explanations 
reflecting a connotative property were read faster after metaphors than similes, 
whereas the reverse was true for explanations reflecting the literal entity, which were 
read faster after similes. This result builds on the semantic difference result found in 
Chapter 1 and is consistent with the hypothesis that reading a metaphor leads to an 
activation increase of the vehicle’s connotative properties.  
It should be noted that the reading times in Experiment 1 were collected in my 
Masters’ thesis, however, whereas my Masters’ thesis compared vehicle reading 
times for 104 topic-vehicle pairs, Experiment 1 has re-analyzed this data for only the 


































 Recent studies have suggested that metaphors (education is a tree) and similes 
(education is like a tree) might engage similar forms of processing (e.g., Bowdle & 
Gentner, 2005). Consistent with this argument, experiments comparing the processing of 
metaphors and similes have often reported null results (e.g., Jones & Estes, 2006). Many 
of these studies, however, used omnibus sentence reading times that may not have been 
sensitive enough to capture processing differences between metaphors and similes. We 
compared metaphor-simile processing using a self-paced moving window paradigm to 
isolate differences at the vehicle position, where figurative processing is assumed to be 
initiated. In Experiment 1, simile vehicles were found to have longer reading times, while 
neither aptness nor conventionality was a significant predictor of reading times. In 
Experiment 2, we examined whether similes convey a more literal meaning by following 
the metaphors and similes (e.g., lawyers are/are like sharks) with explanations that 
expressed either a figurative property (dangerous), or made mention of a vehicle’s literal 
property (fish). A significant interaction was found: explanations expressing a figurative 
property were read faster when they followed metaphors, whereas explanations 
expressing a literal property were read faster when they followed similes. These results 
suggest that metaphors and similes are not identical; rather, they are distinct statements 








 Metaphors and similes relate a topic (such as lawyers) to a vehicle (such as 
sharks). In contrast to metaphors (e.g., lawyers are sharks), similes with the same topic-
vehicle pair include a word such as like before the vehicle (e.g., lawyers are like sharks). 
Previous studies have compared comprehension latencies for metaphors and similes, 
where participants are asked to press a button once they believe they have understood a 
given metaphor or simile (e.g., Chiappe, Kennedy, & Chiappe, 2003; Jones & Estes, 
2006). These studies found no difference in comprehension time between metaphors and 
similes (but see Johnson, 1996, for an exception), suggesting that metaphors and similes 
are not processed nor interpreted differently (Glucksberg, 2008). However, the offline 
nature of the tasks employed so far (e.g., the time taken to read and judge a sentence) also 
makes it possible that processing differences while reading the two statements were not 
captured by the omnibus response times (i.e., reading times for the entire sentence as 
opposed to individual words within the sentence).  
 In order to investigate the online processing involved when reading metaphors 
and similes, and how these forms are interpreted, we conducted two experiments that had 
participants read metaphors and similes in a word-by-word self-paced reading time 
paradigm with explanations after either a metaphor (e.g., cities are jungles) or an 
equivalent simile (e.g., cities are like jungles). Using a moving-window paradigm – 
which is a more sensitive measure than the omnibus response times – allowed us to 
examine only the vehicle reading times after each statement. The first experiment focused 
on how metaphors and similes are processed, and tested predictions outlined by Career of 
Metaphor theory. The second experiment further investigated whether or not metaphors 





Career of Metaphor Theory 
 Career of Metaphor theory (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Gentner & Bowdle, 2008) 
predicts novel metaphors (e.g., life is a bottle) to cause initial comprehension problems 
because the vehicle term (bottle) lacks an associated figurative meaning that can be 
projected onto the topic. The proposed solution is to understand such statements as 
similes (i.e., life is like a bottle) which then triggers a process of feature matching and 
projection between the topic and vehicle. This way the novel expression is understood as 
an analogy; for example, life is like a bottle because both can be filled up. Over time, as 
the vehicle’s career progresses from being used in multiple statements with various topic 
terms, an associated conventional figurative meaning becomes created and stored in 
memory. At this point in the vehicle’s career, Career of Metaphor theory predicts that 
metaphorical statements no longer need to be understood as comparisons, and can instead 
be understood as categorical statements directly because it is now possible to retrieve an 
associated figurative meaning from memory and project that meaning onto the topic. This 
form of categorical processing is also considered easier than the more laborious 
comparative process. Therefore, Career of Metaphor theory predicts that topic-vehicle 
pairs whose vehicles have a conventional figurative meaning should be read faster than 
pairs where the vehicle has no conventional figurative meaning because these pairs must 
be understood as comparisons. Bowdle and Gentner (2005) have found support for these 
predictions when they compared reading times for metaphors with different levels of 
conventionality: more conventional metaphors were read faster.  
 Because conventionalization is argued to reflect a shift from comparative 





will show a corresponding shift for whether they prefer a topic-vehicle pair as a metaphor 
or as a simile. More specifically, because novel topic-vehicle pairs, whose vehicles have 
no conventional figurative meaning, are understood as comparisons, people should prefer 
reading such pairs as similes because the simile structure (x is like y) evokes a 
comparative process. In contrast, topic-vehicle pairs containing vehicles with 
conventional figurative meanings would be preferred as metaphors because these type of 
topic-vehicle pairs are understood using categorical processing (i.e., the figurative 
meaning is retrieved directly from memory), and the metaphor form (x is y) implies 
categorization. Bowdle and Gentner (2005) found support for these predictions: 
participants stated a preference for reading novel topic-vehicle pairs as similes, but more 
conventional topic-vehicle pairs as metaphors. These findings support the argument that 
as conventionalization for a given vehicle term increases, the ability to engage in 
categorical processing also increases. 
 Note, however, that conventionalization (the process of a vehicle obtaining an 
associated figurative meaning) is not predicted to change the meaning attached to a given 
vehicle term. The categorization process proposed by Career of Metaphor theory for 
metaphors with conventional vehicles is ultimately a cognitive “short-cut”. To use an 
analogy, the first time a child learns three times six is eighteen, it is a relatively laborious 
cognitive process compared to the eventual point where the child can simply retrieve the 
associated answer from memory. Career of Metaphor theory is ultimately proposing a 
similar progression for metaphor interpretation: at first, a more laborious comparative 
process is needed to obtain the associated figurative meaning, but with practice, the 





instead be retrieved directly from semantic memory. Therefore, when categorical 
processing is possible because the vehicle term has a conventional figurative meaning, 
that specific meaning is the same one that had previously been obtained countless times 
using comparative processing. For this reason, Career of Metaphor theory predicts that 
metaphors and comparable similes (e.g., lawyers are sharks and lawyers are like sharks) 
should have the same interpretation (Glucksberg, 2008; Glucksberg & Haught, 2006) 
because conventionality affects the type of processing employed (categorical or 
comparative), but not the interpretation that is ultimately derived.  
Conventionality vs. Aptness  
 Career of Metaphor theory refers to the degree of association between a vehicle 
and an associated figurative meaning as a vehicle’s conventionality level (Bowdle & 
Gentner, 2005). Less conventional vehicles have no associated figurative meanings, 
while conventional vehicles have figurative meanings that come easily to mind. For 
example, pairing the vehicle drug with different topic terms activates an associated 
figurative meaning of addiction (e.g., love is a drug, chocolate is a drug, tv is a drug). In 
contrast, a term such as bottle, which has little or no associated figurative meaning, seems 
to activate no figurative meaning when paired with the same topic terms (e.g., love is a 
bottle, chocolate is a bottle, tv is a bottle). These later sentences would be considered less 
conventional. Therefore, following Career of Metaphor theory, a topic-vehicle pair is 
conventional when the vehicle in that pair has a conventional figurative meaning.  
 Whereas conventionality is restricted to the vehicle term, aptness (Chiappe & 





Apt metaphors are defined as expressions where the vehicle term captures many salient 
properties of the topic. For example, people consider a statement such as politics is a 
jungle as more apt than politics is a beach because the vehicle term jungle better captures 
salient properties of politics (e.g., disagreement, difficulties, chaos) whereas a salient 
property expressed by beach (e.g., relaxation) is not considered a salient property of 
politics; thus, politics is a jungle is considered less apt than politics is a beach. Like 
conventionality, Chiappe and Kennedy (2000) have argued that aptness can be a predictor 
for when categorical processing is possible because categorical statements are preferred 
when people feel the vehicle captures many salient properties of the topic (i.e., when they 
are apt). For example, if someone wanted to state something had all the properties of a 
particular category, they would use a categorical statement to express that meaning (e.g. x 
is water), but would use a simile if they wanted to convey that only some, but not all 
properties of a particular category were present in an object, (e.g.,  x is like water). 
Supporting these arguments, Chiappe, Kennedy, Smykowski (2003) found that 
participants preferred the metaphor form for a given topic-vehicle pair when the 
statements were considered more apt. Chiappe, Kennedy, and Chiappe (2003) also found 
that aptness ratings, compared to conventionality ratings, were a better predictor of 
participants’ metaphor preferences.  
 It has been challenging, however, to determine whether conventionality or aptness 
has a greater effect on metaphor processing times because the two variables are often 
significantly correlated (Thibodeau & Durgin, 2011). For example, Glucksberg (2008), as 
well as Jones and Estes (2005, 2006), note that the less conventional items used by 





suggesting that the conventionality effect they found may have actually reflected an 
aptness effect. To test the hypothesis that conventionality effects are masked aptness 
effects, Jones and Estes (2006) contrasted aptness and conventionality by comparing the 
reading times of metaphors with the same vehicle term, but different topics (e.g., a tree is 
an umbrella vs. a magazine is an umbrella). Because conventionality ratings concern 
only the vehicle terms, the conventionality level for both statements is the same. In 
contrast, because aptness takes into account the topic and the vehicle together, metaphors 
with different topic terms would have different aptness ratings despite having the same 
vehicle term. For example, a tree is an umbrella is more apt than a magazine is an 
umbrella because the attributed property (protects from rain) is more typical of trees than 
of magazines. Jones and Estes found that participants preferred reading more apt topic-
vehicle pairs as metaphors, and that more apt metaphors were also read faster. In contrast, 
conventionality did not reliably predict either metaphor preference or reading times, 
furthering the argument that it is aptness rather than conventionality that has a strong 
effect on metaphor processing.  
 We chose to use our ratings of aptness and conventionality (see Chapter 2) 
because these ratings were not significantly correlated. In this manner, we avoided the 
problem faced in previous studies where aptness and conventionality were actually 
significantly correlated (e.g., Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Jones & Estes, 2005). Whereas 
Career of Metaphor theory predicts more conventional vehicles to have faster reading 
times, others (e.g., Glucksberg & Haught, 2008; Jones & Estes, 2006) have reported 
results suggesting that more apt topic-vehicle pairs will also have faster vehicle reading 





isolated to the vehicle region as was done in the present study. Because conventionality 
ratings are associated strictly with the vehicle term, it is possible that conventionality 
ratings will be a better predictor of reading times when those reading times are also 
isolated to the vehicle position rather than the entire sentence. 
Experiment 1 
 The present experiment was conducted to compare the reading times for metaphor 
and simile vehicles. Most studies so far have found no metaphor-simile reading time 
differences (e.g., Jones & Estes, 2006), however the present study employed an online 
self-paced reading technique that could enable us to better measure reading times at the 
vehicle region. In this manner, we could isolate the key constituent of each expression 
type. While we predicted null results between metaphor and simile vehicles because this 
was the most common previous result, we also thought this novel technique might find 
differences that had been missed in previous studies that had used the omnibus reading 
time measures. 
 We were also interested in testing the predictions from Career of Metaphor theory 
regarding conventionality and the interpretation of metaphors and similes. More 
specifically, we wanted to know whether conventionality or aptness would be a better 
predictor of vehicle reading times. Career of Metaphor theory (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; 
Gentner & Bowdle, 2008) predicts a significant positive correlation between 
conventionality ratings and vehicle reading times, and that conventionality ratings are a 
more important predictor of reading times  than aptness. In contrast, others (e.g., Chiappe 
& Kennedy, 2000; Glucksberg, 2008; Jones & Estes, 2006) have argued that aptness is a 





correlation between aptness ratings and vehicle reading times would support these 
predictions. 
 Finally, we tested for the Career of Metaphor theory prediction that metaphors 
and comparable similes have the same interpretation. To test this prediction, the same 
explanation phrase was written after metaphors and similes. It was predicted that if 
metaphors are interpreted as implicit similes, or vice-versa, then the reading times for the 
same explanations after metaphors and similes should be similar. In other words, if 
reading cities are jungles is no different from reading cities are like jungles, then the 
explanation because wild animals wait at every turn should produce similar explanation 
reading times after metaphors and similes because the preceding linguistic context would 
have effectively been the same.   
Method 
Participants 
 One hundred and eighteen students from Concordia University participated in this 
experiment, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and were given monetary 
compensation for participating in the study. They were all native speakers of English. 
Forty participants provided aptness ratings, while 40 participants provided 
conventionality ratings, and 38 participants read the sentences on the computer.  
Materials 
 The 84 topic-vehicle pairs used in Experiment 1 were presented in sentences as 
similes or metaphors (e.g., life is a journey or life is like a journey). The 84 topic-vehicle 





position boundaries (i.e., parts of the sentence which were visible individually): 
Introduction + topic + (is / is like) + vehicle + because + explanation + closing statement. 
Crucially, metaphor and simile sentences differed only at the (is / is like) position. For 
example, the topic-vehicle pair life-journey when written as a metaphor sentence was 
"Bob says life is a journey because each choice we make is like taking a new path.  It was 
mentioned to a friend", and when written as a simile, the sentence was "Bob says life is 
like a journey because each choice we make is like taking a new path. It was mentioned 
to a friend." Introductions always consisted of two words, and had the form Bob says, 
Mary thinks, Ted believes, and so on. Reading times for the word because were analyzed 
for possible spill-over effects from the vehicle. Closing statements had the form “It was 
_____” with the blank filled by a phrase that provided the statement with a sense of time 
or place; for example, It was written on a website; It was uttered to a man, and so on. 
These closing statements were used to capture any spill-over effects after the vehicles and 
explanations.  
 Explanations for topic-vehicle pairs were obtained by writing the topic-vehicle 
pair as a simile into the Google search engine. The first explanation presented by the 
search engine was accepted if it did not violate the constraints from Roncero, Kennedy, 
and Smyth (2006). If the first explanation presented by the search engine violated these 
constraints, the next explanation was checked, and so on, until an explanation which did 
not violate the constraints was found. If no explanation appeared on the Internet, a 





Aptness and Conventionality Ratings 
 These ratings had been collected in a previous study (Normative Study of Chapter 
2 in this thesis). For aptness ratings, 20 participants were given a booklet that presented 
the topic-vehicle pairs as metaphors (life is a journey), while a second group of 20 
participants read a similar booklet that contained similes rather than metaphors. Below 
each item in both booklets, a scale ranging from 0 to 10 was presented. Participants were 
asked to circle the aptness ranking that reflected their judgements of the statements' 
aptness (0 representing low aptness, and 10 representing high levels of aptness). 
Participants were told that aptness reflects “the extent to which the second word in the 
word-pair captures important features of the first word.” Politics is a jungle was given as 
an example of an apt statement, whereas politics is a beach was given as an example of a 
less apt statement. In our previous study, the aptness ratings for metaphors and similes 
were found to have a strong positive correlation (>.8), favouring the use of averaged 
aptness ratings. For this reason, averaged aptness ratings were also used in the present 
study. 
 To collect conventionality ratings, participants were presented booklets that had 
either metaphor or simile statements. For each statement, participants were asked to list 
what properties they felt the vehicle term was expressing about the topic. For example, a 
participant could have written the properties valuable and important for the metaphor 
time is money. A third group of 20 participants received a booklet with metaphor 
statements, while a fourth group of 20 participants received a booklet with simile 





different properties; however, the most frequently written property for a given topic-
vehicle pair as a metaphor or simile was often the same property.  
 Conventionality ratings were then collected by giving 40 participants a booklet 
containing vehicle terms and the property that had been listed most frequently for that 
vehicle as a metaphor or simile in the previous property elicitation task. Half of the 
participants received a booklet containing properties that had been written for metaphors, 
while the other half received a booklet with the properties that had been written for 
similes. Participants were asked to indicate on a scale from 0 to 10 how common it was to 
use that vehicle term to express the presented property. For example, addiction was the 
property written most frequently for love is a drug, and participants were asked how 
common it was to use the word drug in a statement such x is a drug to express the 
meaning that x is addictive. In the previous study, the metaphor and simile 
conventionality ratings were found to be not significantly different, promoting the use of 
averaged conventionality ratings. In this study, we also chose to use the averaged 
conventionality ratings in the analyses.  
Procedure 
 Stimuli were presented on a 20” Viewsonic monitor attached to a Macintosh 
computer running PsyScope (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993). Responses 
were collected on a CMU response box which had three buttons. The middle button was 
used to collect reading times and the two other buttons were used to collect decision 
times (left- no, right- yes). The experiment lasted 30 minutes without a break. We also 





were right-handed, or the index finger on their left hand if they were left-handed. After 
the moving-window paradigm was explained, participants read 15 practice items 
consisting of both metaphors and similes. The sentences were first presented completely 
as dashes replacing each letter in the sentence. Once the participant pressed a button, the 
introduction would appear, while the rest of the sentence would still be represented as 
dashes. When the participant pressed the button a second time, the topic would appear, 
and the introduction would be replaced with dashes. Therefore, only one sentence 
fragment was on the screen at a time. 
Results 
Outlier Removal 
 In order to eliminate outliers, RTs shorter than 200 ms and larger than 5000 ms 
were first removed. Next, the linguistic form by position means were calculated for each 
participant based on the remaining RTs. A participant’s RTs were then removed if they 
were larger than the mean (plus 2.4 standard deviations), or smaller than the mean (minus 
2.4 standard deviations). This standard deviation value is the number recommended by 
Van Selst and Jolicoeur (1994) for the removal of outliers in a sample size of the 
magnitude obtained in the present experiment. RTs removed at this stage were replaced 
with the cutoff values (i.e., M + 2.4 SD for RTs greater than this value, and M - 2.4 SD 
for RTs smaller than this value). From these values, the linguistic form by position means 






 A two-way repeated measures ANOVA, with position and linguistic form as the 
within-groups factors, was run. Mauchly’s test of sphericity was significant (p < .001); 
thus, Greenhouse-Geisser levels of significance were used. Not surprisingly, with 
different blocks having different word lengths, a main effect of position was found (F1 
(2.36, 87.26) = 197.34, p < .001; F2 (1.17, 97.02) = 837.27, p < .001); and with simile 
sentences having an extra word, it was not surprising to find a main effect for linguistic 
form (F1 (1, 37) = 25.04, p < .001; F2 (1, 83) = 6.43, p < .05). Crucially, the interaction 
was significant (F (1.84, 68.07) = 7.80, p < .05; F2 (1.37, 113.69) = 5.35, p < .05). 
Planned comparisons (paired t-tests), were run to compare metaphor and simile RTs at 
positions subsequent to the (is/is like) position: positions 4-7.  For position 4 (the 
vehicle), RTs for simile vehicles were significantly slower than RTs for metaphor 
vehicles (t1 (37) = 4.17, p < .01; t2 (83) = 2.17, p < .05). RTs for position 5 (because) 
were virtually identical (t1 (37) = -0.25, p = .805; t2 (83) = -0.15, p = .88). For position 6 
(the explanations), simile explanation RTs were significantly slower than metaphor 
explanation RTs (t1 (37) = 3.23, p < .01; t2 (83) = 2.50, p < .05). For block 7 (closing 
statement), the result was not significantly different (t1 (37) = 1.42, p = .17; t2 (83) = 
1.09, p = .28). Mean reading times in milliseconds for the vehicle and explanation 








Table 3A: Vehicle and Explanation Reading Times 
Mean RTs (and SDs) for the vehicle and explanation sentence fragments (in milliseconds)  
   Vehicle* Explanation*   
 Metaphor  388 (96) 735.86 (456)   
 Simile   418 (89)  850.92 (531)    
*p < .05 
 Aptness and Conventionality Ratings 
 We next ran correlations between reading times for those regions where 
significant differences had been found (i.e., the vehicle and explanation regions) and the 
different ratings collected: aptness, conventionality, and metaphor preference. For aptness 
ratings, there was no significant correlation for either the vehicle position (metaphor 
vehicles, r (84) = .08, p = .23; simile vehicles, r (84) = .19, p = .08), or the explanation 
position (metaphor explanations, r (84) = .03, p = .78; simile explanations, r (84) = .01, p 
= .92). Reading times also did not correlate with metaphor preference ratings (metaphor 
vehicles, r (84) = .08, p = .48; simile vehicles, r (84) = .04, p = .75). There was also no 
significant correlation with the conventionality ratings and vehicle reading times 
(metaphor vehicles, r (84) = .11, p = .31; simile vehicles, r (84) = -.07, p = 53), nor with 
explanation reading times (metaphor explanations, r (84) = -.09, p = .42; simile 
explanations, r (84) = .02, p = .87). Therefore, neither aptness nor conventionality ratings 






 We compared reading times for metaphor and simile vehicles, as well as 
explanations after these statements. Vehicle reading times were longer when vehicles 
were read within a simile. Previous studies had failed to find reading time differences 
between metaphors and similes (e.g., Jones & Estes, 2006); however, it is possible that 
recording the omnibus reading time for the entire sentence rather than only the vehicle 
region, as was done in this experiment, was not a sensitive enough measure to capture the 
processing difference between metaphors and similes.  
 Contrary to expected predictions, neither aptness nor conventionality ratings were 
significant predictors of reading times. As the only difference in our sentences was the 
word like, and reading times were not related to aptness or conventional level of the 
topic-vehicle pairs, we suggest that the linguistic frame (x is y versus x is like y) must 
trigger different processes for metaphors and similes. Furthermore, such processes must 
ultimately be slower for similes, causing the observed slower reading times.  
 One possible explanation is that similes initiate comparative processes regardless 
of the aptness or conventionality level, while metaphors initiate categorical processing, 
regardless the aptness or conventionality of a given topic-vehicle pair. This argument is 
consistent with other theories. For example, category-based approaches note that 
metaphors have the same grammatical form as categorisation statements, and argue that 
vehicles in metaphors act as predicates which project properties onto the topic (e.g., 
Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990). Similarly, Gentner and Bowdle (2008) recognize the role of 
syntactic structure in their concept of grammatical concordance, in that “linguistic form 





metaphors invites a categorisation process, whereas the linguistic frame of similes invites 
a comparison process. As previously discussed, the comparison process is assumed to be 
more computationally complex than the projection required for metaphors, and finding 
longer reading times for simile vehicles in the present study is consistent with this 
argument. However, we did not find reading times to be related to a topic-vehicle pairs’ 
conventionality level, as would be predicted by Career of Metaphor theory, nor the 
aptness level of a given topic-vehicle pair, as argued by past researchers (e.g., 
Glucksberg, 2008). Instead, reading times were best predicted by the linguistic structure 
that was read (metaphor or simile), which suggests metaphors and similes are 
consistently processed as different statements. 
 We also did not find support for the hypothesis that metaphors and similes have 
similar meanings, as predicted by Career of Metaphor theory (e.g., Bowdle & Gentner, 
2005). We hypothesized that reading the same explanation after either a metaphor or a 
simile would produce similar reading times if indeed time is like money has the same 
interpretation as time is money. Instead, explanations after similes had slower reading 
times. We suggest that this difference reflects the differences in interpretation that similes 
and metaphor produce. Metaphors and similes may engender different interpretive 
processes, which reflect both in the way their vehicles are read and in the way their 
explanations are treated as a function of the preceding expression. We decided to test this 
hypothesis further in Experiment 2. More specifically, we tested the prediction that a 
metaphor will yield a faster reading of a subsequent explanation when that explanations 





the simile expressions: a literal property of the simile vehicle should yield for faster 
reading.  
Experiment 2 
 Glucksberg and Haught (2006a, 2006b) argue that the vehicle term in metaphors 
and similes is different, such that shark refers to the figurative referent of shark in the 
metaphor lawyers are sharks, but to the literal referent of shark in the simile lawyers are 
like sharks. Support for this hypothesis comes from comparisons of participants’ 
interpretations of metaphors and similes. For example, in ideas are diamonds participants 
would infer the property brilliant, while the property shiny (a literal property of 
diamonds) had a greater probability of being inferred for ideas are like diamonds 
(Glucksberg & Haught, 2006a). This result suggests that metaphors receive a figurative 
interpretation, while similes are interpreted literally.  
 To test the hypothesis that simile vehicles are interpreted more literally, we 
decided to write explanations to appear after metaphors and similes that reflected either a 
figurative property of the expression (education is (like) a tree because education grows), 
or highlighted the vehicle as a literal entity by referring to a literal property (education is 
(like) a tree because education is a plant). For these sentences, we expected the sentence 
with the figurative property would be read faster after metaphors because the expression 
will prime the salient figurative property. In contrast, as the vehicle is interpreted literally 






 One potential problem was that explanations containing the literal property could 
be read slower because the statements themselves are objectively false. As lawyers are 
not literally fish, for example, reading the sentence lawyers are (like) sharks because 
lawyers are fish could cause confusion and slow reading times more so than statements 
that assert a related figurative property (i.e., lawyers are (like) sharks because lawyers 
are dangerous). To avoid this potential confound, we chose to write both the expression 
and the subsequent explanation using a negative structure (i.e., lawyers are not (like) 
sharks because lawyers are not dangerous and lawyers are not (like) sharks because 
lawyers are not fish). In this manner, both sentences can be seen as being objectively true 
as lawyers are not literally fish, and on a matter of opinion, people may deem lawyers as 
not dangerous.  
 Writing our statements in a negative structure also allowed us to examine 
questions related to comprehending a negated figurative statement. For example, it has 
been argued that understanding a negative statement first requires processing that 
statement as an affirmative statement, which subsequently causes negated statements to 
have longer reading times (Hasson & Glucksberg, 2006; MacDonold & Just, 1989; 
Mayo, Schul, & Burnstein, 2004). The schema-plus-tag model (Clark & Chase, 1972), for 
instance, proposes that negative statements of the form A is not B are understood by 
representing the proposition as [NOT [A is B]]. Consequently, understanding a negative 
sentence is assumed to take longer than understanding a positive sentence because two 
steps are required for comprehension: processing the positive core, followed by negating 
that same core. In contrast, a statement of the form A is B would be predicted to have 





people read the statement lawyers are sharks, they would be predicted to only entertain 
the assertion that lawyers are dangerous. However, reading the negated statement lawyers 
are not sharks, people would mentally represent both the negated statement, as well as 
the counter-statement (i.e., lawyers are sharks), and the need to mentally represent both 
statements would result in longer reading times.  
 Support for these predictions comes from a study by Hasson and Glucksberg 
(2006). They found that positive metaphors (e.g., my daughter is an angel) primed 
affirmative-related properties (sweet), but not negative-related properties (nasty), in a 
subsequent lexical decision task, whereas the negated metaphors (my daughter is no 
angel) primed both affirmative- and negative-related properties at 500 ms after 
presentation of the metaphor. They also found that at 150 ms after presentation of a 
negated metaphor that the priming effect was actually stronger for the affirmative-related 
properties, whereas at 1000 ms, a priming effect was only found for the negative-related 
properties.  These results are consistent with the argument that people comprehend 
positive statements directly, whereas negative statements are understood by first 
interpreting the negated statement as an affirmative, followed by subsequently negating 
this propositional core. We decided to further test the hypothesis that negated statements 
take longer to process than positive statements by comparing the reading times found for 
the vehicles in Experiment 2 to when they were written in an affirmative structure in 
Experiment 1. Consistent with past studies, we predicted that reading times for negated 






 In summary, using the same paradigm as Experiment 1, we again contrasted the 
vehicle and explanation reading times of metaphors and similes. However, in this 
experiment, we also manipulated these sentences in two manners. First, we presented the 
expressions in a negative structure (e.g., education is not (like) a tree). Second, we 
followed the sentence with an explanation that stated either a salient figurative property 
of the vehicle or made reference to one of the vehicle’s literal properties. Similar to 
Experiment 1, we expected vehicles in negative similes to have longer reading times 
because they are, by hypothesis, understood as comparative statements rather than 
categorizations. When comparing these vehicle reading times to those found in 
Experiment 1, we also predicted a significant difference, and that reading times would be 
longer for the negated vehicles. Explanations containing a figurative property (lawyers 
are not sharks because lawyers are not dangerous) were predicted to be read faster after 
metaphor expressions, while those containing a literal referent (lawyers are not sharks 
because lawyers are not fish) were predicted to be read faster after simile expressions.  
Method 
Participants 
 One hundred and twenty participants from Concordia University were given 
course credit or monetary compensation for participating in this study. All participants 







 From the topic-vehicle pairs used in Experiment 1, we used 20 topic-vehicle pairs 
to compare vehicle reading times in negative metaphors and similes. We ensured the 
same vehicle term was not presented more than once, and picked vehicles that could 
activate both a salient figurative attribute, but also a strong literal representation. Towards 
this goal, we used the property that had been written most often for a given topic-vehicle 
pair by participants for the conventionality ratings. More specifically, the most frequent 
property written for a given topic-vehicle pair as a metaphor was the property used in the 
explanations that expressed figurative properties. For the literal sentences, a literal 
property was selected. This literal property was often the vehicle’s literal category (e.g, 
plant for the metaphor education is a tree, and fish for the metaphor lawyers are sharks). 
A list of the negative topic-vehicle pairs, as well the properties used in the explanations, 
are presented in Figure 3B.  
Design 
 Because our expressions, until the explanation region, would differ only by the 
word like, we were concerned that presenting participants both our metaphor and simile 
expressions might lead to some participants ignoring the presence of the word like in the 
sentence. To address this concern, we ran our expression by explanation conditions as 
separate groups. Thus, one group read negative metaphors followed by explanations 
expressing figurative attributes, while the next group read negative similes followed by 
explanations expressing figurative attributes. Two additional groups were run for 





sentences were presented with the same structure as Experiment 1: Introduction + topic + 
(is not / is not like) + vehicle + because + explanation + closing statement. For each of 
the four groups, the 20 experimental items were presented with 30 filler items. The filler 
items were positive metaphors and similes that contained topic-vehicle pairs not used in 
the set of experimental items, which were also followed by related explanations. The 
filler sentences were written with a positive structure rather than a negative structure.  
Procedure 
 The procedure was similar as employed in Experiment 1. Participants were asked 
to read normally for comprehension. We also asked participants after reading each 
sentence to rate how apt they found the sentence. Politics is a jungle was given as an 
example of an apt statement, whereas politics is a beach was given as an example of a 
less apt statement. Also, because many of the filler sentences were actual jokes (e.g., men 
are like couches because you often find them in front of the TV), we also asked 
participants to rate how funny they found each sentence. Only the aptness ratings were 
included in our analysis. The experiment lasted 30 minutes. 
Results 
Outlier Removal 
 For each participant, outlier removal proceeded as was done in study 1. All 
vehicle RTs shorter than 200 ms and larger than 5000 ms were removed. For the 
explanation region, RTs shorter than 200 ms and larger than 10000 ms were removed. 
For each participant, the mean and standard deviation of the remaining RTs for the 





was larger than the mean plus 2.391 standard deviations, or smaller than the mean minus 
2.391 standard deviations. This standard deviation value is the number recommended by 
Van Selst and Jolicoeur (1994) for the removal of outliers in a sample size of the present 
magnitude. RTs removed at this stage were replaced with the boundaries (i.e., M + 2.391 
SD for RTs greater than this value, and M - 2.391 SD for RTs smaller than this value).  A 
total of 139 RTs were changed (corresponding to 5.8% of the dataset).  
 Because we ran independent groups, we also ran outlier removal across 
participants within a condition to ensure the distribution of outliers across the different 
conditions was the same. For the vehicle and explanation conditions, participants whose 
mean RT was larger than the group mean plus (or minus) 2.43 standard deviations had 
their means removed and not replaced. This criterion is the one recommended by Van 
Selst and Jolicoeur (1994). Five participants had both their vehicle and explanation 
reading times removed because they were identified as outliers. As both the vehicle and 
explanation reading times from these participants were found to be outliers, it is possible 
that these participants incorrectly reported their first language as English. An additional 
two reading times were removed from the vehicle condition and an additional three 
reading times were removed from the explanation condition, for a total removal of 15 
participant reading times (6.25% of the dataset). No outlier removal was done for the 
aptness ratings. 
Analyses 
 For the vehicle region, the mean vehicle RT for negative similes was 837 (SD = 





199; Mdn = 650.37). The RTs for the simile condition were not normally distributed (D 
(57) = .172, p < .001). Levene’s test for equality of variances was also found to be 
significant (p < .001). Therefore, we ran independent t-tests that were bootstapped on 
1000 samples (Mooney & Duval, 1993). The difference was found to be significantly 
different (t1 (92.66) = 3.37, p < .001, r = .33).  A paired t-test also found the difference 
significant by items (t2 (19) = -9.97, p < .001, r = .92).  
 We used the RTs from the items analysis to compare the RTs for the vehicles 
used in Experiment 2 to RTs for the vehicles when they were read in a positive context in 
the Experiment 1. For both metaphors and similes, vehicles read in the negative context 
were found to have significantly slower RTs (positive metaphors, t2 (19) = 8.115, p < 
.001, r = .88; positive similes, t2 (19) = -12.01, p < .001, r = .94). These results support 
the prediction that negative statements take longer to process than affirmative statements. 
 For explanations after metaphors, the mean reading time for explanations 
expressing a figurative property was 1694 ms (SD = 610), while the mean for 
explanations expressing a literal property was 2084 (SD = 874). For similes, the mean 
reading time for explanations expressing a figurative property was 2091 ms (SD = 742), 
while explanations expressing a literal property had a mean reading time of 1754.61 ms 
(SD = 645.90). To compare these reading times, a univariate ANOVA was run with 
explanation reading times as the dependent variable. Sentence structure (metaphor or 
simile) and literality (figurative or literal) were the fixed factors. The main effect of 
sentence structure was not significant (F (1, 108) = .06, p = .81, 2 = .004), nor was the 
main effect of literality (F (1, 108) = .04, p = .85, 2 = .004). However, the sentence by 





distributions for the metaphor literal explanations were not normally distributed (D (29) = 
.17, p < .05), nor were the figurative attribute explanations after similes (D (27) = .17, p < 
.05). Therefore, we followed-up the significant interaction by using independent t-tests 
that were bootstrapped on 1000 samples to compare reading times for explanation after 
metaphors and similes. Consistent with the significant interaction found, we found 
different results for metaphors and similes. While for metaphors the explanations 
expressing figurative properties were read faster than those expressing a literal referent (t 
(55) = -1.823, p < .01, r = .24), the reverse result was found for similes: explanations 
expressing a literal property were read faster (t (53) = 1.912, p < .01, r = .25). These 
results are presented in Appendix 3C. The comparison for similes was also significant by 
items (t2 (19) = -4.97, p < .001, r = .75), and approaching significance for the comparison 
after metaphors by items (t2 (19) = -1.56, p = .14, r = .34), but in the same direction as 
that observed in the analysis by subjects.  
 Lastly, the aptness ratings were entered into a univariate analysis of variance with 
the ratings as the dependent variable. Sentence structure and literality were again entered 
as the fixed factors. The main effect of sentence structure was not significant (F (1, 108) 
= .734, p = .393), while the main effect of literality was significant (F (1,108) = 22.39, p 
< .05). The interaction effect was not found to be significant (F (1, 108) = .50, p = .48). 
These results suggest that participants found both negative metaphors and negative 
similes more apt when their explanations expressed a literal property. Supporting this 
hypothesis, sentences with explanations expressing a figurative property had an average 
aptness rating of 3.31 (SD = .87), while those expressing a literal property had a mean 





(96.823) = 5.036, p < .001, r = .42); Levene’s test for equality of variance was 
significant, p < .001). We also compared aptness ratings within the metaphor and simile 
conditions. Metaphors followed by explanations expressing a literal property were rated 
more apt (M = 4.27, SD = 1.51) than when followed by an explanation expressing a 
figurative property (M = 3.30, SD = .83; t (45.10) = 3.063, p < .05, r = .37; Levene’s test 
for equality of variances was significant, p < .01). Similarly for similes, explanations 
expressing a figurative property were rated less apt (M = 3.31, SD = .93) than when the 
explanation expressed a literal property (M = 4.55, SD = 1.4; t (50.38) = 4.04, p < .01, r = 
.47; Levene’s test for equality of variances was significant, p < .01). Therefore, in both 
cases, those sentences with explanations expressing figurative properties were rated less 
apt. These comparisons were also significant by items (metaphors, t2 (19) = -4.58, p < 
.001, r = .72; similes, t2 (19) = 6.45, p < .001, r = .83).  Consistent with Experiment 1, no 
significant correlations were found between aptness ratings and the vehicle or 
explanation reading times.  
Discussion 
 Similar to Experiment 1, participants read metaphors and similes followed by 
explanations. Sentences were read using a self-paced moving window, which allowed us 
to compare reading times for the vehicle region alone. Similar to Experiment 1, vehicles 
had longer reading times when they were read within a simile compared to when the 
same word was read in a metaphor. Furthermore, this result was found despite the 
sentences being written in a negative structure (e.g., lawyers are not (like) sharks). We 
also compared the vehicle reading times in Experiment 2 to when they were read in a 





were longer for the negative sentences. This result is consistent with past studies that 
suggest negation slows down processing time because people must first evaluate the truth 
value of the negated statement (Glucksberg & Hasson, 1990; MacDonold & Just, 1989; 
Mayo, Schul, & Burnstein, 2004).  
 Explanations in Experiment 2 were written to refer to either a figurative property 
of the vehicle (e.g., dangerous for shark), or referred to a more literal property of the 
vehicle (e.g. fish for shark). Consistent with our predictions, explanations that expressed a 
figurative property were read faster when they followed metaphors, whereas the reverse 
was observed for similes: explanations that referred to literal properties of the vehicle 
were read faster after similes. These results are also consistent with past arguments by 
Glucksberg (Glucksberg, 2008; Glucksberg & Haught, 2006a, 2006b) that while the 
vehicle is interpreted figuratively in metaphors, it is interpreted literally within similes. 
These results are presented in Table 3C 
Table 3C: Figurative and Literal Explanation Reading Times 
Mean Vehicle and Explanation RTs (and SDs) per property type (in milliseconds)  
   Vehicle* Figurative Explanation* Literal Explanation*   
 Metaphors  665 (198) 1694 (43)   2084 (874)  
 Simile   837 (327) 2091 (742)   1754 (645) 
*p < .05 
 Statements were rated more apt when the explanation expressed a literal property 
(e.g. lawyers are not (like) sharks because lawyers are not fish) than when it expressed a 





dangerous). Thus, participants deemed the statements less acceptable when it negated a 
figurative property. Indeed, the average aptness rating for explanations negating a 
figurative property was below the scale’s mid-point of 3.5 (labelled moderately apt) for 
both metaphors and similes, whereas the average aptness rating for explanations negating 
a literal property were both above this mid-point. When these same items in Experiment 
1 were written in a positive structure, and rated in isolation, they had an average aptness 
rating of 5.2 on 10-point scale, where 5 had been labelled moderately apt. Therefore, 
negating the figurative properties does appear to have decreased the relative aptness 
rating for the items.  
 This last result provides indirect evidence for Hasson and Glucksberg’s (2006) 
argument that negated metaphors first activate affirmative-related properties rather than 
negative-related properties. Had reading a negated statement such as lawyers are not 
sharks activated properties associated with kindness (a negative related property), then 
aptness ratings would have probably shown a relative increase because the written 
sentence would have matched the activated mental representation of lawyers being kind. 
Instead, the results suggest that when people read a statement such as lawyers are not 
sharks, they first process the affirmative statement (lawyers are sharks), which in turn 
activates a salient affirmative-related property (i.e., dangerous). Thus, a statement such as 
lawyers are not sharks would first be interpreted as meaning that lawyers are not 
dangerous, rather than meaning that lawyers are kind (Giora et al., 2005). When 
participants then read a sentence that contradicts this mental representation (i.e., lawyers 
are not sharks because lawyers are not dangerous), it is possible that participants rate the 






 Results from both Experiment 1 and 2 suggest that metaphor and similes are 
distinct types of expressions, even when they both employ the same topic-vehicle pairs. 
Vehicles of similes had longer reading times compared to the same vehicles in 
metaphors. This result was found whether the expressions were affirmative (lawyers 
are/are like sharks) or negative (lawyers are not/are not like sharks), while reading times 
were not related to either the aptness or conventionality level of a given topic-vehicle 
pair.  
 The longer reading times for similes suggests that the two expressions rely on 
different comprehension processes. One possible interpretation for this consistent 
difference is that the vehicle is assigned a more literal or more figurative meaning, 
depending on the type of structure that it is embedded in (x is y in metaphors, or x is like y 
in similes).  Experiment 2 found support for this prediction because explanations with 
figurative properties were read faster after metaphors, while those with literal properties 
were read faster after similes. 
 The finding that metaphors and similes may elicit different vehicle 
representations, and ultimately how the topic-vehicle pair relationship itself is interpreted, 
is problematic for theories such as Career of Metaphor theory which predict that novel 
metaphor statements can be understood by being understood as similes. If vehicles are 
treated literally within similes, and conventionalization does not change the meaning 
produced in a simile versus a metaphor, then metaphors should also create literal 
representations of the vehicle. Instead, the results found in this study support the 





Consequently, the results are more supportive of theories such as Categorization theory 
(Glucksberg, 2008) which argues that metaphors are understood as categorizations, 
consistent with a metaphor’s embedded x is y structure. Categorization theory, however, 
also predicts aptness to affect metaphor processing, and we did not find aptness ratings to 
be related to vehicle reading times.  
 Adopting the hypothesis that similes would be understood as comparisons, but 
metaphors as categorizations, as a result of their embedded structure, the subsequent 
question is why understanding similes as comparisons would cause longer vehicle 
reading times? Both Categorization theory (Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990; Johnson, 1996) 
and Career of Metaphor theory (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005) predict that similes will be 
more difficult to interpret than metaphors. As discussed in Career of Metaphor theory, for 
example, a comparison (i.e., simile) requires an alignment process between the topic and 
vehicle followed by a projection of those properties found to be in common. In contrast, 
for categorical processing, a meaning associated with the vehicle term is simply 
projecting onto the topic—there is no previous alignment stage. Thus, categorical 
processing is predicted to be faster than comparative processing because less processing 
stages are required. Therefore, while we did not find support for the predictions that 
aptness and conventionality would affect reading times, we did find support for the 
prediction that vehicles require more processing time when read within similes.  
Conclusion 
 Across the two studies, the results suggest that metaphors and similes are neither 





times when read in similes, suggesting that processing similes is more difficult than 
processing comparable metaphors. Furthermore, while the metaphor vehicle does appear 
to obtain a figurative interpretation, the representation of the simile vehicle seems to 
remain literal. In summary, whereas previous researchers and theorists since Artistotle 
(trans. 1926) have argued that metaphors and similes are alike—processed similarly and 
produce the same interpretation—the present results suggest that both the processing and 















Chapter 4: Examining the reading of Metaphors and Similes with Eye Tracking 
The results found in Chapter 3 were somewhat surprising as they we would have 
predicted longer metaphor vehicles reading times based on both the results from in 
Chapter 2, as well as the prediction by Career of Metaphor theory that metaphors would 
have longer processing than similes. The results are consistent, however, with the 
predictions that a comparison is easier to understand than a predication statement. Earlier 
versions of categorization theory also predicted similes would be more difficult to read 
than metaphors because they would need to be converted to metaphors for 
comprehension. Johnson (1995) found support for this hypothesis. When he compared 
sentence reading times for metaphors and similes read at the end of paragraphs, we found 
longer reading times for similes.  
The longer simile vehicle reading times found in Chapter 3, however, are not 
consistent with the earlier discussion regarding connotative properties receiving more 
activation when read in metaphors, as this would have predicted longer reading times for 
metaphor vehicles. One possible explanation is that sentence comprehension processes 
masked those processes exclusive to the vehicle such as a shift in the activation level of 
associated properties. Supporting this hypothesis, the eye-tracking study presented in 
Chapter 4 found shorter saccade lengths for metaphor vehicles, regardless the familiarity. 
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that reading a vehicle in a metaphor causes 
increased activation for connotative properties. This paper was submitted for publication 
to the Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition with the 
author order of Roncero, Ashby, and de Almeida. The manuscript is now in preparation 
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Since Aristotle, numerous papers have discussed whether metaphors (life is a 
journey) and comparable similes (life is like a journey) convey the same meaning. In this 
study, eye movements were recorded as participants read sentences containing metaphors 
and comparable similes followed by explanations (e.g., Mary believes liquor is/is like a 
crutch because it is used in difficult situations). We measured reading times and the 
spatial pattern of fixations as a function of the expression’s familiarity and aptness, as 
well as the expression type (i.e., metaphor or simile). First-pass reading times were 
comparable for familiar metaphors and similes, but longer for unfamiliar metaphors, 
indicating that familiarity plays an early role in figurative language processing. Several 
measures also indicated that metaphors were initially more difficult to process than 
similes irrespective of the aptness or familiarity level. These results provide initial 








Metaphors are not (like) similes: Evidence from eye movements 
Metaphors usually express a relationship between a topic (e.g. guilt) and a vehicle 
(e.g., infection) using a linguistic form such as X is Y (e.g., guilt is an infection). Similes 
also relate a topic and a vehicle, but typically include comparative words such as like, as 
in X is like Y (e.g., guilt is like an infection). Although the surface forms of these 
expressions differ by simply one word, readers may process them in fundamentally 
different ways; similes can be processed as literal expressions whereas metaphors might 
entail specific figurative language processes. Central questions in figurative language 
research include whether figurative language recruits processes that are similar to those 
used for understanding literal expressions, and how familiarity and aptness affect 
metaphor processing. The present study investigates these questions by monitoring eye 
movements during silent reading. Using several eye movement measures, we examined 
the initial, online processes that occur when interpreting topic-vehicle relations in 
metaphors, how these processes compare to those involved in processing similes, and the 
effects of familiarity and aptness on metaphor processing. 
Theories of metaphor processing 
Comparison theory.  The idea that the meaning of a metaphorical expression of 
the form X is Y entails similarity between topic and vehicle has been prevalent, at least 
since Aristotle (trans. 1926). This idea has been incorporated in the works of many 
contemporary psychologists, linguists, and philosophers (e.g., Ortony, 1979; Miller, 
1979; Gentner, 1983).  The key point of the comparison theory is that a metaphor carries 
the meaning of a simile (as in X is like Y) except for the omission of a comparative word 





understand a statement involves accessing the knowledge domains of the topic and the 
vehicle, and then mapping their shared relations. For example, to comprehend the 
expression crime is a disease, a reader would identify the shared relation between crime 
and disease (e.g., both are contagious). Then, the arguments of the relation would be 
aligned (i.e. crime with disease, and neighborhood with population) to create analogies 
such as crime spreads through neighborhoods like a disease spreads in a population (see 
also Black, 1979).  Thus, the comparison theory assumes that metaphors are treated as 
implicit similes and comprehended as comparisons. 
The standard pragmatic model. In its early inception (Searle, 1979; see also Grice, 
1989), the standard pragmatic model proposed that the comprehension of metaphors 
involved three main stages: (a) literal interpretation—when the meaning of the metaphor 
is interpreted as a literal statement (sentence meaning); (b) the realization that the 
sentence meaning is defective (Searle, 1979); and (c) the search for an alternative 
meaning (which Searle called speaker’s meaning). Although all proponents of the 
pragmatic model assume that a literal meaning should be obtained at first (Grice, 1989; 
Searle, 1979), there is no agreement on how the meaning of a metaphor is achieved, with 
the establishment of comparisons being among the many possible functions of a 
metaphor (see Davidson, 1978; Searle, 1979). 
One of the common processing predictions that emerged from the pragmatic 
model was that metaphors should take longer to process than literal statements because, 
contrary to literal statements, metaphors would require the search for alternative 
meanings. However, with few exceptions (e.g., Janus & Bever, 1985), most studies have 





particular when the metaphors in question were apt or familiar (Blasko & Connine,1993; 
Gildea & Glucksberg, 1983; Pynte, Besson, Robichon, & Poli, 1996).  
After the seeming downfall of the standard pragmatic model, two main theories of 
metaphor processing became prevalent: categorization theory and career of metaphor 
theory. Categorization theory claims that readers comprehend metaphors through 
categorization processes, which are distinct from the comparison processes engaged to 
process similes (Glucksberg, 2003, 2008; Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990). In contrast, 
career of metaphor theory (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Gentner & Bowdle, 2008) claims 
that novel metaphors engage comparison processes whereas familiar metaphors engage 
categorization processes.  
In this study, we monitored eye movements as readers silently read metaphor and 
simile sentences in order to investigate the early, online processing of figurative 
language. These temporally-sensitive and spatially-sensitive measures yielded novel data 
that may inform future theories of figurative language processing as well as data that 
converge with findings from other online studies. To provide a theoretical context for our 
findings, the following sections review the central claims of two prominent theories of 
metaphor processing: categorization theory and career of metaphor theory. 
Categorization theory. The most recent version of categorization theory assumes 
that metaphors and similes are processed differently, with similes engaging comparison 
processes whereas metaphors initiate a categorization process (Glucksberg, 2008). For 
example, in the literal statement hammerheads are sharks, the properties of sharks are 
interpreted as being true of hammerheads. Similarly, the metaphor lawyers are sharks 





such as lawyers are sharks, however, are false in that lawyers are not literally sharks. 
According to categorization theory, we resolve this apparently false statement by 
interpreting the vehicle word (e.g., sharks) in metaphors as referring to a category that 
includes the abstract properties of the vehicle rather than to its literal exemplar 
(Glucksberg & Haught, 2006). In the metaphor lawyers are sharks, for example, the 
vehicle sharks represents a category of vicious and aggressive predators, not the actual 
animal. 
Categorization theory claims that the comparison processes used to process novel 
similes are slower than the categorization processes used to comprehend novel metaphors 
(Glucksberg, 2008; Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990). According to Glucksberg and 
colleagues, this is because two objects in a literal expression are similar in innumerable 
ways, and it takes time for people to determine the relevant vehicle properties that make 
the comparison, or simile, valid.  In a metaphor, however, the vehicle refers to a smaller 
category of abstract relations, which does not include the literal properties of the 
vehicle’s base term. Thus, categorization theory predicts that novel metaphors will be 
comprehended faster than novel similes. In support of this prediction, Johnson (1996) 
compared participants’ reading times for metaphors and similes at the end of short 
paragraphs and found longer reading times for similes. Roncero, Kennedy, and Smyth 
(2006) also found evidence consistent with the claim that similes can be more difficult to 
comprehend than metaphors because of the potentially infinite conditions under which 
the topic and vehicle can be compared. In their comparison of metaphor and simile 
productions on the Internet, simile statements were followed by explanations clarifying 





writers seem to be aware of the interpretation problem posed by similes, and try to aid 
comprehension by writing explanations for their simile statements.  
When metaphors and similes are familiar, however, categorization theory predicts 
that similar comprehension times will be observed (Glucksberg, 2008). Experience with 
familiar similes allows readers to recognize quickly which vehicle properties are relevant. 
The disadvantage of having to sort through the different properties of novel similes is no 
longer true for familiar similes. Therefore, familiar similes and metaphors should be 
processed with comparable effort.  
Lastly, categorization theory predicts aptness to facilitate metaphor 
comprehension. In apt metaphors, the vehicle is assumed to use an easily recognizable 
exemplar that serves as a clear prototype for the expressed metaphor (Glucksberg, 2008), 
and captures salient properties of the topic (Chiappe & Kennedy, 1999). For example, 
Jones and Estes (2006) found that more apt metaphors, such as beavers are lumberjacks, 
were comprehended faster and understood better than comparable metaphors in which the 
same vehicle did a worse job of capturing the salient features in the topic, such as 
termites are lumberjacks. When metaphors are novel and not apt, however, the simile 
form should be processed more easily (Glucksberg, 2008).   
Career of metaphor theory. The career of metaphor theory has proposed that the 
processes used to comprehend metaphors and similes depend on the conventionality of 
the topic-vehicle relation, which changes over time (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Gentner & 
Bowdle, 2008). This theory claims that a metaphor vehicle gradually acquires a figurative 





Essentially, the claim is that similes become metaphors over time, with the word like 
dropping out.  
 According to career of metaphor theory, readers use comparison processes to 
understand similes (Gentner & Bowdle, 2008). Once a simile becomes familiar, it is 
written in metaphor form (i.e., without the like), which invites readers to use 
categorization processes described by Glucksberg (2008). Career of metaphor theory 
claims that novel metaphors are more difficult to process than conventional metaphors. 
When a metaphor is new to a reader, such as life is a bottle, the initial categorization 
process is interrupted because readers do not yet have the categorical relation between 
topic and vehicle stored in memory (Gentner & Bowdle, 2008).  Readers resolve this 
initial difficulty by launching comparison processes to comprehend the metaphor as a 
simile (i.e., life is like a bottle). Over time, repeated exposure allows a simile vehicle to 
acquire a conventional figurative meaning. When that happens, readers can access the 
figurative meaning from a metaphor vehicle directly and understand the figurative 
relation through a categorization process rather than by initiating a comparison process 
(Gentner & Bowdle, 2008). This shift from comparison to categorization processes could 
be expressed linguistically via a preference for the metaphor form (e.g., crime is a 
disease) rather than the equivalent simile form (crime is like a disease). Consistent with 
this hypothesis, Bowdle and Gentner (2005) found that participants preferred the 
metaphor form when the vehicle had a conventional figurative meaning.   
Previous research on simile and metaphor processing 
 Few studies have directly examined metaphor and simile processing. Previous 





indicate that they have understood the statement. With the exception of Johnson (1996), 
studies report few reading time differences for metaphors and similes (e.g., Chiappe, 
Kennedy, & Chiappe, 2003; Glucksberg & Haught, 2006; Jones & Estes, 2006). This 
general finding of no difference in comprehension time might suggest that metaphors and 
similes are not processed differently. But the offline nature of the tasks employed thus 
far, such as the time taken to read a sentence and then rate it, also raises the possibility 
that processing differences were not captured by measures of whole sentence reading.  
Previous research demonstrates that online studies using temporally sensitive 
measures, such as event-related potentials or eye movements, are able to detect subtle 
differences in literal vs. figurative language processing (e.g., Pynte, Besson, Robichon, & 
Poli, 1996). In an eye movement study that examined metaphor processing, Blasko and 
Briihl (1997) found that familiar metaphors received shorter first-pass fixations than 
unfamiliar metaphors.  Inhoff, Lima, and Carroll (1984) found that a context which 
facilitated the figurative meaning of the metaphor reduced reading times (see also Frisson 
& Pickering, 1999; Pickering & Frisson, 2001). Such online studies have contributed to 
our knowledge of figurative language processing, however no previous eye movement 
study has compared figurative and literal language processing using expressions that 
contain the same lexical items. 
The present study 
 To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the early, online processing 
of metaphors and comparable similes as it unfolds during the silent reading of text. We 
examined participants’ online interpretation of metaphors and similes by measuring their 





and aptness ratings for these topic-vehicle pairs to examine how processing might be 
affected by these variables. Eye movement technology tracks comprehension processes 
with multiple measures that include fixation times and re-reading patterns, which serve as 
indicators of processing difficulty (Rayner, 1998; 2009). Further, this method allowed us 
to monitor reading in the vehicle region specifically, yielding a more precise window into 
the time course of detecting figurative language. We also measured eye movements when 
reading the explanation region, which was the same plausible explanation for each pair of 
expressions (e.g., Friendship is/is like money because it is easier made than kept). 
Analyses of eye movements in the explanation region allowed detection of any 
comprehension effects that might arise later in sentence reading (i.e., after the critical 
vehicle region). 
In the present experiment, the simile vehicle regions and the metaphor vehicle 
regions were visually identical (see Table 4A). By measuring eye movements when 
reading identical text, we controlled for lexical effects that stem from the processing of 
particular words. Therefore, it is likely that our findings mainly reflect differences in the 











Table 4A: Example Simile and Metaphor Materials 
Rated Unfamiliar    
1. A. Bob says hair is like a rainbow because each head has many different colors. 
B. Bob says hair is a rainbow because each head has many different colors. 
2.  A. Henry thinks trees are like straws because they suck up nutrients. 
 B. Henry thinks trees are straws because they suck up nutrients. 
Rated Familiar 
      3.   A. Mary believes liquor is like a crutch because it is used in difficult situations. 
 B. Mary believes liquor is a crutch because it is used in difficult situations. 
4.  A. Amanda says television is like candy because it is both addictive and harmful. 
 B. Amanda says television is candy because it is both addictive and harmful. 
Our dependent measures included time spent reading in the vehicle region and in 
the explanation region during initial sentence reading (first-pass time), and the time spent 
processing the vehicle and the explanation if participants re-read the sentence (second 
pass time). We also gathered data about where the eyes traveled in the text (e.g., whether 
they moved forward to the right to process new text or regressed to the left to re-read 
previous text) and the length of the saccade after the vehicle was fixated. Longer 
fixations, shorter saccade amplitudes, and/or more regressions are known to be sensitive 





cognitive system first detects figurative language (e.g., metaphor) and how the processes 
engaged compare to those used for processing literal statements (e.g., similes).  
The three main theories of metaphor processing hold specific predictions for the 
eye movement data. The standard pragmatic model predicts longer first-pass times, 
shorter forward saccades from the vehicle, and more regressions in the metaphor than the 
simile conditions, as metaphors must be rejected as literal expressions and alternative 
meanings need to be sought. Once metaphors have been interpreted, then metaphor and 
simile processing would proceed in a similar fashion, and be reflected in comparable 
means for second-pass reading measures. The categorization model predicts faster first 
pass reading times and longer forward saccades from the vehicle in unfamiliar metaphors 
than unfamiliar similes. Familiar similes and metaphors should be processed with 
comparable effort. Also, one might expect fewer regressions from apt novel metaphors 
than novel similes, as apt metaphors should be processed more easily using 
categorization processes. Career of metaphor theory also claims that the familiarity of the 
expression matters. In addition, career of metaphor theory predicts that unfamiliar 
metaphors will be more difficult to process than unfamiliar similes, as a metaphor would 
usually appear in print only after the simile form has become familiar. Therefore, career 
theory would predict longer first-pass times, shorter forward saccades from the vehicle, 
and more regressions in the unfamiliar metaphor than the simile conditions. Once 
comparison processes were engaged, however, second-pass times should be comparable 
for unfamiliar metaphors and similes. Familiar metaphors, however, should be interpreted 
as easily as similes, reflected by comparable means for first-pass time, length of forward 







 Fifty native English speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal (via contact 
lenses) vision participated for course credit or payment of $7 US at the University of 




An Eyelink 1000 eye tracker monitored the location of the right eye, as 
participants viewed sentences binocularly. Viewing distance was 60 cm, and 3-4 
characters equaled approximately 1° of visual angle. Eye position data were sampled at 
1000 Hz.  
Materials 
The materials consisted of 66 topic-vehicle pairs (e.g., wrestler-gorilla) from 
which we created sets of metaphors and similes. Items in the simile and metaphor 
conditions were identical, with the exception of the addition of the word like in the simile 
condition; see Figure 4A for sample items in each condition. Each participant saw half of 
the topic-vehicle pairs presented as similes and the other half presented as metaphors. 
The 66 experimental items were combined with 88 filler items from unrelated 
experiments. Participants answered a yes/no comprehension question with a key press 
after 25% of the sentences, but they did not know in advance which sentences would be 





Previous studies have sometimes created novel metaphor statements by 
scrambling well-known metaphors. This procedure often leads to metaphors that are  
difficult to comprehend (e.g., a sauna is a fish; Jones & Estes, 2005). Instead, we used a 
set of topic-vehicle pairs that have been used in previous research (e.g., Chiappe, 
Kennedy, & Smykowski, 2003), and then restricted that list to those items which had at 
least four independent productions on the Internet, based on Google search results. 
Therefore, we expected the statements would be largely comprehensible, but that some 
would be relatively unfamiliar to participants.  
We tested the familiarity of the metaphors by asking 20 students who did not 
participate in the main experiment to rate the 66 metaphors on a scale of 1 to 7 (with 1 
being not at all familiar and 7 being very familiar). The mean novelty rating for all 
metaphors was 4.1. Twenty-six items were rated as unfamiliar (1-3, mean = 2.0). Forty 
items were rated as familiar (3 or higher, mean = 5.2).   
We also asked 20 students who did not participate in the main experiment to rate 
the aptness of 66 metaphors on a scale of 1 to 10 (with 1 being not at all apt and 10 being 
very apt). The mean aptness rating for all metaphors was 6.1. Twenty items were rated as 
very apt (>7). Thirty items were rated as moderately apt (5-7), and sixteen items were 
rated low in aptness (<5). Therefore, most of our items were fairly apt. 
Explanations for topic-vehicle pairs were obtained by entering the topic-vehicle 
pair as a simile in the Google search engine. The first explanation produced by the search 
engine was accepted if it followed coherently from the simile. If this was not the case, the 
next explanation was considered, until an adequate explanation was found. If no 






The experiment lasted 30–45 min. After the participant provided consent, he or 
she was seated at the eye tracker and instructed as to the format of the experiment. The 
tracker was then aligned and calibrated. A chin rest and forehead rest minimized head 
movements. Calibration was checked between trials and the tracker was recalibrated as 
necessary. Participants were asked to read normally for comprehension, and were told 
that a comprehension question would appear after some sentences. 
Data analyses  
Software developed at the University of Massachusetts was used to delete trial 
with blinks and to obtain subject and item averages for each condition 
(http://www.psych.umass.edu/eyelab/software). To address the question of whether 
skilled readers process metaphors and similes in a similar fashion, we examined two 
types of eye movement measures: (a) measures of processing time and (b) measures of 
the spatial pattern of fixations. Table 4B illustrates the two data analysis regions in each 












Table 4B: Vehicle and Explanation Regions used in the Data Analysis 
                                                            Vehicle                          Explanation 
Bob says hair is like a             |rainbow|   |because each head has many different colors.| 
Bob says hair is a                    |rainbow|   |because each head has many different colors.| 
Mary believes liquor is like a  |crutch|      |because it is used in difficult situations.| 
Mary believes liquor is a         |crutch|      |because it is used in difficult situations.| 
Measures of processing time indicate how long readers spent reading in a given 
region. First-pass time was calculated as the sum of all consecutive fixations in a region 
(e.g., the vehicle or the explanation) beginning with the first fixation and including 
additional fixations up until the eye moved to another area of the sentence. We report 
data from trials without regressions (>85% of all trials) in order to avoid the potential 
confound of higher regression rates with faster reading times (Rayner & Sereno, 1994; 
Altman, 1994). We also report second-pass time, or the time spent re-reading a region 
after returning to it. First-pass and second-pass time reflect early and later effects in 
language processing (Rayner, 1998).   
Measures describing the spatial pattern of fixations indicate where readers were 
looking as they read the similes and metaphors. In the present study, we analyzed three 
first-pass measures: forward saccade length, which is the length of the saccade after the 
first fixation in the region; launch site, or the length of the saccade that initially enters the 
region; and landing position of the first fixation in the region. These measures of first-
pass fixation locations are expressed in terms of number of characters. Two additional 





measure is calculated as the percentage of all trials in which first-pass fixations on the 
vehicle or the explanation were followed by a regression to earlier in the sentence. 
Regressions-in reports the percentage of all trials in which a regression landed in the 
initial region of the sentence and the vehicle region. Percentage data were subject to 
arcsine transformation for statistical testing.  
Predetermined cutoffs were used to trim the data (Rayner, 1998). Fixations on the 
target word that were under 100 ms were eliminated from the analysis since such short 
fixations do not seem to reflect cognitive processing of the target word (Rayner, 1998; 
Rayner & Pollatsek, 1987). To eliminate overly long fixations, we excluded fixations 
over 500 ms from our analysis. Approximately 2% of the data were lost due to these 
cutoffs and track losses. The remaining data were subject to two sets of 2 x 2 analyses of 
variance (ANOVAs) by subjects (F1) and items (F2). In the first set of ANOVAs, we 
tested for effects of familiarity (high and low) and expression type (simile and metaphor). 
In the Subjects analyses, both factors were treated as within-subjects variables. In the 
items analyses, type of expression was treated as a within factor and familiarity as a 
between factor. The same eye movement measures were obtained for the vehicle and 
explanation regions, then subject to statistical analyses. All participants responded 
accurately to 80% or more of the comprehension questions.  
Lexical variables, such as word frequency and length, are known to affects eye 
movement measures (see Rayner, 1998). Given that most of our materials were natural 
occurrences found on the internet, rather than laboratory constructions, controlling for 
lexical differences in our familiar and unfamiliar items was difficult. We conducted post-





respect to letter length and frequency. On average, the unfamiliar vehicles occurred 36 
times per million words (SE=12.8) and the familiar vehicles occurred 113 times per 
million words (SE=48.5) (Francis & Kucera, 1982). The mean length of the unfamiliar 
vehicles (7.2) was significantly different from the mean length of the familiar vehicles 
(5.9), F (1, 64) = 6.12, p<.05. Given the influence of these lexical factors on eye 
movements, we included frequency and length as covariates in follow-up items analyses 
when a familiarity effect appeared. Thus, the familiarity effects we report are those found 
to be significant after accounting for word frequency and length.   
As previous research has suggested that metaphor aptness may also play a critical 
role in metaphor processing, we ran a second set of ANOVAs to test for aptness effects in 
each measure. To maximize the number of less apt items, the midpoint of the rating scale 
(5) served as the boundary between less apt and more apt items. As in previous research, 
aptness ratings were correlated with familiarity ratings (r = .28, p<.05). Although aptness 
effects appeared in a few eye movement measures, only one aptness effect remained 
significant when both familiarity and aptness were included in the ANOVAs (2x2x2). For 
completeness, we note null effects of aptness in measures that yielded familiarity effects. 
Results 
The Vehicle Region: Initial Processing Measures 
First-pass times. The mean first-pass times for trials without regressions from the 
analysis region are presented in Table 4C. Initial tests indicated a main effect of 
familiarity, F1(1,49)= 37.54, p< .001, F2(1,64)= 8.33, p<.005, and an interaction between 
familiarity and expression type, F1(1,49)= 5.97, p< .05, F2(1,64)= 10.78, p<.005. 





unfamiliar vehicles. When word frequency and length were entered as covariates, these 
main effects were significant, F2(1,62)= 25.54, p<.0001, and F2(1,62)= 42.67, p<.0001, 
which indicates that lexical differences between familiar and unfamiliar vehicles 
accounted for the main effect of familiarity. However, the analysis of covariance also 
confirmed a significant interaction between expression type and familiarity, F2(1,62)= 
5.37, p<.05, suggesting longer first-pass durations for unfamiliar than familiar metaphors, 
F2(1,62)= 6.98, p<.01, but no comparable familiarity effect for similes, F2<1. A similar 
analysis that tested aptness, rather than familiarity, indicated no significant interaction 
between expression type and aptness F2(1,62)=1.93, p>.15. To ensure that this null result 
did not stem from inadequate power, we conducted a follow-up simple effects test of 
expression type for the low aptness items only (F<1). 
Table 4C: Mean Reading Times for Vehicles 
Unfamiliar Familiar 
First-pass time 
Simile    282    261   
Metaphor   308    267    
Second-pass time 
Simile    205   241    
Metaphor   298   263   
Forward saccade length. Table 4D presents the mean length of the forward 





effect of expression type, F1(1,49)= 7.95, p< .01, F2(1,64)= 8.99, p<.005, indicating that 
forward saccade lengths were significantly shorter in the metaphor than the simile 
condition. This result is unexpected, given that the average landing position on simile 
vehicles is closer to the explanation region (see Table 4D); saccades leaving simile 
vehicles should be shorter than saccades leaving metaphor vehicles. Therefore, the 
observed difference is not easily accounted for by low-level factors, and it may indicate 
greater initial difficulty processing metaphors than similes, as saccades are generally 
shorter when reading more difficult text as well as among less skilled readers (Rayner, 
1998). The following two measures are included to provide interested readers with a 
complete description of significant results that may help with interpreting the saccade 
length effect.  
Launch site. Table 4D also presents the mean number of characters before the 
vehicle from which saccades to the first vehicle fixation were launched. Statistical tests 
returned a main effect of expression type, F1(1,49)= 10.72, p< .05, F2(1,64)= 10.82, 
p<.005, indicating that the average initial saccade into the vehicle region was shorter for 
similes than metaphors, as would be expected if readers were likely to launch a 
proportion of their saccades to simile vehicles from the preceding word like. Neither 
familiarity nor aptness effects appeared in this measure (Fs<2). 
 Landing position. Table 4D also presents the mean number of characters into the 
vehicle that first fixations landed on in each condition. On average, the eyes landed a 
fraction of a character further into simile vehicles than metaphor vehicles, resulting in a 
main effect of expression type, F1(1,49)= 14.96, p< .001, F2(1,64)= 20.71, p<.001. This 





saccades of the same length land in different places if the launch site differs). A main 
effect of familiarity appeared, F1(1,49)= 19.14, p< .001, F2(1,64)= 4.911, p<.05, 
indicating that the eyes landed further into unfamiliar than familiar vehicles. However, 
the analysis of covariance indicated that this effect could be accounted for by lexical 
factors such as word frequency, F2(1,62)= 8.22, p<.01, and word length, F2(1,62)= 
116.74, p<.0001. A similar analysis that tested for aptness indicated no effect (F<1). 
Table 4D: Spatial Pattern of First-Pass Fixations for Vehicles 
Unfamiliar Familiar 
Forward saccade length (characters) 
Simile     8.6  8.4 
Metaphor    8.1  8.1 
Launch site (characters before Vehicle) 
Simile     4.9  5.1 
Metaphor    5.4  5.5 
Landing position (characters into Vehicle) 
Simile     2.9  2.5 







The Vehicle Region: Re-reading Measures 
Second-pass times. The mean second-pass times for trials in which participants 
re-read appear in Table 4A. Statistical tests returned a main effect of expression type, 
F1(1,49)= 26.34, p< .001, F2(1,64)= 17.78, p<.001, and means indicated that participants 
spent more time re-reading vehicles in metaphors than in similes, irrespective of their 
familiarity or aptness (Fs<1).  
Regressions out. Table 4E contains the regression means. Although the overall 
mean regression rate was low (about 8%), expression type did affect this measure. 
Readers regressed more often when reading metaphor vehicles (14%) than simile 
vehicles (6%), F1(1,49)= 23.01, p<.001, F2(1,64)= 22.42, p<.001, indicating that 
metaphors were more difficult to process. Since metaphors cannot be resolved literally—
for they are literally false—the incremental process of sentence integration may have 
been interrupted in a few cases and triggered the eyes to return to an earlier point in the 
sentence to re-evaluate the phrase. Contrasts between regressions-out from the short 
vehicle regions and the longer explanation regions indicate that readers were more likely 
to regress from vehicles than from explanations, F1(1,49)= 6.44, p<.05, F2(1,64)= 36.25, 
p<.001. This suggests that readers were more likely to respond immediately to difficulties 
with sentence integration  than to wait until they reached the explanation region, 
irrespective of expression type.  
 Regressions-in. Table 4E also indicates, there was a main effect of expression 
type, F1(1,49)= 12.45, p<.001, F2(1,64)= 12.53, p<.001, indicating that readers returned 






Table 4E: Regression Data 
    Unfamiliar Familiar 
Regressions out (%) from the Vehicle  
Simile          5      7 
Metaphor     14    14  
Regressions out (%) from the Explanation  
Simile          5     4  
Metaphor       9     9  
Regressions in (%) to Vehicle from Explanation   
Simile          3     3    
Metaphor        7     6  
The Explanation Region: Initial Processing Measure  
First-pass time. These means appear in Table 4F. In the explanation region, there 
was a significant main effect of familiarity in the subjects but not the items analyses, 
F1(1,49)= 15.29, p< .001, F2(1,64)= 1.31, p>.25, and no effect of expression type 
appeared (Fs<1). Tests for an effect of aptness were not significant (Fs<1), nor were tests 
for an interaction with expression type, F1(1,49)= 2.8, p=.10, F2(1,64) <1. 
The Explanation Region: Re-reading Measures 
Second-pass time. These means are also presented in Table 4F, and there was a 





p<.05. Skilled readers spent longer re-reading explanations that followed metaphors than 
those that followed similes. 
 Regressions-out. Aldo shown in Table 4F, readers regressed from metaphor 
explanations more often (9%) than simile explanations (4.7%), F1(1,49)= 18.06, p<.001, 
F2(1,64)= 20.17, p<.001. The likelihood of regressions from explanations was 
comparable to that observed when skill readers process non-figurative sentences (Rayner, 
1998).2 In addition, items analyses that accounted for familiarity and frequency indicated 
that readers were more likely to regress from the explanations of less apt similes (7%) 
and metaphors (14%) than from more apt similes (4%) and metaphors (8%), F2(1,62)= 
5.09, p<.05. 
Table 4F: Mean Reading Time for the Explanation Region 
 Unfamiliar Familiar 
 First-pass time 
Simile    1090   1173  
Metaphor   1119   1179  
Second-pass time 
Simile    1007      959  
Metaphor   1075   1079 
Discussion 
In the present study, we used eye tracking to investigate the early, online 





were monitored as they silently read metaphors and similes that contained identical words 
(with the exception of like). Several measures indicated that eye movements recorded 
during metaphor reading differed from those recorded during simile reading, which 
suggests that readers engaged at least some distinct processes when reading metaphors. 
This study yielded two novel findings that, together, provide an online view of early 
metaphor processing as it unfolds during reading.  
First, skilled readers seemed to have more initial difficulty processing metaphor 
than simile expressions. This early metaphor processing difficulty was reflected in one 
first-pass measure (the length of the first forward-going saccade in the vehicle region) as 
well as in re-reading patterns (a higher proportion of regressions and longer re-reading 
times). Second, an initial metaphor familiarity effect was observed in first pass reading 
time, such that readers spent longer reading vehicles in unfamiliar metaphor expressions 
than when these same vehicles were presented in the corresponding simile expression. In 
contrast, readers spent a comparable amount of time reading vehicles in familiar 
metaphors and similes. Furthermore, whereas vehicles were read faster in familiar than 
unfamiliar metaphors, we observed similar reading times for vehicles in familiar and 
unfamiliar similes.  Thus, familiarity seems to facilitate the early processing of metaphors 
but not similes. This result is consistent with the familiarity effect that Blasko and Briihl 
(1997) found, in that unfamiliar metaphors elicited longer whole sentence reading times 
than familiar metaphors. The present data demonstrate that the familiarity of figurative 
language affected reading processes as soon as the vehicle word was identified.  
Overall, the eye movement data reveal differences in the early reading patterns of 





probability of regressions, and longer re-reading times are indicators of reading difficulty. 
The present study found a similar data pattern when we compared metaphor and simile 
reading on several measures. Readers made shorter forward saccades when leaving 
metaphor vehicles than simile vehicles. This effect could not be accounted for by landing 
position on the vehicle, as saccades were shorter in the simile condition than the 
metaphor condition when entering the vehicle region. The import of finding that readers 
make shorter saccades when leaving metaphor vehicles than simile vehicles is not 
completely clear. At minimum, these data indicate that the cognitive system differentiates 
between figurative and literal statements very quickly. A more liberal view of the data 
might claim it suggests an effect of higher-order comprehension processes on the forward 
progress of the eyes through the text. In other words, it may be that the eyes slow down in 
response to processing difficulties. Another indication that readers had more difficulty 
processing metaphor vehicles is the higher probability of regressions and longer re-
reading times for metaphor than simile vehicles. Therefore, multiple eye movement 
measures indicate that early metaphor processing demands more cognitive resources than 
early simile processing, which converges with other online studies that suggest that 
comprehending metaphorical sentences recruits more cognitive resources than does 
comprehending literal sentences (e.g., Coulson &Van Petten, 2002; Lai, Curran, & Menn, 
2009; Tartter, Gomes, Dubrovsky, Molholm, & Stewart, 2002).  
The eye movement data hold implications for understanding the early phases of 
online metaphor processing. Information about the timing of these processes is available 
from first-pass measures of reading time and the spatial pattern of fixations. Finding 





suggests that skilled readers typically detected unfamiliar metaphors when the vehicle 
was first fixated, rather than downstream. Therefore, these data demonstrate that 
familiarity affects the processing of metaphors within 250 ms of fixating the vehicle. This 
provides converging evidence that skilled readers quickly integrate words into an 
ongoing semantic representation as soon as they are identified (Rayner, 1998; Rayner & 
Duffy, 1986), and extends that quick integration to figurative language processing.  
The spatial pattern of fixations provides another indicator of the time course of 
metaphor processing. Recall that readers’ saccades were longer going into metaphor than 
simile vehicles, but saccades were shorter when leaving metaphor than simile vehicles. 
This shift in relative saccade amplitude constrains the time window of metaphor detection 
because saccade amplitude is set when the saccade is programmed (Vergilino-Perez & 
Beauvillain, 2004). In other words, the amplitude effect would be unlikely to appear 
unless metaphor detection occurred before the leaving saccade was programmed, which 
occurs around 120 ms before the end of the fixation (in order to account for eye 
movement programming time). As the mean reading time for metaphor vehicles was 288 
ms, readers should have detected the figurative relation no later than 170 ms into the 
fixation on the vehicle in order for expression type to affect the forward saccade. 
Therefore, these data suggest that the cognitive system initiates figurative language 
processing somewhat earlier than has been suggested by other online studies (e.g., 
Kazmerski, Blasko, & Dessalegn, 2003; Pynte et al., 1996).  
Finally, the present study holds several implications for existing theories of 
metaphor processing. We note that no one theory was fully able to account for our results 





of eye movement data, we are necessarily measuring only the early phases of metaphor 
processing. Therefore, predicted effects that did not appear here may arise in later phases 
of processing. Also, we recognize that null effects of aptness in several measures can be 
attributed to the composition of our materials, as we intentionally sought metaphors that 
were relatively apt. Therefore, further research is needed to provide a true test of whether 
aptness affects early metaphor processing. As we recognize that “absence of proof is not 
proof of absence” (William Cowper), the following discussion focuses on the significant 
effects that did appear in this study.  
Our online data produced patterns of means that are consistent with some of the 
predictions derived from career of metaphor theory, categorization theory, and pragmatic 
theory.  First, finding longer reading times on metaphor vehicles that were unfamiliar 
than those that were familiar, with no corresponding difference appearing in simile 
condition, was consistent with both career of metaphor theory and categorization theory. 
Relatively novel metaphors (e.g., life is a bottle) may have caused readers difficulty 
because a categorical relationship between life and bottle was not yet stored in memory. 
When reading similes, however, skilled readers may have interpreted the vehicle in its 
literal form by comparing the topic with the vehicle, irrespective of its familiarity 
(Gentner & Bowdle, 2008).  In contrast, this metaphor familiarity effect on initial vehicle 
reading time is not predicted by the classic pragmatic model, which does not make 
specific predictions for familiarity in metaphor processing. 
The second prediction of career of metaphor theory, that novel metaphors are 
resolved by initiating a comparison process, received less support in this study.  If 





reading times and regression patterns for the simile and unfamiliar metaphor expressions 
would be similar. Instead, re-reading times and regressions rates were longer for 
metaphors than similes in both the vehicle and explanation regions, irrespective of 
familiarity, which suggests that when major interpretation difficulties occurred, the 
effects spanned the full sentence. These data are consistent with pragmatic theory. The 
longer re-reading times for explanations following metaphors than explanations that 
follow similes suggests that metaphor interpretation continues long after the eyes have 
moved on to new text.  Finding longer re-reading times and higher regression rates in 
metaphor reading suggests that metaphors and similes are processed somewhat 
differently regardless of aptness or familiarity.   
One possible explanation for such differences in our re-reading measures is that 
metaphors are initially processed by predication—rather than categorization—regardless 
of their familiarity or aptness level, while similes are initially treated as comparisons also 
regardless of their familiarity or aptness level. This suggestion might help explain why 
certain reading-time measurements were not affected by familiarity or aptness, but were 
instead better predicted by the type of expression read (i.e., metaphor or simile). We say 
predication in the case of metaphors because to assume that lawyers are sharks is an 
actual categorization implies that at some level of representation the two arguments—
lawyers and sharks—belong to the same category. The processing consequence, as 
suggested by other researchers (Gentner & Bowdle, 2008; Glucksberg, 2008, Glucksberg 
& Haught, 2006) is that the vehicle is treated differently depending on whether it is read 
in a metaphor or in a simile. Under this hypothesis, the vehicle in metaphors would 





entity status as the topic, thus inviting a literal interpretation. That is, a simile vehicle 
may be taken to be the entity against which the topic is compared, without predicating its 
content to the topic. The predication involved in metaphor processing may incur extra 
processing resources, which is consistent with our finding of shorter forward saccade 
lengths after reading metaphor vehicles than simile vehicles. While our study does not 
provide direct evidence for such a semantic difference in vehicles, we assume that some 
difference contributes to the effects we observed in the vehicle region.   
 In summary, this study examined metaphor and simile processing by recording 
eye movements during silent reading. Effects appeared during the initial reading of the 
vehicle as well as during re-reading of the vehicle and explanation regions.  In terms of 
first-pass effects, we found a familiarity effect on metaphor reading time that did not 
appear for the simile sentences. An effect of expression type appeared very early in the 
eye movement record: processing differences between similes and metaphors initially 
registered as differences in forward saccade amplitude. No effect of aptness appeared in 
our initial reading measures. Re-reading occurred in a minority of trials, with participants 
re-reading the metaphors more often and for longer than the similes. These later measures 
were not affected by familiarity. Thus, differences in eye movements when reading 
metaphors and similes appear to reflect primarily the different interpretive processes 
yielded by the two types of expressions, as suggested by the standard pragmatic model 
(Searle, 1979; Grice, 1989). For example, those familiar with the Forest Gump simile, 
Life is like a box of chocolates (and its explanation, you never know what you are going 
to get) may find that the entity box of chocolates brings to mind a literal representation of 





metaphor form, Life is a box of chocolates may take box of chocolates to predicate 
something about life—possibly its diversity, sweetness, and so forth. The explanation 
brings to the original simile the conditions for the expressed comparison, but it would 
arguably be disruptive of the established predication. We suggest that the two expressions 
engender different interpretations—and thus that metaphors may be like similes, but that 
metaphors are not similes.  
Endnotes  
1. A similar pattern held for the initial region of the sentence as well, F1(1,49)= 28.62, p<.001, F2(1,64)= 
42.51, p<.001. An interaction between expression type and region was also significant F1(1,49)= 8.06, 
p<.01, F2(1,64)= 10.09, p<.005, indicating the higher proportion of regressions into the initial regions of 
metaphors. 
2. Regressions-in were not calculated for the final, explanation, region in the sentence because its position 











Chapter 5: Alzheimer’s Disease Patients’ Interpretations of Metaphors and Similes  
 The results found in Chapter 4 were more consistent with the prediction that 
metaphors would require increased processing. In the discussion chapter, I will address 
some possible reasons for why this paradigm and moving window could have produced 
different results. In my opinion, the most important result was the longer saccade lengths 
found for metaphor vehicles regardless the familiarity level. This result suggests that 
some process remains unique to metaphor which requires additional cognitive effort. 
Furthermore, faster reading times for more familiar metaphors, but not similes, is 
consistent with the prediction that a particular meaning becomes associated with a 
metaphor vehicle. Note, however, that we did not find evidence suggesting metaphors are 
understood as similes. Instead, metaphors remained more difficult than similes at all 
levels of familiarity. 
 If metaphors do require a unique process that leads to metaphors and similes 
being interpreted differently, then this process could be diminished in cognitively 
impaired populations such as Alzheimer’s Disease patients who may have diminished 
cognitive abilities for understanding metaphors. In contrast, if similes, but not metaphors, 
are understood literally, and do not require the same cognitive steps needed for 
understanding metaphors, then this population could retain the ability to comprehend 
similes.  This chapter presents a study that tests this hypothesis by examining the 
interpretation of metaphors and similes in people diagnosed with probable Alzheimer’s 
Disease (AD).  
We had three central research questions in this chapter. First, would AD patients 





greater cognitive effort than similes, as suggested by the results found in Chapter 4, AD 
patients could show greater ease interpreting similes. Our second research question was 
whether apt and familiar metaphors would be easier to comprehend? Chapter 4 had 
suggested that more familiar metaphors are easier to comprehend, whereas none of the 
studies in Chapters 3 and 4 had found a correlation between aptness and reading times. It 
is possible that in a cognitively impaired population, apt metaphors would be easier to 
comprehend because they reflect more salient properties; an argument revisited in the 
final chapter. Our third research question was whether individual differences could 
predict higher metaphor interpretation scores? We compared patients’ abilities to 
interpret metaphors and similes with multiple cognitive abilities. This assessment can 
help indicate what processes are important for understanding metaphors and similes. 
We thank Dr. N.P. Vasavan Nair and associated staff at Douglas Mental Health 
University Institute, Raffaela Cavaliere and associated staff at the Alzheimer’s Society of 
Montreal, and Melissa Hindley and associated staff at the Sunrise Retirement Home in 
Beaconsfield, for their assistance with the recruitment of participants. Elderly 
participants, who provided aptness and familiarity aptness, as well as metaphor 
interpretations, were recruited from the general public with the assistance of Leah and 
Marnie McQuire.  
 At Sunrise Retirement Home, Melissa Hindley and Vanessa Manco assisted with 
the collection of MoCA and MMSE scores. For the rest of the participants, Nancy 
Azevedo assisted with data collection. Finally, Marco DeCaro served as the second judge 





lead author who wrote the first draft. Dr. Roberto G. de Almeida contributed to the 






The Importance of Being Apt:  
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 Recent studies have found that patients with Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) have no 
difficulty understanding metaphors that are familiar (e.g., lawyers are sharks; Amanzio, 
Geminiani, Leotta, & Cappa, 2008). Studies with healthy subjects, however, have showed 
that metaphors that are apt—i.e., those metaphors considered to capture well the 
relationship between a topic (e.g., music) and a vehicle (e.g., medicine), as in music is 
medicine – are also easy to understand, even when they are unfamiliar (Blasko & 
Connine, 1994; Jones & Estes, 2006). We presented AD patients (N=11) metaphors that 
were familiar and apt (e.g. knowledge is power), more apt than familiar (e.g., music is 
medicine), more familiar than apt (e.g., cities are jungles), or neither apt nor familiar 
(e.g., anger is heart). In an interpretation task, AD patients performed worse than elderly 
controls only in those items considered familiar but not apt. Independent aptness ratings 
were found to correlate with participants’ metaphor interpretation scores. These results 
suggest that AD patients produce good metaphor interpretations, even for unfamiliar 











 Metaphors are said to permeate everyday language use—so much so that some 
authors believe that most, if not all, our linguistic expressions convey some form of 
metaphorical concept (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Thus, it is somewhat surprising that, to 
date, only a few studies have investigated how people with Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) 
interpret metaphors (e.g., Amanzio, Germianiani, Leotta, & Cappa, 2008; Papagno, 2001, 
Winner & Gardner, 1977). We report a study on the interpretation of metaphors by AD 
patients, examining, in particular, which variables—such as aptness and familiarity—
might affect how patients understand the relationship between a topic (x) and a vehicle 
(y) in metaphors of the form x is y (e.g., music is medicine).   
Metaphor Interpretation in People living with Alzheimer’s Disease 
 In one of the first studies examining metaphor interpretation in AD, Winner and 
Gardner (1977) presented a metaphorical statement (e.g., heavy heart) to seven 
individuals diagnosed with pre-senile dementia and probable AD, and asked them to pick 
among four pictures one that best matched the statement. Two of the picture-types used 
are relevant to the present paper: one that matched the figurative meaning of the 
metaphor (a picture of a man crying), and a second one which displayed the literal form 
(a person having difficulty walking due to carrying a large red heart). AD patients were 
found to pick the picture representing the metaphorical meaning as many times as the 
picture representing the literal meaning (45% and 44% respectively). The results 
suggested that AD patients can have difficulty interpreting metaphors via their intended 





 One limitation to the study by Winner and Gardner was a lack of information 
regarding the impairment level of the participants. Consequently, it remained unclear 
whether metaphor interpretation difficulties were an early-, middle-, or late-stage 
symptoms of AD. Also, no cognitive or verbal tests were reported that could have 
checked for possible relationships between these abilities and metaphor interpretation. 
Papagno (2001) helped answer some of these questions in a longitudinal study, where AD 
patients were asked to interpret conventional metaphors whose meanings were expected 
to be very familiar to participants. At first examination, 19 patients out of 39 (49%) 
showed normal performance in all language tests. Metaphor comprehension was actually 
found to be the least impaired linguistic ability at first examination. When AD patients 
were retested at a later stage, there was an overall decrease in verbal fluency and 
metaphor comprehension, yet a large number of participants still had no trouble 
providing the correct interpretation for various metaphors. These results led Papagno to 
conclude that language impairment, especially for figurative language, is not an early 
symptom of AD and may only occur late into the progression of the disease.  
 While these results suggested that AD patients are efficient at providing the 
correct interpretation for metaphors, it is important to remember that there are many 
additional variables that can affect the ease of comprehending metaphors (Giora, 1997, 
2003). Winner and Gardner (1977), for example, reported difficulty for half of their 
metaphorical statements, but it is not clear whether certain factors related to the items 
themselves made some metaphors more difficult to comprehend than others. Familiarity, 
for example, is a variable that can make opaque metaphors and idioms much easier to 





meaning is not derived from the individual lexical items (Gibbs, 1999). The first time a 
person hears the idiom John bought the farm (which in English means that John has died) 
the listener may be unaware of the associated figurative meaning and construct a literal 
meaning based on the denotational meaning of the words in the sentence. Once someone 
is aware of the figurative meaning, however, it is possible that they can simply retrieve 
that meaning from memory to deduce the correct interpretation of the idiom. The ability 
to retrieve a salient meaning from memory is also assumed for conventional metaphors, 
such as stating that a film is a blockbuster, or insult metaphors such as john is a pig, 
where there is a strongly associated conventional figurative meaning. Thus, idioms and 
conventional metaphors are assumed to initiate similar retrieval processes whereby the 
meaning is possibly retrieved from memory. For less familiar or new metaphors, such as 
genes are blueprints or deserts are ovens, an interpretation is possible, but if one has not 
heard this statement previously, then one must construct a meaning online. The 
construction of a sentence’s meaning is thus assumed to use certain cognitive abilities, 
but as such abilities are presumably impaired in AD patients, there is an expected 
difficulty for constructing the meaning of new metaphors.  
 Previous studies (Winner & Gardner, 1977; Papagno, 2001) did not report the 
familiarity level of their items, or simply reported that all of the items were familiar, 
leaving open the possibility that AD patients had no difficulty interpreting metaphors—as 
in the case of Papagno’s (2001) study—because all the metaphors were familiar. 
Amanzio, Germiniani, Leotta, and Cappa (2008) tested this familiarity hypothesis by 
asking participants diagnosed with AD to interpret conventional metaphors as well as 





conventional metaphors, whose meanings are very well known, because patients would 
simply need to retrieve the associated figurative meaning from memory. In contrast, AD 
patients would have more difficulty with novel metaphors, whose meaning must be 
constructed. To further support this retrieval-construction hypothesis as the main cause of 
poor interpretation performance, participants’ ability to interpret conventional and new 
metaphors was compared to their interpretations for idioms, which are also assumed to 
simply rely on memory retrieval.  
 The results supported the predictions. In addition to conventional metaphors, AD 
patients also showed good interpretation (similar to controls) for idioms. Novel 
metaphors were the only category where AD patients displayed a relative impairment 
compared to controls. AD patients’ performance in verbal and visual reasoning tasks 
were also the best predictors of metaphor interpretation scores; as well as scores on 
executive function tasks. Amanzio et al. (2008) took these results to support their 
argument that the main obstacle faced by individuals when interpreting novel metaphors 
is the need to construct a meaning that relies on impaired executive functions: “if the 
central executive is damaged, the ability to create a new resemblance, required to 
understand a novel metaphor, may be defective” (p.7). When the process was retrieval 
rather than construction, AD patients performed as well as controls. 
Present Study 
 The studies examining metaphor interpretation to date have found two main 
results. First, metaphor interpretation is relatively preserved in AD patients, especially 





people diagnosed with AD will have difficulty interpreting a metaphor must also take 
into account features related to metaphor itself, such as the item’s familiarity level. The 
goal of the present study was to further investigate metaphor interpretation in AD, in 
particular, whether the familiarity effect found for metaphors (Amanzio et al., 2008) 
might actually reflect an aptness effect. 
 Aptness is defined as how well a statement expresses its figurative meaning 
(Chiappe & Kennedy, 2000). Past studies have found that unfamiliar statements can be 
comprehended easily when apt (e.g., Blasko & Connine, 1993), leading some researchers 
to argue that aptness could possibly be a more important variable for metaphor 
comprehension than familiarity (e.g., Chiappe, Kennedy, & Chiappe, 2003; Glucksberg, 
2003, 2008; Glucksberg & Haught, 2006b). However, determining whether aptness or 
familiarity is a more important variable has been difficult because several studies report 
large positive correlations between aptness and familiarity ratings (Jones & Estes, 2006). 
These results cast doubts on studies that have relied on subjective ratings of familiarity 
from participants because these ratings may have actually reflected the items’ aptness 
level (Jones & Estes, 2005). For example, the novel metaphors employed by Amanzio et 
al. (2008) were those that had received an aptness score above 3.5 (on a 7-point scale). 
However, aptness ratings were never collected for the conventional metaphors, as their 
only requirement was a familiarity rating above 3.5 (on a 7-point scale), leaving open the 
possibility that these items were also significantly more apt, as well as more familiar. 
Therefore, AD patients may have provided more correct interpretations for conventional 
metaphors in the study by Amanzio et al. (2008) because those items’ aptness levels were 





 In order to control for the effects of aptness and familiarity in the present study, 
we created item groups based on familiarity ratings, as was done by Amanzio et al. 
(2008), but also categorized items based on aptness ratings to ultimately create four item 
groups. Based on the results found in previous studies, we expected our aptness and 
familiarity ratings would be highly correlated; thus, we did not expect to find items that 
would be familiar, but not apt, or vice-versa. Instead, we created groups that were either 
high or low on both variables, and item groups that were relatively higher in either 
familiarity or aptness. By comparing the scores for items high on both aptness and 
familiarity to a group of items that is relatively lower on one of these variables, we can 
examine whether a decrease in aptness or familiarity would have a greater impact on 
metaphor interpretation scores. For example, if aptness is a more important variable than 
familiarity, then AD patients should demonstrate good interpretation scores, compared to 
elderly controls, for those items that are considered apt, despite being rated less familiar. 
In contrast, if familiarity is more important than aptness, then statements considered more 
familiar than apt should be well interpreted despite the lower aptness level.  
 We also decided to run correlations between the different ratings and the 
metaphor interpretation scores to determine whether an item’s aptness or familiarity 
rating was a better predictor of metaphor interpretation scores. One concern, however, 
was that our familiarity ratings might reflect aptness rather than general prevalence. 
When Thibodeau and Durgin (2011) collected aptness ratings, familiarity ratings, and an 
objective measure of familiarity (Google production counts), they found the familiarity 
ratings were positively correlated with aptness ratings, but not with Google production 





and Google production totals. Therefore, the familiarity ratings seemed to reflect the 
items’ aptness rather than their general frequency. More specifically, people seem to rate 
a statement as familiar when they also consider the statement apt, but less familiar if it is 
not considered apt. To control for the possibility that our familiarity ratings would reflect 
the item's aptness rather than its general frequency, we also collected Google Internet 
frequency counts as an objective measure of the item's familiarity level. By running 
correlations between the ratings and scores collected, we could check whether our 
familiarity ratings were more related to the item's aptness level, or reflective of the item’s 
general frequency in the real world. Furthermore, this procedure allowed us to examine 
Google counts as a predictor of AD patients’ metaphor interpretation scores.  
Additional Cognitive and Linguistic Variables  
 In addition to examining how different levels of familiarity and aptness impact 
metaphor interpretation, we examined whether a participant’s ability to infer a 
relationship between two objects would predict their ability to interpret metaphors. 
Constructing the meaning of a metaphor often involves understanding the relationship 
between two terms (e.g., time-money), hereafter called the topic (time) and the vehicle 
(money). The topic is typically mentioned first and is the subject of the statement. For 
example, time is money is a statement about time. The vehicle, money, is understood to 
predicate something about time, and the listener is required to understand what properties 
about time are being made salient by money when someone states the metaphor time is 
money. Therefore, we were especially interested in scores obtained in the similarity 
judgments task from the WAIS-IV. In this task, participants are asked what is similar 





based on the quality of the answer provided. This score is a good measure of a 
participant’s ability to create a new resemblance between two objects. Participants’ with 
higher similarity judgment scores were predicted to also produce better metaphor 
interpretations. 
 An additional cognitive test was the digit span task (a sub-test of the WAIS-IV) as 
a measure of a person’s working memory capacity. Constructing the meaning of a 
metaphor presumably requires being able to hold both the topic and vehicle terms in 
working memory, and participants with an extremely short digit span might not be able to 
hold the topic term once the vehicle term itself is processed. Consequently, participants 
found to have a very limited digit span would also be expected to display poor metaphor 
interpretation abilities.  
 The final question of interest was whether participants would have an easier time 
interpreting a metaphor such as the mall is a zoo if it was presented as a simile (the mall 
is like a zoo). Career of Metaphor theory (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Gentner & Bowdle, 
2008) argues that the comprehension of a novel metaphor involves a comparison process 
between the terms within a metaphor (e.g., teachers-sculptors). More specifically, to 
understand a new metaphor such as teachers are sculptors, the metaphor must be 
understood as a simile (a metaphorical comparison) via the form teachers are like 
sculptors. Relying on Career of Metaphor theory, we can recast the difficulties faced by 
people diagnosed with AD when trying to interpret a new metaphor. When a novel 
expression is presented as a metaphor (e.g., hair is a rainbow), the hearer is invited to 
access a stored metaphorical sense that does not in fact exist, making comprehension 





the metaphor understood as a simile (hair is like a rainbow). AD patients, however, have 
central executive impairments (Amaznio et al., 2008; Baddeley, Della Sala, Gray, 
Papagno, & Spinnler, 1997), and these impairments could hinder their ability to mentally 
convert a metaphor into a simile. To test the hypothesis that the main obstacle faced by 
AD patients when interpreting a new metaphor is converting that form into a simile, the 
present study asked participants to interpret both metaphors (e.g., deserts are ovens) and 
comparable similes (deserts are like ovens). If AD patients have difficulty interpreting 
new metaphors because they are unable to mentally convert such statements into similes, 
then they should produce better interpretations when metaphors are presented as similes. 
Method 
Participants 
 Eleven patients with probable AD (age range 55-84, M = 74), diagnosed with 
mild-to-moderate cognitive impairment were recruited with assistance from the 
Alzheimer’s Society of Montreal, as well as Sunrise of Beaconsfield, a retirement 
community in Beaconsfield, Quebec. Participants were referred to us as individuals who 
had been given a diagnosis of AD according to the criteria specified by the National 
Institute of Neurological and Communicative Disorders and Stroke-Alzheimer’s Disease 
and Related Disorders Association (NINCDS-ADRDA; McKhann et al., 1984), and had 
no other diagnosed dementia or pathology. The study was fully explained to each 
participant and they gave written informed consent to participate in the study. 
Furthermore, MoCAs and MMSEs were administered to all AD patients, with the 





commands, and have an MMSE score of at least 16. All participants passed this criteria, 
and were able to comply with the requirements of cognitive testing.   
 Ten elderly controls (age range 63-86) were recruited from either Sunrise of 
Beaconsfield, were caregivers of the participants diagnosed with AD, or recruited from 
the general public. For elderly controls, only the MoCA was administered, with the 
requirement that all elderly controls obtain a score above 25. All participants (AD 
patients and elderly controls) were native speakers of English, or had a fluent command 
of English (n = 2) having both attended university in English and worked professionally 
their entire lives in English. Therefore, these participants’ English proficiency level was 
considered sufficient for the present study. All participants had a minimum education 
level of 6 years. Demographic and neuropsychology data for the two participant groups 




























Similarity Judgment Score 
 
P 84 17 19           26  10  13 
P 68 14 21           29     14  29 
P 82 15 26           29 14  29 
P 55 15 14           16 8  21 
P 71 14 16           23 10  23 
P 83 17 22           30 12  21 
P 84 21 17           26 13  11 
P 76 13 14           21 13  0 
P 86 11 16           18 13  19 
P 81 11 13           24 8  23 
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C 63 16 28            7  23 
C 76 15 26            12  27 
C 65 16 29 13  25 
C 73 13 28 10  26 
C 65 15 27 12  29 
C 86 15 29 11  28 
C 75 15 29 13  25 
C 69 15 28 12  28 
C 70 08 28 11  26 



















Aptness and Familiarity Ratings 
 Nineteen elderly controls (age range 60-83; 10 females), all native speakers of 
English, were recruited from the general public and given monetary compensation for 
completing a rating task. These participants did not take part in the subsequent metaphor 
interpretation task. They were presented with two booklets each containing the same 82 
metaphors (e.g., trees are umbrellas), with a scale ranging from 1 to 7 displayed beneath 
each metaphor. In one booklet, participants were asked to rate how apt they found each 
metaphor, where 1 was labeled not apt, 4 as moderately apt, and 7 as very apt. Aptness 
was explained as how valid they found each statement. Politics is a jungle was given as 
an example of an apt statement, while politics is a beach was given as an example of a 
less apt statement. For the second booklet, participants were asked to rate how familiar 
they found each statement. Familiarity was explained as how often they had read or heard 
this statement in the past, with 1 labeled as not familiar, 4 as moderately familiar, and 7 
as very familiar. Although the two booklets contained the same items, the items were 
sorted differently in each booklet. 
Google Production Frequencies 
 When Thibodeau and Durgin (2011) collected Internet production counts of 
metaphors, they obtained the raw search totals produced by the Google search engine. 
This method, however, overlooks possible confounds that can inflate the counts for 
certain items. For example, if a metaphor statement is the title of a particular song or 
book, such as wisdom is an ocean, there will be a large number of commercial sites 





in Google’s search total. Another problem with Google search totals is that they include 
the same expression being used repeatedly within a website. Thus, if someone were to 
use a particular metaphor 100 times on a given website, those 100 counts would be 
included in Google search totals. Indeed, clicking on the various links for different 
expressions, a web searcher will discover that the production totals are often dominated 
by a few websites.  Therefore, while an expression may be reported as appearing a 
million times, there are not necessarily a million separate websites listing that expression. 
 We decided instead to collect Internet production totals using the more 
conservative method designed by Roncero, Kennedy, and Smyth (2006). This search 
method also uses Google search count totals, but has specific guidelines for whether a 
metaphor production can be included in the count total. These guidelines are designed to 
ensure that count totals reflect only spontaneous uses of metaphor; thus, repetitions of the 
same book title or song title, or when people quote the same sentence repeatedly within a 
website, are counted only once within the total. This method is more laborious than 
simply collecting raw Google search totals, as it requires inspecting each production 
against the guidelines. For that reason, the method is generally applied to only the first 30 
productions found for each expression, as most metaphors typically do not reach this 
number of productions.  
Selection of Metaphors  
 Prior to selecting the metaphors, we decided that only 20 metaphors would be 
presented to AD patients because a larger number of items would conceivably cause 





and aptness ratings: apt and familiar; more apt than familiar; more familiar than apt; 
neither apt nor familiar.  Eight items were chosen and categorized as familiar and apt 
because the aptness and familiarity rating for each item was greater than 5. To produce 
the list of items considered neither familiar nor apt, the five items with the lowest 
averaged familiarity and aptness rating were chosen.  Items defined as more familiar than 
apt, were those that had a familiarity rating greater than 5, but an aptness rating between 
3 and 5. The reverse was true for items considered more apt than familiar: an aptness 
rating greater than 5, but a familiarity rating between 3-5. Three metaphors were selected 
and defined as familiar, but less apt, while four metaphors were selected and defined as 
more apt than familiar. There were no items that had either an aptness or familiarity 
rating greater than 5 combined with a rating lower than 3 on the other scale.  
Interpretation Norms 
 In order to collect interpretation norms—i.e., to obtain the most common 
interpretation for each expression—a booklet containing the 20 selected metaphors was 
created. This booklet was presented to another 20 healthy elderly controls (age range 60-
84; 14 females). These participants did not partake in the ratings norms nor did they serve 
as controls in the interpretation task. In this booklet, each metaphor was presented within 
a sentence that asked participants to state which property was being expressed about the 
topic (e.g., Education is a stairway because education is…). Each sentence was presented 
with a line placed underneath where participants could write their answers. This method 
helped facilitate answers that would reflect a particular property or adjective, and 





 The different properties expressed by each participant were collapsed under a 
single property label when they were considered synonyms. For example, ruthless and 
aggressive for lawyers are sharks were grouped together under the property label 
ruthless, while valuable and important for time is money were both categorized under the 
property label important. Participants also sometimes wrote elaborate sentences that had 
the similar meaning of a particular property label, without necessarily using a synonym of 
that particular property label. For example, one participant wrote lawyers are sharks 
because lawyers are out to get you! This sentence was categorized as expressing the 
property label ruthless for lawyers are sharks because the sentence conveys the belief 
that lawyers are ruthless.  
 Two judges were involved in coding the responses. The first judge created the set 
of property labels that reflected the properties written for each metaphor. The same judge, 
together with a second judge, then verified the accuracy of the property labels based on 
the participants’ responses. The two judges resolved any discrepancy. A particular 
property label was considered a salient property for that metaphor if it had been stated by 
a minimum of three participants. Those property labels that had been mentioned by at 
least two participants were considered less salient properties. Finally, properties stated 
only once were considered non-salient properties. A list of the metaphors sorted by item 
group, accompanied by their salient and less salient properties, is presented in Table 5B 






 Two booklets were created for the metaphor interpretation task. One booklet 
listed half the original metaphors as similes, while the other half of the metaphors were 
rewritten as similes (e.g., cities are like jungles rather than cities are jungles). In the 
second booklet, the topic-vehicle pairs were in the same order, but those items that were 
metaphors in booklet 1 were written as similes in booklet 2, and vice-versa for those 
items that had been written as similes in booklet 1. Each participant would be read either 
booklet 1 or 2, and then asked to provide their interpretation of each sentence.  
 Both the similarity judgments task and forward digit span task from the WAIS-IV 
were used. In the similarity judgments task, participants are asked what is similar 
between two objects (e.g., horse-tiger, food-gasoline) with different scores allocated 
based on the quality of the answer provided. The task itself can continue for a maximum 
of 18 object pairs, but is discontinued after three consecutive scores of 0. In the digit span 
task, participants are asked to repeat back a series of digits in increasing order. Two trials 
of each length, ranging from two to eight, are administered, with a score of one given for 
each correct trial. The task continues until a participant has two consecutive incorrect 
trials.  
 Both the MoCA and MMSE provide a general measure of a participant’s 
cognitive capacity. The MoCA is a 30-point test that assesses several cognitive domains 
(e.g., perception, recall, abstraction). The test typically takes roughly 10 minutes to 
complete, has been validated in the setting of mild cognitive impairment (Nasreddine et 





impairment present in a patient. Similar to the MoCA, the MMSE (Folstein et al., 1975) 
is also a 30-point questionnaire that is frequently used in clinical settings to access the 
degree of cognitive impairment in patients. Like the MoCA, the MMSE assesses different 
cognitive domains including recall, language, and complex commands. The MoCA, 
however, is typically better at capturing milder forms of cognitive impairment, whereas 
the MMSE is more suited for individuals with more severe conditions.  
Procedure 
 A researcher first administered the MoCA and MMSE, if the participant was a 
person diagnosed with AD, or only the MOCA if the participant was an elderly control, 
followed by the digit span task and the similarity judgments task. Afterwards, each 
participant was read either the first sentence of booklet 1 or 2, and asked to provide their 
interpretation of the sentence. For example, the first time the metaphor music is medicine 
was read, the researcher asked the participant “What is someone trying to say when he or 
she says that music is medicine?” If the participant couldn’t provide an answer, or failed 
to mention a particular property, the researcher then asked the participant “if someone 
were to say that music is medicine, what would they be trying to say about music?”  This 
method helped prompt answers that reflected a particular property that could then be 
matched to the interpretation norms. After an interpretation had been given, or if the 
participant was still unable to provide an adequate answer, the next sentence was read, 
and so on, for all 20 items. Participants were given unlimited time to provide an 
interpretation, and told it was fine if they could not think of an interpretation. Most 






 Two items were dropped from analysis because participants (AD patients and 
elderly controls) repeatedly expressed difficulty providing an interpretation. Several 
participants expressed understanding the statement life is a journey but stated it was 
difficult to put into words a particular meaning. When interpretations were provided, 
most participants provided elaborate discussions about life in general rather than 
providing a particular property or adjective. The second item that caused confusion and 
was consequently dropped from analysis was genes are blueprints. For most participants, 
there was an initial period where the participant had to be told that the sentence meant 
genes “as in DNA” as opposed to blue jeans. Several participants (especially AD 
patients) expressed not understanding the concept DNA. Therefore, the metaphor 
interpretation scores for life is (like) a journey, an apt and familiar metaphor, and genes 
are (like) blueprints, a more apt than familiar metaphor, were both not included in any of 
the analyses involving metaphor interpretation scores. 
Metaphor Interpretation Scores 
 When allocating points for the interpretation provided, we used a procedure 
similar to that used by Papagno (2001), who assigned a score of 2 or 1 for correct 
answers. We gave a score of 2 if the interpretation mentioned a property found to be 
salient in the metaphor interpretation norms, and a score of 1 if a less-salient property 
was mentioned. Interpretations that included statements or properties not identical to the 
category label, but expressing the same meaning, were also recorded as correct responses 
(i.e., a match for either a salient or non-salient property).  If the interpretation expressed a 





participant was unable to provide an answer, a score of 0 was given. One researcher first 
allocated a set of scores, while a second judge, who was blind to whether the 
interpretations came from a control or person diagnosed with AD, also provided scores as 
a reliability check. The interclass correlation was .85 (p < .001). Because this reliability 
score was high, the scores from the first researcher were used in all subsequent analyses.  
 We first present a comparison of the general means for metaphor and simile 
interpretation scores for both AD patients and elderly controls to check for an effect of 
linguistic structure. AD patients had a mean interpretation score of 1.28 for metaphor 
sentences (SD = .48), and 1.33 for simile sentences (SD = .18). The difference was not 
significant (t (10) = -.30, p = .77, r = .09). For elderly controls, the mean interpretation 
score for metaphors was 1.48 (SD = .18), and 1.54 for similes (SD = .37), and found to 
not be significantly different (t (9) = -.44, p = .67, r =-0.15). Because these comparisons 
were not significantly different, we averaged participants’ metaphor and simile 
interpretation scores and used these scores in all further analyses. 
 The averaged figurative interpretation scores for AD patients was 1.31 (SD = .25), 
and 1.51 for elderly controls (SD = .17); this difference was significant by subjects and 
items (t1 (19) = -2.14, p < .05, r = .44; t2 (17) = -2.17, p < .05, r = .47). To isolate the 
source of this significant difference, we next compared participants’ scores within the 
different item groups (i.e., apt and familiar; more apt than familiar; more familiar than 
apt; neither apt nor familiar). We did not run items analyses for these comparisons due to 
the decreased power from the reduced sample size in each category (n  < 8). For apt and 
familiar items, AD patients had a mean interpretation score of 1.58 (SD = .29), while 





significantly different (t (19) = -.80, p = .33, r = .18).  This result is consistent with 
Amanzio et al. (2008), who also failed to find significant interpretation differences 
between AD patients and controls for familiar items, which were also presumably apt.  
 The distributions for some of the three other item groups were found to be not 
normally distributed; thus, we used non-parametric tests in their analysis and report the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic. For more apt than familiar items, the mean interpretation 
scores was 1.42 (SD = .56, mdn = 1.33; D (11) = .25, p < .05) for AD patients, and 1.87 
for elderly controls (SD = .23, mdn = 2.00, D (11) = .38, p < .05).  The difference for this 
item group was marginally significantly (U = 28.50, p = .06, r = -.45). For the familiar, 
but less apt items, the mean interpretation scores for AD patients was 1.48 (SD = .56, 
mdn = 1.33), and for elderly controls was 1.93 (SD = .21, mdn = 2.00, D (11) = .53, p < 
.05). This comparison was significantly different (U = 25.00, p < .05, r = -.53). Finally, 
for the items that were neither apt nor familiar, AD patients had a mean interpretation 
score 0.74 (SD =.20, mdn = .80, D (11) = .29, p < .05), while elderly controls had a mean 
interpretation score of 0.82 (SD = .36, mdn = .80). This comparison was not significantly 
different (U = 46.50, p = .56, r = -.14). Therefore, the only item group where AD patients 
did significantly worse than elderly controls was for items categorized as more familiar 









Table 5C: Interpretation Scores 
Mean Interpretation Scores (and SDs) for AD Patients and Elderly Controls 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Item Group     AD Patients  Elderly Controls 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Apt and Familiar    1.58 (.29)  1.67 (.19) 
More Familiar than Apt*   1.48 (.56)  1.93 (.21)   
More Apt than Familiar   1.42 (.56)  1.87 (.23)  
Neither Familiar nor Apt   0.74 (.20)  0.82 (.36) 
Average Score Across Item Groups*  1.31 (.25)  1.51 (.17) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
*p < .05 
Items Analysis 
 For the metaphors used in the interpretation task, the mean familiarity rating was 
4.76 (SD = 1.76), and the mean aptness rating was 4.75 (SD = 1.63). As predicted, the 
two sets of ratings were positively correlated (r = .85, p < .05). The average number of 
Internet production totals was 13.44 (SD = 13.86). When we then ran correlations with 
the metaphor interpretation task scores from AD patients, there was no significant 
correlation with the Internet production totals (r = .33, p < .01), but significant 





familiarity ratings (r = .67, p < .05). We also found the aptness ratings correlated 
positively with the Google production totals (r =.54, p < .05), but the correlation between 
the production totals and familiarity ratings was not significant (r = .43, p = .07). This 
finding replicates the correlation pattern found by Thibodeau and Durgin (2011), and 
suggests that our familiarity ratings were affected by the item’s aptness level.  
Participant Variables 
 For the digit span task, the group means were comparable. AD patients had a 
mean digit span score of 10.64 (SD = 2.66), while controls had a mean digit span score of 
11.45 (SD = 1.13), and this difference was not significant (t (13.50) = -.94, p = .36; 
Levene’s test for equality of variances was significant (F (1,20) = 15.43, p < .01)). AD 
patients had an average similarity judgment score of 17.18 (SD = 10.12), while controls 
had an average similarity judgment score of 25.64 (SD = 2.54). This difference was 
significant (t (11.25) = -.269, p < .05, Levene’s test for equality of variances was 
significant, F (1,20) = 13.35, p < .01).  
 We next ran correlations with the metaphor interpretation scores for AD patients 
to examine whether digit span or similarity judgments would be a better predictor of 
metaphor interpretation scores. Only similarity judgments were found to correlate with 
metaphor interpretation scores (r = .66, p < .05).  
Discussion 
 Elderly controls and AD patients were asked to provide interpretations for 
different metaphors and similes to examine whether elderly controls would provide better 





simile statements. Interpretation scores for metaphors and similes were similar, but 
elderly controls were found to provide better interpretations than AD patients. Therefore, 
the comprehension problem faced by AD patients does not appear to be an inability to 
convert a metaphor statement into a comparison, as may have been predicted by Career 
of Metaphor theory (Bowdle & Gentner, 2008).  
 We further examined the interpretation score difference between AD patients and 
elderly controls by comparing scores for different item groups (apt and familiar, more apt 
than familiar, more familiar than apt, and neither apt nor familiar). Similar to Amanzio et 
al. (2008), AD patients and elderly controls provided equally accurate interpretations for 
items considered highly familiar, but only when the items were also highly apt. For items 
rated familiar and apt, as well as items rated more apt than familiar, interpretation scores 
for AD patients and elderly controls were comparable. In contrast, for items rated more 
familiar than apt, AD patients provided worse interpretations than elderly controls. 
Therefore, these results suggest that aptness is an important variable for good metaphor 
interpretation in AD patients, and could even be a more important variable than 
familiarity, because AD patients only provided worse interpretations when the items’ 
aptness rating level decreased. When the familiarity level of the items decreased, but the 
aptness level remained constant (i.e., the items rated more apt than familiar), AD patients 
still provided interpretations that were as good as those provided by elderly controls.   
 Further support that aptness has a greater impact than familiarity for metaphor 
interpretation comes from the correlation results. The familiarity ratings did not 
significantly correlate with the collected Internet production counts, while aptness ratings 





that more apt statements would also be more frequent, but it is unclear why familiarity 
ratings, as a measure of general prevalence, would not correlate with the same production 
totals. This correlation pattern matches that found by Thibodeau and Durgin (2011), 
where the researchers had argued their familiarity ratings were more reflective of the 
item’s aptness level because familiarity ratings significantly correlated with aptness 
ratings, but not the collected frequency totals from Google. Therefore, it could also be 
argued that the familiarity ratings in our study were not a valid measure of general 
prevalence because the Internet frequency totals correlated with aptness ratings, but not 
familiarity ratings, suggesting that our familiarity ratings were contaminated by the 
items’ aptness level.  
 Adopting collected Internet production totals in the present study as a more 
accurate measure of familiarity, we still found no significant correlation with metaphor 
interpretation scores. Therefore, neither the collected familiarity ratings nor Internet 
frequency counts were a significant predictor of AD patients’ metaphor interpretation 
scores. The only linguistic variable that predicted accurate metaphor interpretation was a 
metaphor’s aptness level, which suggests that an item’s aptness level is a more important 
variable than familiarity for metaphor comprehension in people diagnosed with AD.  
 It should also be noted that while our items did have high familiarity ratings, they 
were not the kind of conventional metaphors used in previous studies where the meaning 
could be obtained from the dictionary (e.g., Amanzio et al., 2008; Papagno, 2001, Winner 
& Gardner, 1977). Similar to the unfamiliar metaphors used by Amanzio, we determined 
the salient and less salient properties for our expressions by collecting interpretation 





elderly controls, whereas we found interpretation was equal to controls as long as the 
statement had a high aptness level.  
Beyond Aptness: The ability to infer a relationship between two objects   
 The fourth best-interpreted metaphor by AD patients was deserts are ovens, 
where the salient property was hot; and a majority of AD patients correctly interpreted 
hair is a rainbow as meaning that hair is colourful. However, neither deserts are ovens 
nor hair is a rainbow had been rated apt or familiar, and both had low Internet production 
totals (n < 5). Therefore, metaphors may also be easily interpreted, despite not being very 
apt, when the abstraction level demanded is low, and the salient intended properties are 
concrete and sensory in nature (Aisenman, 1999). For example it is easier to determine 
the relationship between carrots and broccoli (both vegetables) than between music and 
tides (both have rhythms). Therefore, in the same way that different metaphors require 
constructing meanings that may reflect different abstraction levels, individuals who can 
best deal with these higher levels of abstractions may also have an easier time 
interpreting metaphors. Metaphors requiring more basic level abstractions, such as 
deserts are ovens, would be more easily interpreted because the salient property is 
concrete and sensory. In contrast, metaphors such as families are fortresses would be 
more difficult to interpret because the metaphor does not make reference to a specific 
literal property of fortresses (e.g., made of stone), rather it refers to more abstract 
concepts of security and protection.  
 Supporting the above argument, we found a significant positive correlation 





similarity judgments scores, and their metaphor interpretation scores. Therefore, being 
able to infer the similarity between two concepts (e.g., music-tides) was a good predictor 
of whether AD patients could infer the intended relationship between the topic and 
vehicle terms in a metaphor (e.g., music is medicine). Amanzio et al. (2008) discussed 
how executive functions in AD patients could affect metaphor interpretation: they argued 
that the cognitive deficit impacted the patient’s ability to create a new relationship 
between two objects. The positive correlation found between similarity judgments scores 
and metaphor interpretation scores supports the above argument.  
 Amanzio et al. (2008) also examined several additional cognitive tests (e.g., 
theory of mind tasks), which were ultimately found not to correlate with metaphor 
interpretation scores. In the present study, we similarly found that metaphors 
interpretation scores were not related to scores on tests of cognitive function such as the 
digit span task, or MoCA and MMSE scores. Therefore, the ability to infer a semantic 
relationship between two concepts seems somewhat cocooned from other cognitive 
abilities. In the present study, for example, participants’ ability to infer a relationship was 
not related to either their general level of impairment or their working memory digit 
spans. Rather, AD patients’ ability to correctly interpret a metaphor was best related to 
their ability to infer what property was shared between two presented objects.  
Conclusion 
 Amanzio et al. (2008) had argued that unfamiliar metaphors cause interpretation 
difficulties for people diagnosed with AD because they require meaning construction 





additional factors such as aptness, and whether the intended salient properties are 
concrete or abstract. These variables ultimately combine with participant variables, such 
as the capacity to infer the relationship between two objects, to determine whether one 
can construct the intended meaning of a metaphor. The present study shows that 
metaphor interpretation in mild to moderate AD patients is spared, even when metaphors 
















Chapter 6: Final Discussion 
 This thesis examined the comprehension of metaphor and simile expressions. 
Chapter 2 included two experiments investigating how metaphor and simile expressions 
are interpreted and used. Chapter 3 employed a self-paced reading paradigm to 
investigate how metaphor and simile expressions are processed, while Chapter 4 reported 
results from one experiment employing eye-tracking to examine how metaphors and 
similes are processed. Finally, Chapter 5 examined Alzheimer's Disease Patients' ability 
to interpret metaphor. Central questions included whether metaphor and simile 
expressions are processed and interpreted similarly, and whether aptness or 
conventionality are predictors of processing time and ease. Career of Metaphor theory 
(Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Gentner & Bowdle, 2008) and Categorization theory 
(Glucksberg, 2008) make different predictions as to how these questions might be 
answered.  
 Career of Metaphor theory predicts that metaphors and similes can initiate distinct 
forms of processing, but produce similar interpretations, and that vehicle conventionality 
is the most important variable for metaphor comprehension. In contrast, Categorization 
theory predicts that metaphors and similes initiate similar forms of processing, convey 
different meanings, and that aptness is the most important variable for metaphor 
comprehension. In general, findings were inconsistent with both Categorization theory 
and Career of Metaphor theory. Metaphors and similes in Experiments 1 and 2 of Chapter 
2 were found to produce occasionally different interpretations, while in Experiment 1 of 





were shorter, which suggests metaphor vehicles were more difficult to process than 
simile vehicles. Finally, aptness was not a significant predictor of reading times.  
Pragmatic Variables 
 Regarding the prediction that pragmatic variables such as aptness and 
conventionality would be significant predictors of reading times, we did not find support 
for Categorization theory’s prediction that higher aptness ratings would correlate with 
faster reading times nor the prediction from Career of Metaphor theory that vehicles with 
higher conventionality ratings would have faster reading times were supported. These 
results differ from previous studies which found significant correlations between reading 
times and the collected aptness or conventionality ratings (e.g., Jones & Estes, 2006), but 
those studies relied on omnibus reading times (i.e., the time needed to read a full 
sentence) rather than restricting reading times to the vehicle region as done in Chapters 3 
and 4. Therefore, it is possible that aptness or conventionality ratings do not predict faster 
reading times when those reading times are isolated to the vehicle term.  
 Reading times in studies such as Jones and Estes (2006) also measured the time 
when participants felt they understood the sentence; therefore, it is possible that these 
reading times were probably affected by non-linguistic variables, in addition to the time 
needed for lexical access. Consequently, omnibus reading times could be more 
susceptible to non-linguistic variables such as participants’ perceived level of aptness for 
a given expression rather than the contribution of particular constituents (e.g., the vehicle 
term) to the sentence interpretation. This argument is supported by the finding in Chapter 





reading times, aptness ratings were able to predict to what extent participants agreed with 
a given sentence.  
 Regarding conventionality, it should be noted that these ratings were collected in 
a manner similar to past studies: we asked participants to what extent a vehicle term was 
associated with a particular meaning. More specifically, participants were asked how 
common it was to use a vehicle term such as drug in a sentence such as x is a drug to 
convey the notion that x is addictive. However, this method for determining 
conventionality may actually be the reason why conventionality has often been found to 
be a worse predictor than aptness. First, the concept of conventionality, as defined by 
Career of Metaphor theory, assumes that vehicle terms will be associated with a single 
property (e.g., addiction). However, as found in Chapter 2 and other studies (e.g., 
Chiappe and Kennedy, 2000; Thibodeau & Durgin, 2011), vehicles terms often bring to 
mind several properties rather than one. Therefore, notions of conventionality may be 
better suited for those instances where vehicles are associated with a single figurative 
property (e.g., addiction for the vehicle term drug, and colourful for rainbow).  
 The comprehension of a given topic-vehicle pair is also presumably affected by 
the topic term within that pair. For example, although drug may have the conventional 
figurative meaning of addiction, pairing this vehicle with a topic that is not considered 
addictive (e.g., broccoli is a drug) would cause more problems than pairing this vehicle 
with an object that is considered addictive (e.g., chocolate is a drug). Recall, for example, 
that Jones and Estes (2006) found faster reading times for more apt topic-vehicle pairs 
(e.g., a goalie is a spider) than less apt topic-vehicle pairs (e.g., a fisherman is a spider). 





was a more salient property of goalies than fishermen. Aptness ratings are able to capture 
such differences between pairs because participants are asked to rate to what extent a 
given vehicle term captures salient properties for a given topic term. In contrast,  
conventionality ratings are virtually “blind” to topic effects because participants are 
asked to consider only the vehicle term when providing their ratings. Therefore, it is 
perhaps not surprising that conventionality ratings are often a worse predictor than 
aptness ratings or are found to be null predictors because they fail to take into account the 
variability caused by the topic terms. 
Comprehension Times 
 We found inconsistent results in Chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 3, we compared 
metaphor and simile processing using a self-paced reading moving-window paradigm 
(hereafter referred to as SPR). Experiment 1 of Chapter 3 compared metaphors and 
similes in a declarative affirmative sentence (e.g., lawyers are (like) sharks), while 
Experiment 2 of Chapter 3 compared metaphors and similes in a negative sentence (e.g., 
lawyers are not (like) sharks). In both of these SPR experiments, vehicles had longer 
reading times when they were read in similes. By contrast, first-pass reading times in 
Chapter 4 (eye-tracking) for metaphor and simile vehicles were comparable—although 
total reading times were longer for metaphors-- and saccade length was shorter for 
metaphors. Therefore, while the results from Chapter 3 suggest simile vehicles take 
longer to comprehend, Chapter 4 suggests metaphors are more difficult. .  
 Why would the moving-window SPR paradigm yield longer reading times for 





longer reading times than eye-tracking studies because SPR is less natural. Unlike eye-
tracking, where participants are asked to simply read the sentences in a normal manner, 
participants in SPR must push a button to read the subsequent section, and this 
requirement could be unreflective of natural reading patterns. For example, participants 
may choose to press the button once they recognize a word, rather than fully integrating 
that word into their interpretation of the given sentence. This type of strategy would make 
comprehension appear faster than reality. On the other extreme, a participant may be 
extra cautious and take extra time to ensure they have fully understood and incorporated a 
word into their current interpretation  of the sentence before reading the subsequent 
section. In these circumstances, reading times will appear longer than the time actually 
needed for normal reading. Finally, a participant could also adopt a rhythmic button-
pressing pattern, simply tapping the button as fast as possible for each section, and fully 
interpreting the sentence only when all sections have been read. Witzel et al. note that 
SPR experiments often yield results for sentence sections subsequent to the word of 
interest. These "holdover" effects, as described by Witzel et al., suggest that reading 
times  for a particular section could "not reflect the processing associated with the words 
on which they are recorded" (p.108). More specifically, because participants might press 
the button before fully reading and integrating the given presented section, they 
subsequently do such processing after having already moved past the target section. In 
the present thesis, for example, the SPR experiment of Chapter 3 found longer vehicles 
and explanation times for similes, whereas explanation reading times in the eye-tracking 
experiment were similar. The longer reading times for simile explanations in our SPR 





previously read. Similarly, it is possible that longer reading times for simile vehicles in 
our SPR experiments reflect a "spill-over" effect (Rayner, 2009) from having read a 
longer verbal segment in similes (is like) than in metaphors (is).  
 Because reading times in SPR are susceptible to "holdover effects" in addition to 
general reading processes, a better comparison between Chapter 3 and 4 could be reading 
times in the SPR study and total times in the eye-tracking study. Total time in eye 
tracking refers to the time participants spent first reading a particular section (e.g., the 
vehicle), as well as the time spent reading that section after participants have regressed 
back to that section from a later point in the sentence. Therefore, total time may reflect 
both general reading processes, as well as possible "holdover" effects that occur post-
regression. In this manner, total times as opposed to first-pass times in eye-tracking are 
more analogous to SPR times. Interestingly, the eye-tracking total time results are 
actually opposite to that found in the SPR study: metaphor vehicles had longer total time 
than simile vehicles. It should be noted, however, that the explanations presented in the 
eye-tracking study were not the same explanations presented in the self-paced reading 
study. It is possible that participants found explanations in the eye-tracking study more 
acceptable for similes than metaphors, which led to a larger number of regressions for 
metaphors. In contrast, reading the explanation region in the SPR study would not have 
increased metaphor vehicle time because participants were unable to return to the 
metaphor vehicle for further processing.  
 Several additional differences also exist between the studies presented in Chapters 
3 and 4: the set of topic-vehicle pairs was different; items were not categorized via 





were the minority sentence types among a large number of literal sentences (as part of 
another "filler" experiment), whereas participants in the SPR study saw only metaphors 
and similes. Therefore, further investigation is needed to fully understand why these two 
studies produced different results as there are multiple potential causes. A study that 
compares SPR and eye tracking results using the same metaphors and similes would be 
informative. 
 Perhaps the greatest advantage provided by eye tracking is that certain results 
(e.g., the location and duration of eye fixations) are relatively immune to non-linguistic 
variables. Unlike button presses which can be delayed, eye fixations and scan paths are 
relatively instant measures of reading behaviour (Rayner, 2009). For example, while first-
pass times for metaphor and simile vehicles were similar, shorter saccade lengths were 
found for metaphor vehicles. Therefore, time may not be the best predictor of 
comprehension difficulty, nor whether processing a metaphor requires more stages than 
processing a simile, because this result indicates that equal processing times for different 
expressions is not necessarily an indication that the processes used to understand each 
expression were the same. This result is especially problematic for Categorization theory, 
as Gluckberg (2003, 2008) has previously argued that finding no significant time 
differences for metaphors and comparable literal statements supports the hypothesis that 
metaphors and literal statements do not trigger distinct comprehension processes. The 
eye-tracking results, however, demonstrate that equal time involvement is not necessarily 
evidence that the cognitive processes used for metaphors and similes is the same. In other 
words, the absence of evidence (null time differences) is not the evidence of absence (no 





 De Almeida, Manouiliidou, Roncero, and Levin (2011), for example, have noted 
that comparable reading times could reflect figurative processing occurring faster and 
more efficiently, but not necessarily rely on the same process.  This view of metaphor 
processing is similar to Ortony's (1979) interactionist theory, whereby contextual support 
rather than literality itself determines ease of processing. When a context can make either 
a literal or figurative interpretation readily available, than both sentence types should 
have comparable reading times (as found by Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds, & Antos, 1978, 
and described in the opening chapter). Unlike Ortony et al., however, de Almeida et al. 
assume an initial bias towards a literal interpretation because figurative meanings must be 
derived from initial literal interpretations. The results found in Chapter 4 support de 
Almeida et al.'s argument. Although vehicle first-pass times were similar, the vehicles 
appear to have been processed differently. Saccade lengths were shorter for metaphor 
vehicles and indicates metaphor vehicles took more effort (Rayner, 1998).  
 Similar results to those found in Chapter 4 come from researchers who use ERP 
studies to study the processing of metaphors. As noted in the Introduction, these 
researchers have found results suggesting that the cognitive processes for metaphors and 
comparable literal statements can be different, despite requiring equal amounts of 
processing time. Recall that Pynte et al. (1996) reported finding no time differences 
(wave onset was similar), which suggested that the processing of metaphors was not more 
delayed compared to literal statements; although a larger negative amplitude was found 
for metaphor vehicles around 400 ms (i.e., an N400 effect), suggesting metaphors had not 
been processed like the literal statements. One possible explanation for Pynte et al.'s 





vehicles were first read, and the larger magnitudes and shorter saccade lengths found for 
metaphor vehicles reflects a need to activate figurative properties that are not initially 
activated. In this manner, the key difference between metaphors and literal statements 
would not be the type of processing that is triggered (a qualitative difference), but rather 
the amount of activation that properties first receive (a quantitative difference). In other 
words, N400 effects are larger when the appropriate interpretation is not the one initially 
activated by the words alone. Supporting this hypothesis, when Pynte et al. (1996) 
presented metaphors after supportive contexts, thus making a particular interpretation 
easier by priming those properties needed to interpret the statement as a metaphor, N400 
amplitudes for metaphors were reduced.  
 Currently, I am developing an ERP study to investigate the processing of 
metaphors and similes. No ERP study to date has compared the processing of metaphors 
and similes; however, a study that found larger amplitudes for metaphors or similes, in 
comparison to more "literal" statements (e.g., love is (like) a drug versus penicillin is a 
drug) would inform us regarding which statement type is more difficult to process. For 
example, if similes are less difficult to process than metaphors, then we would expect 
metaphor vehicles to produce larger amplitudes around 400 ms; whereas larger 
amplitudes for simile vehicles would suggest that similes are more cognitively effortful. 
Finally, if the waveforms of metaphors and similes were similar, it would provide further 
support for the hypothesis that processes used for metaphors and similes are not 
inherently distinct, but may be more difficult to execute for a certain expression type. The 
planned study would also follow metaphors and similes with related properties to 





metaphor or simile context does make certain properties activate faster. For example, as 
soon will be discussed, if metaphors have the effect of making connotative properties 
more salient, then greater priming should be observed for connotative properties when 
they follow metaphors (i.e., smaller N400 amplitudes) than when they follow similes.  
The Interpretation of Metaphors and Similes 
 When we asked participants in Chapter 5 to provide the meaning of metaphor and 
simile expressions, both elderly controls and people diagnosed with Alzheimer’s Disease 
(AD) provided similar interpretations. For example, participants commonly interpreted 
both music is medicine and music is like medicine as meaning that music is soothing. 
Therefore, presenting a metaphor or simile did not produce a more literal or figurative 
answer; instead, interpretations were similar regardless the linguistic structure. 
 Similar results were found in Chapter 2. When participants were asked to produce 
property lists. The lists produced for metaphor and similes often included the same 
properties. Furthermore, participants rated metaphor and simile properties as reflecting 
comparable levels of connotativeness. Therefore, unlike the results found by Glucksberg 
and Haught (2006a), these results do not support the dual-reference hypothesis because 
the properties written for similes were not more literal, and were often the same 
properties as the ones written for metaphors. One significant difference we did observe 
for metaphor-simile property lists was a larger number of salient properties for 
metaphors. Specifically, certain properties seemed more accessible to participants when 
they read topic-vehicle pairs within a metaphor. Therefore, rather than arguing that 





that metaphors and similes initially activate a similar set of properties, but certain 
properties receive more activation, thus making them more accessible for interpretation. 
For the remainder of this thesis, I will put forward the proposal that vehicles activate a set 
of salient properties.  
The results reported in Chapter 2 support the argument that words activate related 
salient properties rather than a set of properties that is strictly literal or figurative. For 
example, compare the property lists given by participants for bulldozer when read in 
isolation versus within a metaphor. While we can observe certain salient properties 
related to so-called literal concept of bulldozer in Table 2C (e.g., big, hardhats, 
construction), we can also observe salient properties that might be considered more 
figurative/connotative of bulldozer such as destructive and dangerous. Crucially, when 
participants then interpreted the metaphor salesmen are bulldozers, the most frequent and 
salient property was destructive, which had also been written for the vehicle in isolation. 
This result is also quite common; for example, participants interpreted health is a glass as 
reflecting properties such as breakable—which was also written for glass in isolation. 
Interpreting clouds as fluffy may also seem inconsistent with the factual information 
related to clouds (i.e., clouds are not literally fluffy), but when participants listed 
properties related to clouds, fluffy was the most frequent and salient property. Therefore, 
the results are not consistent with the prediction words should activate literal or figurative 
properties only. Instead, consistent with the graded saliency hypothesis (Giora, 1997), a 






 As previously mentioned, the results from the present series of experiments pose 
difficulty for both Categorization theory and Career of Metaphor theory. Against Career 
of Metaphor theory, conventionality ratings were not found to be significant predictors of 
reading times, and the interpretations for metaphors and similes were found to be distinct, 
with metaphors appearing to increase the activation levels of more connotative properties. 
Against Categorization theory, the results suggested that processing metaphors and 
similes is not completely analogous. Glucksberg (2008) predicts comprehension times to 
be similar when the statements are familiar, yet saccade lengths were shorter for 
metaphor vehicles in Chapter 4. Also, while interpretation differences between metaphors 
and similes were found, these differences are subtle, and do not support the hypothesis 
that a "literal shark" is activated in similes, but a "figurative shark" is activated in 
metaphors. In other words, the semantic difference appears to be relative rather than 
absolute. Therefore, because the results were not fully supportive for either of the main 
theories investigated in this thesis, it is worth examining whether a different framework 
could be adopted and allow a better understanding of the results found.  
A New Framework 
 The question to be answered in this new framework  is how someone understands 
a metaphor such as music is medicine, and how understanding this metaphor is different 
from both understanding an equivalent simile (music is like medicine) and sentences such 
as penicillin is medicine. In the Introduction, I discussed theories of metaphor as being 
distinguishable by two stages of comprehension: an access stage where lexical access 





discuss the proposed framework in terms of these stages, while also detailing key terms 
such as meaning and properties, and how the proposed framework is both similar and 
different to past theories discussed. 
Access Stage 
 Theories typically discuss two sources of information during reading: the word 
and the context. In the proposed framework for comprehending a metaphor such as music 
is medicine, we will focus the discussion on what occurs when a person reaches the 
vehicle (i.e., medicine). The context in this case would be the preceding words in the 
sentence (i.e., music is). Theories of language comprehension agree that reading a word 
will activate a “meaning”, but what specifically is meaning? What meaning do words 
activate? Presumably, it can be agreed that reading the word cat will activate the meaning 
CAT, but this answer merely forces a second question: what is the meaning of CAT? In 
the proposed framework, a meaning is defined as an index to a set of properties. Thus, 
reading the word cat activates a set of CAT properties. For most words, this activation is 
predicted to be relatively straight-forward, except for words where distinct meanings 
actually have distinct references in the world (e.g., homonyms). For example, the word 
bank can refer to the institution or the location beside a river; thus, it could be considered 
to have at least two meanings. In these situations, context would aide in selecting the 
correct meaning for the given context (Duffy, Morris, & Rayner, 1998). Note, however, 
that selecting a particular meaning entails selecting a particular set of properties that exist 
in one referent, but is absent in the other. For example, the properties generally associated 
with a pitcher in baseball (e.g., being a person) are quite different from those associated 





reflect the different properties that have been activated. However, these cases are seen 
more as the "exception" than the "rule." Words such as cat and bottle, which are 
generally not considered homonyms and have only one referent, are predicted to activate 
one set of properties whenever lexical access occurs. Later, we will discuss how context 
could possibly affect this access stage.   
Stating that a word such as cat activates a set of properties further forces a 
definition of which properties are activated. One possible answer is that CAT activates a 
set of literal properties. My hesitation with this answer, however, is that there is no clear 
definition of what a literal meaning entails. Consider the statement John is a cold person. 
Is this statement literal or metaphor? Rumelhart (1993) argues there are actually three 
possibilities: (1) Not literally true because John is not actually cold, and the word cold is 
being used metaphorically; (2) Literally true because the sense of cold activated is being 
unemotional, and in that sense, John is literally cold; (3) Neither literal nor metaphorical, 
the use of cold as unemotional was originally metaphorical, but has become conventional, 
such that cold now includes the sense of unemotional. Glucskberg similarly agrees that it 
can be difficult to determine whether a particular representation is literal or figurative, 
and that its classification as literal or figurative can change over time:  
 with repeated encounters with a metaphor vehicle such as spider, it becomes polysemous to the 
extent that its meaning can be modulated in context in the same way that any other word meaning can be 
modulated in context—for example, by processes of pragmatic narrowing or broadening. At what point 
might ad hoc concepts lose their ad hoc status and become lexically encoded? To our knowledge, there are 
no clear criteria for distinguishing between ad hoc concepts and lexically encoded ones. Similarly, we have 
no clear criteria for distinguishing between metaphorical and literal uses of concepts, other than the 
distinction between linguistic and extra-linguistic meaning. As Carston put it, ‘The use is a literal one if the 
logical/deﬁnitional properties of the linguistic encoding are preserved; it is nonliteral if they are not’ (2002, 
p. 340). To identify any given instance of language use as literal or non-literal therefore requires identifying 
the logical/deﬁnitional properties of the lexical concepts employed. It is difficult enough to identify such 
properties at any speciﬁc point in a word’s (or a metaphor’s) career. Tracking changes in such properties 





drawn as a convenient ﬁction while we devote our energies to discovering the processes that people use to 
understand language use in context. (Glucksberg & Haught, 2006a, p. 377). 
Therefore, although it can be difficult to distinguish meanings/senses as figurative 
or literal, Glucksberg argues that this "fiction" should be maintained while pursuing a 
better understanding of the processing mechanics. However, the maintenance of a literal-
figurative distinction has perhaps actually been disadvantageous to our understanding of 
how metaphor is processed and interpreted. In the Introduction, it was noted that 
determining whether a sentence out of context (e.g., My chiropractor is a magician) 
should be interpreted literally or figuratively is rather difficult (Rumelhart, 1979). 
Similarly, results increasingly suggest that reading a given word or sentence can activate 
multiple properties, both literal and figurative, followed by an interpretation that is based 
on the properties activated.  
 When someone says my chiropractor is a magician in the “figurative” manner, 
for example, we attribute certain properties to the chiropractor (e.g., being very good at 
his profession), but different properties in the “literal” interpretation (e.g., actually 
performing a magic show as a magician would do). In this manner, the only difference 
between a literal and figurative interpretation would be the properties being attributed. 
Therefore, I disagree with Glucksberg that a literal-figurative distinction should be 
maintained, and similarly, disagree with the dual-reference hypothesis according to which 
there are two sharks within the lexicon (i.e., a literal one and a figurative one). Instead, I 
propose that it is more parsimonious to argue that that words activate multiple salient 
properties, and an interpretation is based on these properties. This proposal is consistent 
with the Giora's (2003) hypothesis that when words activate a given meaning, it entails 





prototypicality, familiarity, and conventionality. In this manner, salient properties can be 
seen as a reflection of personal experience, stereotype, be highly cultural, and potentially 
different between two individuals.  
 Consider the metaphor lawyers are sharks, which is repeatedly considered apt by 
participants and well understood even by patients with Alzheimer’s Disease. The aptness 
of this statement seems unrelated to any “literal notion” as lawyers are not necessarily 
mean individuals and more typically people who strive to be proficient at their job, while 
attacks from sharks are relatively infrequent compared to other events (e.g., car 
accidents). Nevertheless, people generally consider lawyers are sharks to be an apt 
metaphor because properties such as ruthlessness and viciousness have become strongly 
associated with both lawyers and sharks (perhaps due to certain tv shows like Boston 
Legal and Shark Week). In other words, these properties have become salient properties 
for lawyer and shark.  
 It should be noted that none of the studies in the present thesis directly measured 
for saliency, but the pragmatic variables examined are indirectly related to saliency. 
When participants were asked to rate conventionality, for example, they rated how 
strongly certain properties (e.g., addiction) were associated with particular vehicle terms 
(e.g., shark). These ratings can be seen as a measure of saliency where participants are 
asked to to what degree a certain property is salient for that vehicle term. Similarly, the 
definition of aptness itself includes the notion of saliency: the extent to which the vehicle 
captures salient aspects of the topic. Thus, when people report that lawyers are sharks is 
an apt metaphor, they are reporting that the words lawyers and sharks activate similar 





The results found by Blasko and Connine (1993) can also be discussed in terms of 
saliency. In their study, priming for “literal” and “figurative” properties was similar for 
metaphors rated high for aptness and familiarity. Glucksberg (2003) has interpreted these 
results as the figurative meaning being activated whenever an apt and familiar metaphor 
is read. Instead, I would argue that the properties after metaphors that demonstrate 
priming do so not because they are figurative, but rather because these properties are 
salient for these apt and familiar metaphors. In other words, familiarity with a certain 
metaphor makes related properties more salient to the extent that properties which would 
be considered "literal" or "figurative" will both demonstrate priming due to their high 
levels of saliency. Similarly, in the case of apt metaphors, certain properties demonstrate 
priming because they are being activated by both the topic and the vehicle.  
The Role of Context 
 Based on the saliency results obtained in Chapter 2, the explanation results found 
in Chapter 3, and the shorter saccade lengths found in Chapter 4, reading a vehicle within 
a categorical frame (X is Y) rather than a comparative frame (X is like Y) appears to affect 
which initially activated properties will receive extra attention. These distinct frames 
could have context effects. De Almeida et al. (2010), for example, have argued that the 
different structures of metaphors and similes impact how a vehicle is interpreted. More 
specifically, because metaphors have a predicative structure (X is Y), they are proposed to 
work like an algorithm (BE (e (<e,t>)), which is driven by the form of the sentence, and 
in this manner, metaphors can signal that a given interpretation should include more 





Our analysis relies on understanding that the univocal be projects an argument structure that 
specifies different semantic types for its internal and external arguments. The basic form is that of 
predication in which e, an entity (referent) is taken to be the topic to which the predicative type 
(<e,t>) applies (see Partee, 1986). It is possible that the arguments in BE (e <e,t>)) are subject to 
type-shifting  operations-- e.g., shifting the internal argument from a basic entity type to a 
predicate (p. 186). 
 In contrast, in the case of similes, de Almeida et al. argue that the comparative structure 
causes the vehicle term to be treated as entity and makes more denotative properties 
receive greater attention:  
Our proposal for similes of the form x is like y (lawyers are like sharks) . . . the predicate be-like 
type shifts the internal argument for the purposes of comparison between two arguments of the 
same type (p. 186). 
Therefore, consistent with arguments outlined by Glucksberg and Haught (2006), de 
Almeida et al. assume that a vehicle term is treated differently depending on whether a 
vehicle is read within a metaphor or simile: "It is because they have different structures 
that they yield different interpretations" (p.186). Metaphors can be seen as providing a 
context where connotative properties become more salient (because they are primed by 
the predicative frame).  
 The above prediction is consistent with the results found in Chapter 2 where 
certain properties appeared to become more salient when the word was read within a 
metaphor, as well as the results from Chapter 3, where explanations containing denotative 
properties were read faster after similes. Note, however, that these results could also be 
interpreted as consistent with Categorization theory’s claim that vehicles activate a literal 
representation in similes, but a figurative representation in metaphors. The initial 
activation difference would then cause priming effects, such that explanations with 
figurative properties are read faster after metaphors, while explanations with literal 





as previously discussed, is needing to define certain properties as literal or figurative, and 
the related problems that such definitions entail. I propose instead that the distinction is 
connotative-denotative rather than literal-figurative, and that the same salient properties 
are initially activated whenever a word is read. The X is Y structure, however, has the 
effect of increasing the activation level of connotative properties. 
Additional support also comes from the saccade length results found in Chapter 4. 
Metaphor vehicles were found to have shorter saccade lengths, which suggested the 
metaphor vehicles required additional processing compared to when they were read in a 
simile. Recall also the results found by Pynte et al. (1996), where larger amplitudes were 
found for metaphor vehicles, but this effect disappeared when the metaphors were placed 
after supportive contexts. It is possible the N400 effects found for metaphors in isolation 
reflects the need to give additional activation to certain connotative properties. When 
these statements are presented after a context that primes these same properties, however, 
then the additional activation needed for these properties is diminished. A future eye-
tracking study could also compare the metaphor and simile sentences used in Chapter 4 in 
isolation and when proceeded after supportive contexts (similar to the study by Oronty et 
al. (1982)). I would predict shorter saccade lengths for metaphor vehicles when sentences 
are read out of context, but similar saccade lengths when these sentences are presented 
after contexts that prime a vehicle’s connotative properties. 
The difference between denotative and connotative properties being proposed is 
similar to the divide proposed between abstract and concrete nouns (Aisenman, 1999). 
Denotative properties refer to the physical manifestation of an object. In other words, the 





connotative properties would be ideas associated with that concept, with no obvious 
physical referent. For example, participants in Chapter 2 when answering the 
connotativeness quiz were required to respond that rectangular was a denotative property 
of painting, but artistic was a connotative property. The word rectangular refers to the 
physical make-up of a painting, whereas artistic refers our general opinion of paintings 
(i.e., that paintings are artistic productions), and has no specific referent. For example, if 
people were asked to demonstrate something rectangular, they would presumably present 
objects of similar shape. In contrast, asking someone to present something artistic could 
produce not only a wide array of objects of varying shape, but people may even disagree 
on whether a particular object is artistic. Therefore, we can use the physical realm and 
the presence of a referent available to the senses to distinguish connotative and denotative 
properties. Thus, properties can be ranked for connotativeness, as was done in Chapter 2, 
based on how much they reflect concrete observable aspects of a concept. In contrast, it 
seems more difficult to determine whether artistic should be considered a literal or 
figurative property of painting, as previously discussed, and noted by Rumelhart (1993).  
For this reason, the denotative-connotative distinction is preferred to a literal-figurative 
difference.   
Post-Lexical Access: Interpretation Stage 
Although the distinct semantic frames of metaphors and similes can cause certain 
properties to receive increased activation, the initial set of properties for comparable 
metaphors and similes will initially be the same because the vehicles are the same. 
Therefore, in both cases, salient properties associated with the vehicle will be activated. 





a word shark is first read, associated salient properties will also be activated. In the case 
of metaphors, however, certain connotative properties could receive greater activation, 
hence increasing their saliency for interpretation.  
 These activated properties are then used to infer the correct interpretation, with 
more salient properties being used to determine the appropriate interpretation of the 
sentence. Therefore, reading shark within a metaphor or simile would activate salient 
associated properties such as dangerous, as well as other possibly less salient properties 
(e.g., sharp), and people ultimately select which properties are most relevant for 
interpretation with a bias towards more salient properties. In other words, a set of 
possible interpretations is derived from the salient properties activated, and a person then 
infers which of these interpretations is most appropriate given the context and prior 
knowledge (Giora, 1997, 2003). In this manner, someone hearing the sentence My 
chiropractor is a magician would know whether the word magician referred to the 
chiropractor's second job or skill level. Similarly, if for a certain individual dangerous is 
a salient property of shark, then they would probably interpret the metaphor lawyers are 
sharks as meaning that lawyers are dangerous because the predicative frame makes 
dangerous a more salient property than fish. In contrast, when a word lacks salient 
associated connotative properties, then reading a metaphor such as lawyers are gerbils 
can be difficult because the connotative property needed for interpreting the metaphor is 
not a salient property of the vehicle.   
 In summary, replacing the notion of literal meaning with the framework that 
words activate salient properties allows us to better understand the results found within 





salient associated properties is initially activated when a vehicle is a read within a 
metaphor or simile, but the structure has the effect of making connotative properties more 
salient for metaphors, and denotative properties more salient for similes. These different 
activation levels for the activated properties can then cause metaphors to evoke 
interpretations that seem more figurative. The advantage of this framework is the 
elimination of issues related to whether meaning is initially literal or figurative, or 
whether context alone is sufficient for determining the correct interpretation. Instead, 
both the words within a sentence and the context itself are predicted to affect the salient 
properties that are activated. People then deduce from that set of salient properties the 
appropriate interpretation for a given sentence.   
 Ultimately, the framework presented within this thesis is perhaps most similar to 
two notable theories of metaphor: the Standard Pragmatic theory of metaphor (Searle, 
1979) and Davidson’s (1979) view of metaphor comprehension. Similar to Searle, I am 
arguing that a vehicle will activate a particular interpretation which is then considered 
within the present context and ultimately accepted or rejected. The key difference is the 
assumption that the initial meaning is salient (more specially, a set of salient properties) 
rather than a literal meaning. Once these salient properties are activated, however, I agree 
that comprehension can begin to proceed in the open-ended manner described by 
Davidson. From the set of salient properties activated, an interpretation is obtained. 
Unlike Davidson, however, I argue that this open-ended procedure has one key "rule": 
properties with the highest level of activation are considered first. When words are 
typically read in isolation, the properties that will receive the highest level of activation 





metaphors where both the topic and vehicle will activate a similar set of salient 
properties. Furthermore, context and intra-lexical priming can increase the activation 
levels of certain vehicle properties, increasing the likelihood that an interpretation will be 
based on these properties. For example, when someone hears the metaphor music is 
medicine, both the topic and the vehicle will activate the salient property soothing, and in 
turn people will report their interpretation of the metaphor as meaning music is soothing. 
Figure 6 summarizes the proposed framework:  












 The proposed framework differs in key ways from Categorization theory 
(Glucksberg, 2008) and Career of Metaphor theory (Gentner & Bowdle, 2008) theory. 
Within Categorization theory, I disagree with the dual-reference hypothesis, and instead 
argue that the same set of salient properties is activated whenever a particular vehicle is 
read. Within a categorical frame (i.e., X is Y), connotative properties can received 





within a metaphor or a simile. Similarly, the proposed framework diverges from Career 
of Metaphor’s premise that topic-vehicle pairs (e.g., music is medicine) involve structure-
mapping to select a particular property which is implied to be true of the topic. Rather, I 
view lexical access as exhaustive rather than selective. There is not one single property 
that is activated, but rather a large number of salient properties are activated whenever a 
vehicle is read. These properties, consistent with Giora (2003), can be ranked in terms of 
saliency, such that when these terms are read in isolation, more salient properties would 
be activated before less salient properties. However, the proposed framework differs from 
Giora’s hypothesis by predicting that context (i.e., the semantic frame used to mention a 
vehicle) can affect the activation level of related salient properties. More specifically, 
context can increase the activation levels of less salient properties when such properties 
are connotative. In contrast, Giora argues that context is unable to increase the activation 
levels of less salient properties during lexical access. For example, when someone is 
asked to interpret the metaphor music is medicine, multiple salient properties are 
activated by both music and medicine, including the property soothing, which received 
more activation than other related properties.  
Conclusion  
 I put forward the argument that the results obtained in the present thesis suggest 
that lexical meaning may be neither literal nor figurative, and instead represent the 
activation of salient properties. Consistent with direct theories of metaphor processing 
and past researchers (e.g., Gibbs, 1999; Glucksberg, 2003; Giora, 1997), it is possible that 
the brain does not process, store, nor interpret language as literal or figurative when 





particular interpretation as literal or figurative is probably a separate cognitive process 
where we assess the sentence’s merits based on our own knowledge of the world; and an 
interpretation, or set of interpretations, is probably produced without even a consideration 
for whether the sentence is figurative. Interpretations are based on salient activated 
properties which bias how a given sentence should be understood.   
 Therefore, the results obtained in this thesis add weight to the argument that the 
brain uses similar processes for both literal and figurative language, but only because 
there is no actual literal-figurative distinction, there is only salient properties. Moving 
forward, adopting the assumption that metaphor is not unique, there could perhaps be a 
greater push towards examining whether certain theories of language that do not 
reference metaphor could be extended to include metaphor. The Underspecification 
model (Frisson & Pickering, 2001), for example, originated as a theory for explaining 
lexical ambiguity which was later expanded to metaphor and other forms of figurative 
language (e.g., metonymy). Therefore, the next push in metaphor research should perhaps 
not be "new" theories of metaphor, or refinement of current "figurative language" 
theories, but rather an examination of how current theories regarding literal language 
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Table 2A: 
Collected Ratings       
         
 Legend        
 MetFam = Average Metaphor Familiairity Rating    
 SimFam = Average Simile Familiarity Ratings    
 MetCon = Average Metaphor Conventionality Rating    
 SimCon = Average Simile Conventionality Rating    
 MetEnt = Average Metaphor Entropy Rating     
 SimEnt = Average Simile Entropy Rating     
 MetApt = Average Metaphor Aptness Rating     
 SimApt =  Average Simile Aptness Rating     
         
Topic-Vehicle Pair MetFam SimFam MetCon SimCon MetEnt SimEnt MetApt SimApt 
alcohol-crutch 5.20 4.16 7.95 8.00 4.86 4.93 7.35 6.83 
anger-fire 4.75 7.68 7.15 8.80 4.44 4.30 8.48 7.87 
anger-heart 1.20 1.40 4.75 7.56 4.91 4.56 1.91 2.04 
beauty-passport 4.47 2.60 6.70 7.08 4.86 5.52 7.13 5.39 
bible-sword 3.55 2.76 8.65 9.08 4.76 4.14 5.61 4.87 
billboards-warts 1.05 1.12 7.00 8.52 4.20 5.21 4.04 4.48 
christ-door 2.80 2.16 6.40 8.40 4.46 4.54 3.65 5.96 
christians-salt 2.45 1.24 3.35 3.20 4.95 4.59 1.65 2.57 
cigarettes-time 





cities-jungles 6.60 8.04 3.85 5.12 4.65 5.12 8.61 8.61 
clouds-cotton 5.95 8.24 8.70 9.60 3.10 2.89 5.22 6.74 
debt-disease 5.05 6.36 8.45 9.28 5.41 5.06 6.30 5.14 
deserts-ovens 4.75 4.40 9.15 8.92 3.57 4.06 6.26 6.30 
desks-junkyards 2.10 3.20 8.20 8.60 3.98 4.02 4.65 3.74 
dreams-water 2.60 1.76 5.30 8.48 5.01 4.92 3.65 4.09 
education-stairway 5.90 6.84 7.40 8.56 5.01 4.86 8.96 7.65 
exams-hurdles 6.10 6.16 7.00 7.56 4.68 4.76 7.87 8.00 
eyelids-curtains 3.30 3.96 4.40 7.00 4.27 4.29 7.35 7.48 
faith-raft 2.30 2.64 3.95 5.60 4.60 5.12 7.22 5.65 
families-fortresses 3.25 5.28 8.35 8.80 4.48 4.73 7.78 6.22 
fingerprints-
portraits 5.05 5.28 1.70 2.12 4.79 4.74 6.13 6.35 
friendship-rainbow 3.65 4.64 9.05 9.36 3.86 3.76 5.74 5.43 
genes-blueprints 7.85 8.64 7.15 7.28 5.01 5.32 8.39 9.30 
giraffes-skyscrapers 2.40 3.28 8.40 9.56 3.79 4.01 5.48 4.78 
god-fire 2.05 2.40 5.25 5.96 4.42 5.08 3.39 5.22 
god-parent 4.75 4.92 6.10 8.84 4.71 4.48 6.91 6.39 
greed-buzzard 1.25 1.64 5.70 5.96 3.97 4.67 4.57 4.83 
health-glass 1.20 1.48 8.70 8.60 4.02 3.78 3.61 4.70 
hearts-closets 1.95 2.12 6.90 6.52 4.28 4.45 4.39 4.65 
heaven-treasure 4.40 3.60 7.10 8.60 5.12 4.91 6.61 6.96 
highways-snakes 2.55 3.08 4.90 5.76 4.21 4.08 3.18 4.74 
insults-daggers 6.40 7.88 8.70 8.92 3.72 4.19 7.91 7.17 
jobs-jails 3.15 5.00 4.00 3.28 5.07 5.09 5.00 4.17 
knowledge-light 4.45 5.56 8.60 8.76 4.67 4.24 8.09 8.48 





knowledge-power 9.80 9.60 8.75 9.24 4.98 5.26 8.52 8.04 
knowledge-river 5.20 6.08 4.95 5.68 4.81 4.73 4.30 3.83 
lawyers-sharks 7.70 6.17 9.05 4.75 4.85 5.15 8.61 7.35 
lawyers-snakes 4.00 6.46 8.05 6.44 4.41 4.95 7.39 5.83 
life-beach 6.00 3.62 8.80 9.69 4.31 4.52 5.17 5.26 
life-bottle 2.00 2.37 4.40 9.88 4.78 4.60 2.43 2.39 
life-dream 7.25 7.96 7.70 9.06 4.44 5.19 4.48 5.26 
life-joke 5.60 4.32 8.85 9.94 4.13 4.48 6.17 4.00 
life-journey 9.30 9.31 8.75 5.44 4.36 4.43 9.22 9.52 
life-river 4.85 6.04 5.90 8.63 4.83 4.94 7.22 7.74 
love-child 3.80 3.20 8.30 9.06 5.02 4.43 5.30 5.61 
love-drug 8.60 9.69 9.80 8.88 4.27 4.69 8.26 9.09 
love-flower 4.75 5.81 8.42 8.25 4.45 4.04 6.91 7.22 
love-gold 4.75 4.22 8.75 8.38 3.48 4.22 6.91 6.26 
love-melody 5.50 5.06 7.90 6.63 5.02 4.87 5.22 6.43 
love-rainbow 4.90 4.08 8.95 7.25 4.07 3.91 5.39 6.00 
love-rose 5.55 6.86 8.85 8.69 4.72 4.10 6.74 5.78 
memory-river 2.60 2.60 7.40 4.50 4.44 3.53 4.78 4.35 
memory-sponge 7.50 7.79 9.75 9.19 4.67 3.98 6.70 5.70 
men-fish 3.35 3.65 6.70 8.44 5.52 5.18 1.74 2.57 
minds-computers 7.65 7.62 6.90 7.56 4.79 5.22 7.48 8.17 
money-oxygen 2.05 3.21 8.60 8.69 4.15 4.33 4.13 3.30 
music-medicine 6.05 7.60 8.85 4.38 4.20 4.51 7.39 7.48 
obligations-
shackles 2.80 4.57 6.20 5.88 4.88 4.72 6.09 5.17 
peace-river 2.30 2.24 6.10 6.50 4.24 4.60 5.65 4.83 





rage-volcano 5.10 7.62 9.50 8.00 3.94 4.08 8.09 7.65 
runners-torpedoes 1.80 2.83 7.30 9.06 3.50 4.29 4.35 5.00 
salesmen-
bulldozers 2.45 2.99 8.10 8.94 4.83 4.95 5.35 4.00 
schools-zoos 5.15 5.53 8.25 7.31 3.28 5.12 6.96 5.57 
science-politics 3.30 1.42 6.20 4.31 5.09 4.98 4.32 3.17 
sermons-sleeping 
pills 1.40 2.14 4.55 7.13 4.14 4.37 6.43 4.39 
skating-flying 1.65 2.10 8.30 7.44 4.58 4.49 4.26 3.91 
smog-shroud 1.75 1.83 4.25 6.19 4.35 4.57 5.09 6.81 
soldiers-pawns 4.65 5.71 5.80 8.63 4.75 4.81 6.74 8.09 
stores-zoos 5.55 5.33 9.25 3.88 4.76 4.49 5.26 5.09 
teachers-sculptors 5.35 3.95 6.95 6.38 4.83 4.45 7.91 6.70 
television-candy 1.70 1.84 8.40 4.94 4.34 4.40 5.74 5.91 
time-money 9.95 8.25 8.35 3.06 4.86 4.89 8.43 5.91 
time-snail 2.05 4.28 9.85 8.88 4.16 3.89 4.48 3.48 
time-thief 3.30 4.25 3.90 9.00 4.87 4.48 6.91 4.87 
tongues-fire 3.25 2.46 9.05 5.56 4.67 4.36 4.78 3.83 
tree trunks-straws 1.50 1.38 2.15 7.69 4.16 4.21 2.65 4.00 
trees-umbrellas 2.80 2.54 7.40 8.81 4.02 3.98 6.36 6.74 
trust-glue 2.80 4.58 8.85 6.20 3.89 4.28 6.30 6.17 
typewriters-
dinosaurs 3.20 4.22 9.00 7.33 4.24 3.77 6.30 4.17 
winter-death 5.35 4.50 6.05 7.27 4.46 4.31 5.17 4.35 
wisdom-ocean 5.40 5.29 9.20 8.27 4.53 4.94 6.91 6.22 






Table 2B: Collected Properties for Metaphor and Simile Topic-Vehicle Pairs 
        
         
   
         
 Legend        
 Conn = Average Connotativeness Rating    
 Sal = Average Saliency Rating     
 Freq = Frequency       
 TR = Total Responses      
 SR = Single Responses      
         
                  
Topic- Properties as Metaphor  Properties as Simile   
Vehicle            
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 49    TR 49  
Alcohol- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Crutch helpful 1.80 5 3.50 dependent 1.20 5 3.81 
  dependable 1.25 4  supportive 1.25 4  
  addictive 1.67 3  bad 1.50 2  
  support 2.33 3  addictive 2.00 2  
  disability 1.50 2  dependable 2.00 2  
  aid 2.50 2  hard 2.00 2  
  problem 2.50 2  necessity 2.00 2  
  needed 3.00 2  limiting 2.50 2  





            SR 26   
  Metaphor       Simile    
    TR 58    TR 55  
Anger- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Fire dangerous 1.63 8 3.56 red 1.14 7 3.56 
  hot 1.63 8 1.35 dangerous 1.86 7 1.35 
  red 1.40 5 2.11 hot 1.86 7 1.40 
  scary 2.20 5 4.52 destructive 2.17 6 3.54 
  burning 1.67 3  raging 1.33 3  
  hurtful 2.00 2  crazy 2.00 2  
  destructive 2.50 2    SR 23  
  deadly 3.00 2       
    SR 23       
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 54    TR 47  
Anger- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Heart red 1.20 5 2.11 red 1.67 9 2.11 
  beating 1.75 4  passionate 1.00 3  
  pumping 2.00 4  beating 2.00 3  
  bloody 1.67 3  emotive 2.33 3  
  emotional 1.67 3  bloody 1.50 2  
  loving 2.00 3  strong 1.50 2  
  fragile 1.50 2    SR 25  
  hard 2.50 2       
    SR 28          
  Metaphor       Simile    





Beauty- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Passport freedom 1.50 6 4.37 accessible 1.50 2  
  gateway 2.00 3  important 2.50 2  
  advantage 1.00 2  useful 2.50 2  
  beneficial 2.00 2    SR 44  
  useful 2.00 2       
  informative 3.00 2       
    SR 28           
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 51    TR 44  
Bible- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Sword sharp 1.40 7 1.60 sharp 1.11 9 1.60 
  weapon 1.86 5 1.70 strong 2.00 4  
  powerful 1.33 3  powerful 2.25 4  
  dangerous 2.67 3  dangerous 1.33 3  
  life 1.50 2  long 2.33 3  
  deadly 2.50 2  weapon 1.50 2  
  silver 2.50 2  useful 2.00 2  
    SR 27    SR 17   
  Metaphor    Simile    
    TR 39    TR 53  
Billboards- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Warts ugly 1.67 6 3.13 annoying 1.33 6 4.41 
  annoying 2.25 4  round 1.50 2  
  big 1.33 3  unwanted 1.50 2  
  unwanted 1.00 2  big 2.00 2  





  dirty 2.00 2  unsightly 2.00 2  
  everywhere 2.00 2  removable 2.50 2  
  large 2.00 2    SR 35  
  noticeable 2.50 2       
  round 2.50 2       
    SR 12           
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 48    TR 48  
Christ- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Door open/close 1.20 14 1.79 open/close 1.27 15 1.79 
  obstructing 2.33 3  inviting 2.50 2  
  opportunity 1.00 2  entrance 3.00 2  
  wood 1.50 2    SR 29  
  gateway 2.00 2       
  locked 2.00 2       
    SR 23       
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 40    TR 34  
Christians- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Salt bitter 1.33 3  white 1.75 4  
  tasty 1.00 2  small 2.00 3  
  white 1.00 2  granular 1.50 2  
  salty 1.50 2  tasty 1.50 2  
  small 2.00 2    SR 23  
  plenty 2.50 2       
    SR 27           





    TR 51    TR 55  
Cigarettes- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Time Bombs dangerous 2.38 8 2.92 death 2.11 9 3.13 
  death 1.29 7 3.13 dangerous 1.63 8 2.92 
  kills 1.75 4  unhealthy 1.00 3  
  explosive 1.00 3  destructive 1.67 3  
  smoky 1.67 3  explosive 2.33 3  
  fatal 2.00 3  killer 1.50 2  
  limiting 1.50 2  fatal 2.00 2  
  scary 1.50 2  hazardous 2.50 2  
  harmful 2.00 2    SR 23  
  bad 2.50 2       
  unpredictable 2.50 2       
    SR 13           
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 56    TR 59  
Cities- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Jungles crazy 1.71 7 4.20 crowded 1.50 4  
  crowded 1.67 6 3.28 messy 1.75 4  
  noisy 1.00 3  crazy 2.00 4  
  wild 1.33 3  dangerous 2.67 3  
  busy 1.67 3  big 1.00 2  
  dangerous 2.00 3  busy 1.00 2  
  messy 2.00 3  complicated 2.00 2  
  big 1.00 2  huge 2.00 2  
  animals 1.50 2  loud 2.00 2  





    SR 22  confusing 2.50 2  
       dirty 3.00 2  
            SR 28   
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 58    TR 58  
Clouds- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Cotton soft 1.43 15 2.05 white 1.89 18 1.72 
  white 1.87 14 1.72 soft 2.08 13 2.05 
  fluffy 2.00 11 2.33 fluffy 1.55 11 2.33 
  puffy 1.50 2  puffy 1.50 3  
  bouncy 2.00 2  comfortable 2.00 2  
  light-weight 2.50 2  light 3.00 2  
  calming 3.00 2  round 3.00 2  
  round 3.00 2    SR 7  
    SR 8           
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 57    TR 55  
Debt- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Disease painful 1.00 3  spreads 1.50 4  
  deadly 1.67 3  painful 1.33 3  
  harmful 2.33 3  avoidable 1.67 3  
  bad 1.50 2  destructive 1.67 3  
  contagious 2.00 2  unwanted 1.67 3  
  dibilitating 2.00 2  dangerous 2.00 3  
  kills 2.00 2  chronic 1.50 2  
  sad 2.00 2  contagious 2.00 2  





       disabling 3.00 2  
            SR 28   
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 52    TR 56  
Deserts- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Ovens hot 1.00 20 1.63 hot 1.35 17 1.63 
  dry 2.33 6 2.45 dry 1.50 6 2.45 
  burning 2.20 5 2.69 warm 1.75 4  
  cooked 3.00 3  burning 2.00 3  
  baked 1.50 2    SR 26  
    SR 16       
  Metaphor       Simile       
  TR 52    TR 56  
Desks- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Junkyards messy 1.58 12 3.08 messy 1.46 13 3.08 
  dirty 1.88 8 3.07 dirty 1.50 4  
  
junk or 
garbage 1.40 5 1.67 unorganized 1.75 4  
  disorganized 1.33 3  full 2.00 4  
  unorganized 2.00 2  disorganized 2.14 4  
  useless 2.50 2  cluttered 1.00 3  
  ugly 3.00 2    SR 24  
    SR 18           
  Metaphor       Simile       
  TR 56    TR 52  
Dreams- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Water fluid 1.60 5 1.66 fluid 1.00 7 1.37 





  liquid 1.67 3  necessity 1.33 3  
  refreshing 2.33 3  flowing 1.00 2  
  necessary 1.50 2  evaporate 2.00 2  
  vital 1.50 2  fresh 2.00 2  
  plentiful 2.00 2  peaceful 2.00 2  
  pure 2.00 2    SR 30  
  essential 2.50 2       
  unclear 2.50 2       
    SR 28           
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 50    TR 51  
Education- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Stairway higher 1.50 4  steps 1.40 5 1.14 
  steps 1.33 3  hightens 2.00 5 3.62 
  upward 1.33 3  elevate 1.00 2  
  long 1.00 2  passageway 1.00 2  
  passage 1.00 2  long 1.50 2  
  ascension 1.50 2  assending 2.00 2  
  climbing 1.50 2  climbing 2.00 2  
  path 1.50 2  tiring 2.00 2  
  success 2.50 2  upwards 2.00 2  
  tiring 2.50 2  complicated 2.50 2  
    SR 26  steady 3.00 2  
            SR 23   
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 50    TR 45  





Hurdles challenging 1.17 6 3.84 challenging 2.33 6 3.84 
  obstacles 1.50 4  difficult 1.33 3  
  difficult 1.75 4  stressful 1.67 3  
  stressful 2.50 4  frustrating 1.00 2  
  tough 2.33 3  burdens 1.50 2  
  high 1.50 2  obstacles 1.50 2  
  long 2.00 2  passed 3.00 2  
    SR 25     SR 25   
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 55    TR 54  
Eyelids- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Curtains open/close 1.56 14 1.54 open/close 1.63 13 1.54 
  protective 2.40 5 4.13 darkness 1.86 7 3.49 
  private 1.33 3  protective 1.75 4  
  shut 1.33 3  covers 2.75 4  
  shade 1.50 2  private 1.50 2  
  barriers 2.00 2  soft 1.50 2  
  moveable 2.00 2  light 2.00 2  
  shields 2.00 2  long 2.50 2  
  dark 3.00 2    SR 18  
    SR 20       
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 43    TR 47  
Faith- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Raft unsteady 1.40 5 3.29 fragile 2.00 3  
  floating 1.75 4  life-saving 2.00 3  





  safety 1.00 2  safety 1.50 2  
  saviour 1.50 2  floating 2.00 2  
  small 1.50 2  helpful 2.00 2  
  boat 2.50 2    SR 32  
    SR 22           
  Metaphor       Simile       
  TR 56    TR 55  
Families- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Fortresses strong 1.44 9 2.84 strong 1.38 8 2.84 
  protective  1.63 8 3.24 protective 1.50 8 3.24 
  secure 2.20 5 2.95 solid 1.00 2  
  huge 1.50 2  caring 1.50 2  
  supportive 2.00 2  together 2.00 2  
  large 2.50 2  loving 2.50 2  
  lasting 2.50 2  secure 3.00 2  
  important 3.00 2    SR 29  
    SR 24           
  Metaphor       Simile       
  TR 55    TR 54  
Fingerprints- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Portraits unique 1.63 8 3.93 unique 1.50 9 3.93 
  individual 2.25 4  individual 1.75 4  
  images 1.00 3  identity 1.33 3  
  identity 1.67 3  represent 2.33 3  
  revealing 2.00 3  detailed 2.67 3  
  detailed 2.00 2  identifiable 1.50 2  





  clues 2.50 2    SR 28  
  indentity 2.50 2       
    SR 26           
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 58    TR 51  
Friendship- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Rainbow colourful 1.25 16 1.43 colourful 1.85 13 1.43 
  beautiful 1.82 11 4.25 beauty 2.00 7 4.25 
  rare 2.20 5 3.75 happy 1.60 5 4.62 
  magical 3.00 2  rare 1.50 4  
    SR 24  diversified 1.00 2  
       fun 1.50 2  
       wide 1.50 2  
       pleasing 2.00 2  
       shiny 2.50 2  
            SR 12   
  Metaphor       Simile       
  TR 46    TR 53  
Genes- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Blueprints maps 2.00 4  map 1.33 3  
  unique 1.33 3  complicated 1.67 3  
  informative  1.67 3  unique 1.00 2  
  designing 2.00 2  orderly 1.50 2  
  identity 2.00 2  unchangeable 1.50 2  
  personal 2.50 2  stable 2.00 2  
    SR 30  foundation 2.50 2  





            SR 35   
  Metaphor       Simile       
  TR 56    TR 51  
Giraffes- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Skyscraper tall 1.06 18 1.47 tall 1.12 17 1.47 
  high 1.67 6 1.70 noticeable 2.00 3  
  long 2.40 5 2.30 thin 2.33 3  
  imposing 2.33 3  large 2.00 2  
  big 2.50 2  long 2.50 2  
  huge 2.50 2  strong 2.50 2  
  strong 3.00 2    SR 22  
    SR 18           
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 55    TR 54  
God- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Fire powerful 1.60 10 3.82 warmth 2.40 5 2.43 
  destructive 2.83 6 3.54 dangerous 1.33 3  
  dangerous 1.80 5 3.56 powerful 1.33 3  
  hot 1.67 3  light 2.00 3  
  warm 1.00 2  consuming 2.33 3  
  great 1.50 2  strong 1.00 2  
  strong 1.50 2  forceful 2.00 2  
  
intimidatin
g 2.00 2  hot 2.00 2  
  engulfing 2.50 2    SR 31  
    SR 21       
  Metaphor       Simile       





God- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Parent loving 1.82 11 4.07 caring 1.90 10 4.04 
  caring 1.20 5 4.04 loving 2.17 6 4.07 
  protective 2.20 5 3.89 protective 1.50 6 3.89 
  
authoritativ
e 1.50 2  guiding 1.80 5 3.99 
  trustworthy 1.50 2  nurturing 2.50 2  
  forgiving 2.00 2  understanding 3.00 2  
  guiding 2.00 2    SR 27  
    SR 30           
  Metaphor       Simile       
  TR 28    TR 31  
Greed- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Buzzard bad 1.25 4  annoying 1.33 3  
  annoying 1.33 4  selfish 2.00 2  
    SR 20  unwanted 2.00 2  
         SR 24  
  Metaphor       Simile       
  TR 51    TR 49  
Health- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Glass fragile 1.30 10 2.57 fragile 1.38 13 2.57 
  breakable 1.89 9 2.31 breakable 1.75 8 2.31 
  transparent 2.20 5 1.79 transparent 1.80 5 1.79 
  clear 1.33 3  clear 1.50 2  
  full 1.50 2  damageable 2.50 2  
  delicate 2.00 2  empty 3.00 2  
  empty 2.50 2    SR 17  





  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 55    TR 52  
Hearts- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Closests 
closed/ope
n 1.27 11 2.10 closed/open 1.36 13 2.10 
  opened 2.25 4  secrets 1.75 4  
  messy 2.75 4  hidden 1.33 3  
  full 1.67 3  full 1.00 2  
  hidden 1.50 2  personal 1.50 2  
  fillable 2.00 2  messy 2.50 2  
  private 2.50 2  mysterious 2.50 2  
  protective 2.50 2  dark 3.00 2  
    SR 25  deep 3.00 2  
            SR 20   
  Metaphor       Simile       
  TR 56    TR 54  
Heaven- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Treasure golden 1.33 6 2.67 precious 1.80 5 3.64 
  richening 2.33 3  valuable 1.75 4  
  pleasant 1.00 2  secretive 1.00 3  
  beautiful 1.50 2  hidden 1.67 3  
  nice 1.50 2  exciting 2.00 3  
  value 1.50 2  surprising 1.00 2  
  dream 2.00 2  desirable 1.50 2  
  magical 2.00 2  expensive 1.50 2  
  precious 2.50 2  mystery 2.00 2  
  shiny 2.50 2  rare 2.00 2  





    SR 29     SR 24   
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 51    TR 54  
Highways- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Snakes long 1.11 9 1.87 long 1.36 14 1.87 
  slippery 2.00 5 2.50 dangerous 2.80 5 3.44 
  dangerous 2.20 5 3.44 winding 1.25 4  
  curvy 1.33 3  curvy 1.80 4  
  fast 2.00 3  narrow 1.50 2  
  windy 2.00 3  slippery 2.00 2  
  scary 2.33 3  twisting 3.00 2  
  poisonous 2.50 2    SR 21  
  shapy 2.50 2       
    SR 16           
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 49    TR 56  
Insults- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Daggers hurtful 1.38 19 4.07 hurtful 1.64 19 4.07 
  sharp 2.00 6 1.40 sharp 2.00 8 2.74 
  dangerous 2.00 3  dangerous 1.67 3  
  deadly 2.67 3    SR 26  
  harmful 2.00 2       
  bad 2.50 2       
    SR 14       
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 55    TR 55  





Jail boring 2.17 6 4.53 limiting 2.25 4  
  prison 1.00 3  boring 1.00 3  
  confining 1.67 3  confining 1.00 3  
  restrictive 1.00 2  obligation 1.33 3  
  controlling 1.50 2  long-term 1.00 2  
  painful 1.50 2  restricting 1.50 2  
  contract 2.00 2  punishment 3.00 2  
  trapped 2.00 2    SR 36  
  long 2.50 2       
  ugly 2.50 2       
    SR 29           
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 54    TR 53  
Knowledge- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Light bright 1.36 11 1.97 brightness 1.27 15 1.97 
  illuminates 1.33 3  enlighting 2.00 4  
  enlight 2.00 3  illuminating 1.50 2  
  powerful 2.33 3  shiny 2.00 2  
  needed 1.50 2  useful 2.00 2  
  hope 2.00 2  important 2.50 2  
  necessary 2.50 2  needed 2.50 2  
    SR 28  wanted 2.50 2  
            SR 22   
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 59    TR 54  
Knowledge- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 





  important 1.67 6 4.36 powerful 2.00 5 4.29 
  needful 2.25 4  important 2.40 5 4.36 
  expensive 2.33 3  precious 1.00 4  
  useful 2.33 3  useful 1.00 2  
  valuable 1.00 2  acquired 1.50 2  
  necessary 2.00 2  desirable 1.50 2  
  wanted 2.00 2  necessity 1.50 2  
    SR 29  wanted 1.50 2  
       worthy 1.50 2  
       exchangeable 2.50 2  
       resourceful 3.00 2  
            SR 19   
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 50    TR 53  
Knowledge- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Power important 2.00 5 4.40 strength 1.25 4  
  strength 1.50 4  controlling 2.33 3  
  strong 1.67 3  important 1.00 2  
  wanted 2.00 3  manipulative 1.50 2  
  desired 2.00 2  wanted 1.50 2  
  superior 2.50 2  abusive 2.00 2  
    SR 31  necessary 2.00 2  
       desired 2.50 2  
            SR 34   
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 50    TR 49  





River long 1.71 7 2.85 fluid 1.63 8 2.16 
  flowing 1.67 3  long 1.33 3  
  strong 1.67 3  powerful 1.67 3  
  widening 2.00 3  changing 1.50 2  
  deep 1.00 2  constant 1.50 2  
  never-ending 1.00 2  vast 1.50 2  
  dangerous 1.50 2  wet 2.00 2  
  powerful 1.50 2  transparent 2.50 2  
    SR 26     SR 25   
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 58    TR 57  
Lawyers- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Sharks dangerous 1.71 7 3.83 sharp 1.50 4  
  mean 1.50 4  sneaky 1.50 3  
  big 2.25 4  dangerous 1.67 3  
  sneaky 2.25 4  determined 1.67 3  
  scary 1.50 3  predators 2.00 3  
  cruel 1.50 2  attacks 2.00 2  
  sharp 1.50 2  fierce 2.00 2  
  hungry 2.00 2  fighters 2.00 2  
  powerful 2.00 2  untrustworthy 2.00 2  
  eat 3.00 2  quick 2.50 2  
    SR 26  scary 2.50 2  
            SR 29   
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 56    TR 53  





Snakes sneeky 1.57 7 4.50 sneaky 2.17 6 4.50 
  liars 1.40 5 4.68 dangerous 2.25 4  
  slippery 2.00 4  slimy 1.33 3  
  deceivable 2.25 4  venemous 1.33 3  
  poisonous 2.50 4  slippery 1.00 2  
  scary 2.50 4  deceiving 1.50 2  
  dangerous 1.33 3  vicious 1.50 2  
  slithery 1.00 2  poisonous 2.00 2  
  evil 1.50 2    SR 29  
  ugly 1.50 2       
  mean 2.00 2       
  viscious 2.50 2       
    SR 15           
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 57    TR 53  
Life- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Beach relaxing 2.11 9 4.38 relaxing 2.00 8 4.38 
  fun 2.00 7 4.55 warm 1.00 4  
  sunny 1.80 5 2.55 fun 1.25 4  
  beautiful 1.00 3  vast 1.33 3  
  calming 1.33 3  sandy 2.00 3  
  warm 1.33 3  sunny 2.67 3  
  enjoyable 3.00 3  changing 2.00 2  
  soft 2.00 2  hot 2.00 2  
  soothing 2.00 2  pleasurable 2.00 2  
  happy 2.50 2  beautiful 2.50 2  





    SR 16     SR 18   
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 49    TR 51  
Life- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Bottle full 1.60 5 3.02 full 2.00 6 3.02 
  empty 2.00 4  containment 2.00 5 1.99 
  fragile 1.33 3  breakable 1.50 4  
  clear 2.00 3  fragile 1.67 3  
  closed 1.00 2  empty 2.00 3  
  trapped 1.50 2  clear 1.00 2  
  contained 2.00 2  closed 1.00 2  
  short 2.00 2  round 1.00 2  
  breakable 2.50 2  filled 1.50 2  
  transparent 3.00 2  cold 2.00 2  
    SR 22    SR 20  
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 58    TR 53  
Life- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Dream unreal 2.20 5 2.55 personal 1.67 3  
  nice 1.00 2  unrealistic 1.67 3  
  peaceful 1.00 2  imaginative 2.33 3  
  quick 1.00 2  surreal 1.00 2  
  good 1.50 2  unclear 1.50 2  
  perfect 1.50 2  unpredictable 1.50 2  
  happiness 2.00 2  fun 2.00 2  
  personal 2.00 2  beautiful 2.50 2  





  short 2.50 2  scary 2.50 2  
    SR 35     SR 30   
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 57    TR 56  
Life- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Joke funny 1.22 18 2.71 funny 1.18 11 2.71 
  amusing 2.25 4  humour 1.50 4  
  enjoyable 2.50 4  ironic 1.33 3  
  short 2.00 2  not serious 2.67 3  
  fun 2.50 2  surprising 3.00 3  
  laughable 3.00 2  laughter 1.00 2  
    SR 25  entertaining 1.50 2  
       happy 2.00 2  
       amusing 2.50 2  
       comical 3.00 2  
       enjoyable 3.00 2  
       short 3.00 2  
         SR 18  
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 60    TR 55  
Life- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Journey long 1.30 10 2.78 long 1.10 10 2.78 
  adventurous 2.13 8 4.12 adventurous 1.83 6 4.12 
  fun 2.17 6 4.51 unpredictable 1.75 4  
  exciting 2.20 5 4.47 enjoyable 2.00 3  
  hard 2.33 3  exciting 2.33 3  





  road 2.00 2  unknown 1.50 2  
    SR 24  unexpected 2.00 2  
       challening 2.50 2  
            SR 21   
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 55    TR 53  
Life- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
River long 1.25 8 2.85 fluid 1.43 7 2.16 
  fluid 1.83 6 2.16 long 1.50 4  
  beautiful 2.00 3  directional 1.50 2  
  water 1.50 2  changing 2.00 2  
  changing 2.00 2  continuous 2.00 2  
  mysterious 2.00 2  fluid 2.00 2  
  deep 2.50 2  relaxing 2.00 2  
    SR 30  moving 2.50 2  
       unpredictable 2.50 2  
            SR 28   
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 59    TR 55  
Love- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Child young 1.60 6 1.39 innocent 1.27 11 3.96 
  innocent 1.17 5 3.96 naïve 2.50 4  
  immature 1.00 3  playfull 2.75 4  
  sweet 2.67 3  sweet 1.33 3  
  happy 2.00 2  caring 2.67 3  
  kind 2.00 2  joyful 2.67 3  
  
loving or 





  small 2.00 2  young 1.50 2  
  playful 2.50 2  adventurous 2.50 2  
  fun 3.00 2    SR 21  
  growing 3.00 2       
    SR 28           
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 58    TR 59  
Love- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Drug addictive 1.29 17 2.93 adictive 1.13 15 2.93 
  dangerous 2.25 4  bad 1.67 3  
  high 1.33 3  dangerous 2.67 3  
  painful 2.00 2  good 2.00 2  
  bad 2.50 2    SR 36  
  fun 2.50 2       
  healing 2.50 2       
  powerful 2.50 2       
    SR 24           
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 58    TR 57  
Love- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Flower beautiful 1.67 9 4.14 beautiful 1.67 13 4.14 
  pretty 1.50 4  pretty 1.33 3  
  colourful 2.25 4  growth 1.00 2  
  soft 1.50 2  red 1.50 2  
    SR 39  natural 2.00 2  
       dies 2.50 2  





            SR 31   
  Metaphor       Simile    
    TR 57    TR 54  
Love- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Gold precious 1.50 8 3.90 precious 1.00 8 3.90 
  rare 2.00 7 3.04 rare 2.00 7 3.04 
  shiny 2.00 5 1.73 valuable 1.67 6 3.38 
  expensive 1.00 3  shiny 1.50 4  
  worthy 1.50 2  expensive 2.33 3  
  great 2.00 2  wanted 2.67 3  
  hard 2.00 2  desirable 2.00 2  
  heavy 2.00 2  treasure 2.00 2  
  important 2.00 2  wealth 2.50 2  
  treasure 2.00 2    SR 17  
  valuable 2.00 2       
  rich 3.00 2       
    SR 18           
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 56    TR 54  
Love- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Melody soothing 1.25 5  pleasing 1.60 5 4.19 
  relaxing 2.50 4 4.28 beautiful 1.50 4  
  calming 1.50 3  harmonious 1.50 4  
  happiness 2.33 3  soothing 1.00 3  
  peaceful 2.67 3  relaxing 1.67 3  
  musical 1.00 2  rythmic 2.00 3  





  song 1.00 2  calming 2.00 2  
  sweet 1.00 2  sweet 2.00 2  
  beautiful 2.00 2    SR 26  
  romantic 2.00 2       
  harmonious 2.50 2       
    SR 23           
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 59    TR 49  
Love- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Rainbow colourful 1.93 14 1.43 colourful 1.38 16 1.43 
  beautiful 1.40 10 4.25 rare 2.20 5 3.75 
  bright 2.00 3  beautiful 1.50 2  
  nice 2.00 3  fun 2.00 2  
  rare 2.00 3  pretty 2.50 2  
  sparkling 1.50 2  bright 3.00 2  
  uplifting 2.50 2    SR 20  
  magical 3.00 2       
    SR 20           
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 57    TR 53  
Love- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Rose beautiful 2.00 9 4.29 beautiful 2.00 10 4.29 
  blooming 1.25 4  red 1.33 6 1.77 
  pretty 1.00 3  delicate 2.00 6 3.01 
  red 1.33 3  pretty 1.75 4  
  flower 1.67 3  thorny 2.00 4  





  delicate 1.00 2  romantic 1.00 2  
  romantic 1.50 2  fragile 2.00 2  
  prickly 3.00 2    SR 17  
  soft 3.00 2       
    SR 24       
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 48    TR 49  
Memory- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
River fluid 1.20 10 2.16 fluid 2.00 10 2.16 
  long 1.17 6 2.69 long 1.25 4  
  full 2.00 2  continuous 1.67 3  
  narrow 1.50 2  changing 1.50 2  
  stream 2.00 2  current 2.50 2  
    SR 26  deep 1.50 2  
       transparent 1.50 2  
         SR 24  
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 55    TR 50  
Memories- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Sponges absorbant 1.15 13 2.51 absorption 1.21 14 2.51 
  expandable 2.00 2  retentive 1.71 7 1.81 
  flexible 2.00 2  holes 1.50 2  
  full 1.50 2  malleable 1.50 2  
  retainable 2.50 2  squishy 2.00 2  
  soaking 1.00 3  expandable 2.50 2  
    SR 31  wet 3.00 2  





  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 53    TR 45  
Men- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Fish slippery 1.67 3  slippery 1.00 2  
  small 1.80 3  survivors 1.00 2  
  smelly 2.33 3  dumb 1.50 2  
  swimmers 1.00 2  living 2.00 2  
  animal 2.00 2  slimy 2.00 2  
  numerous 2.00 2  smelly 2.00 2  
  nutritious 2.50 2  quick 2.50 2  
  plentiful 2.50 2    SR 31  
    SR 34           
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 59    TR 57  
Minds- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Computers complicated 2.00 11 5.74 processing 2.33 6 1.42 
  intelligent 1.33 3  information 1.67 3  
  memory 1.33 3  useful 2.00 3  
  calculating 1.67 3  smart 1.00 2  
  fast 1.00 2  organized 1.50 2  
  mechanical 1.00 2  learning 2.00 2  
  electrical 2.00 2  programmable 2.00 2  
  smart 2.00 2  analytical 2.50 2  
  technological  2.00 2    SR 35  
  useful 3.00 2       
    SR 27           





    TR 53    TR 54  
Money- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Oxygen needed 1.00 10 2.77 needed 1.21 19 2.77 
  life 1.43 7 3.26 life 1.50 2  
  vital 1.80 5 2.48 important 2.00 2  
  essential 2.00 4  sustains life 2.00 2  
  important 2.25 4  universal 2.00 2  
  survival 2.33 3  everywhere 3.00 2  
  useful 1.50 2  survive 3.00 2  
  air 2.00 2    SR 23  
  everything 2.50 2       
  sought out 2.50 2       
    SR 12       
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 59    TR 53  
Music- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Medicine healing 1.38 10 2.55 soothing 1.33 6 4.04 
  helpful 1.60 8 3.63 curing 1.40 5 2.59 
  cure 2.17 6 2.59 therapy 1.75 4  
  calming 2.00 4  helpful 2.25 4  
  soothing 2.25 4  heals 1.33 3  
  addictive 1.67 3  needed 2.00 3  
  relief 2.00 2  good 1.00 2  
  relaxing 2.50 2  calming 1.50 2  
  drugs 3.00 2  remedy 1.50 2  
    SR 18  relieving 2.50 2  





       treatment 3.00 2  
            SR 16   
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 47    TR 40  
Obligations- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Shackles annoying 1.20 5 4.50 annoying 1.67 3  
  restraining 2.50 4  confining 1.67 3  
  metallic 1.00 2  heavy 1.67 3  
  prison 1.00 2  binding 1.50 2  
  duty 1.50 2  limiting 1.50 2  
  restricting 1.50 2  prisonner 1.50 2  
  trapped 1.50 2  frustrating 2.00 2  
  
uncomfotabl
e 2.00 2  restrictive 2.00 2  
    SR 26     SR 21   
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 53    TR 50  
Peace- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
River calming 1.33 15 4.37 calming 1.30 14 4.37 
  long 1.60 5 2.85 nature 2.00 3  
  relaxing 2.00 4  beautiful 2.00 2  
  quiet 1.67 3  quiet 2.00 2  
  flowing 2.00 3  serenity 2.50 2  
  clear 3.00 2    SR 27  
    SR 21       
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 59    TR 59  







lovable 1.80 5 4.44 playful 1.00 4  
  cute 2.00 5 3.69 cute 1.50 4  
  annoying 1.50 4  energetic 1.75 4  
  fun 1.50 4  annoying 1.67 3  
  small 1.50 4  attentive 2.00 3  
  loud 2.33 3  loud 2.00 3  
  curious 1.50 2  needy 2.33 3  
  innocent 1.50 2  responsibility 1.50 2  
  playful 2.00 2  care 2.00 2  
    SR 28  dependent 2.00 2  
       innocent 2.00 2  
       small 3.00 2  
            SR 25   
  Metaphor       Simile       
  TR 58    TR 58  
Rage- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Volcano erupts 1.70 10 1.85 explosive 1.50 10 2.26 
  explosive 1.78 9 2.26 erupts 1.14 7 1.85 
  dangerous 2.00 8 3.93 dangerous 1.80 7 3.93 
  hot 1.83 6 2.03 destructive 2.40 5 3.72 
  deadly 2.75 4  unpredictable 2.00 4  
  red 1.00 2  red 2.33 3  
    SR 19  violent 1.50 2  
       heat 2.00 2  
       hot 2.00 2  
            SR 16   





  TR 42    TR 47  
Runners- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Torpedoes fast 1.13 16 2.43 fast 1.08 13 2.43 
  speedy 2.00 3  quick 1.33 3  
    SR 23  speedy 2.33 3  
       aimed 2.00 2  
         SR 26  
  Metaphor       Simile       
  TR 54    TR 52  
Salesmen- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Bulldozers destructive 2.43 7 3.09 loud 2.50 6 2.57 
  annoying 2.25 4  persistent 2.00 4  
  aggressive 1.33 3  destructive 2.00 3  
  imposing 1.67 3  forcefull 2.00 3  
  loud 1.67 3  annoying 1.50 2  
  powerful 1.00 2  determined 1.50 2  
  big 2.00 2  pushy 2.00 2  
  tough 2.00 2    SR 30  
  noisy 2.50 2       
    SR 26           
  Metaphor       Simile       
  TR 58    TR 56  
Schools- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Zoos busy 1.20 5 3.70 wild 1.20 5 3.05 
  crowded 1.60 5 3.38 crowded 1.33 3  
  loud 2.00 5 3.61 chaos 1.00 2  





  noisy 1.50 4  crazy 2.00 2  
  full 2.50 4  exciting 2.00 2  
  crazy 1.33 3  loud 2.00 2  
  animals 1.00 2  active 2.50 2  
  packed 1.50 2  controlling 3.00 2  
  messy 2.00 2    SR 34  
  dirty 2.50 2       
  smelly 3.00 2       
    SR 17           
  Metaphor       Simile    
    TR 51    TR 50  
Science- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Politics complicated 1.00 4  complicated 1.00 5 4.31 
  debatable 1.67 3  debateful 1.50 4  
  arguments 2.33 3  argumentative 2.00 3  
  biased 1.50 2  challenging 2.67 3  
  confusing 1.50 2  annoying 2.00 2  
  interesting 1.50 2  difficult 2.00 2  
  conflicts 2.00 2    SR 31  
  theory 2.00 2       
  knowledge 3.00 2       
    SR 29           
  Metaphor       Simile       
  TR 48    TR 53  
Sermons- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Sleeping Pills boring 1.30 10 4.6 boring 1.50 8 4.60 





  sleepy 1.75 4  drowsy 1.50 4  
  drowsy 1.67 3  sleepy 2.50 4  
  long 2.00 2  annoying 2.50 2  
  small 2.00 2  long 2.50 2  
  useful 2.00 2  relaxing 2.50 2  
  uninteresting 2.50 2  unhealthy 3.00 2  
    SR 17     SR 21   
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 54    TR 59  
Skating- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Flying freedom 1.29 7 4.24 freedom 1.82 11 4.24 
  fast 1.80 5 3.29 fun 2.20 5 4.37 
  relaxing 2.00 5 4.5 gliding 1.50 4  
  fun 2.00 3  fast 2.00 3  
  moving 1.00 2  smooth 2.33 3  
  soaring 1.00 2  airless 3.00 3  
  amazing 1.50 2  exilirating 1.50 2  
  gliding 1.50 2  liberating 2.00 2  
  lightweight 2.00 2  sky 2.00 2  
  enjoying 2.50 2  windy 2.00 2  
  exciting 2.50 2  exciting 2.50 2  
  bird 3.00 2    SR 20  
    SR 18           
  Metaphor       Simile       
  TR 29    TR 36  
Smog- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 





  blurry 1.00 2  blinding 1.00 2  
  cloudy 1.50 2  thick 1.50 2  
  dirty 1.50 2  dark 2.00 2  
  engulfing 1.50 2    SR 24  
  thick 1.50 2       
    SR 16           
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 32    TR 50  
Soldiers- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Pawns unimportant 1.00 2  controlled 1.17 6 3.18 
  followers 1.50 2  useful 2.20 5 3.93 
  
moved or 
movable 1.50 2  expendable 1.00 3  
  small 1.50 2  puppets 1.50 2  
    SR 24  small 1.50 2  
       weak 1.50 2  
       played 2.00 2  
       orders 3.00 2  
            SR 26   
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 54    TR 52  
Store- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Zoo crowded 1.40 5 3.38 busy 1.83 6 3.70 
  loud 1.25 4  crowded 1.00 4  
  noisy 2.50 4  loud 1.75 4  
  messy 1.00 3  messy 1.75 4  
  busy 1.67 3  chaotic 2.00 4  





  crazy 1.00 2  diversity 2.67 3  
  hectic 1.00 2  packed 1.50 2  
  packed 1.00 2  animals 2.50 2  
  animals 1.50 2  nature 2.50 2  
  smelly 2.00 2    SR 18  
  confining 2.50 2       
    SR 20           
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 50    TR 58  
Teachers- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Sculptors creators 1.00 5 2.44 creators 1.69 13 2.44 
  artists 1.25 5 2.51 artists 1.00 5 2.51 
  builders 1.25 5 2.20 molds 1.75 4  
  creative 1.50 4  shaping 1.33 3  
  shaping 1.33 3  inspiring 2.00 3  
  knowledge 2.00 2  imaginative 1.00 2  
  Crafty 2.50 2  educational 2.00 2  
    SR 24  influential 2.00 2  
       makers 2.50 2  
            SR 22   
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 58    TR 56  
Television- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Candy sweet 1.33 9 1.76 addictive 1.50 8 4.27 
  addictive 1.57 7 4.27 sweet 1.33 6 1.76 
  good 1.60 5 4.13 unhealthy 2.00 5 3.08 





  harmful 2.33 3  good 1.00 3  
  treat 2.33 3  colourful 2.67 3  
  
tasty or 
tasting 2.67 3  fun 2.00 2  
  yummy 1.50 2  tasty 2.00 2  
  
enjoyful or 
enjoyable 2.00 2  tempting 2.00 2  
  entertaining 2.50 2  enjoyable 2.50 2  
    SR 18  pleasurable 2.50 2  
            SR 17   
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 58    TR 54  
Tv- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Drug addictive 1.16 19 2.93 addictive 1.06 16 2.93 
  bad 2.25 4  unhealthy 2.00 3  
  fun 2.25 4  fun 2.00 2  
  good 2.00 2  recreational 2.50 2  
  harmful 2.00 2  time consuming 2.50 2  
  exciting 2.50 2  unnecessary 2.50 2  
  unhealthy 2.50 2  various 2.50 2  
  healing 3.00 2  colours 3.00 2  
    SR 21     SR 23   
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 53    TR 55  
Time- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Money important 1.38 8 4.36 precious 1.67 6 4.16 
  powerful 1.67 3  valuable 1.60 5 3.28 





  precious 2.00 3  necessity 3.00 4  
  expensive 1.00 2  scarce 1.50 2  
  limited 2.00 2  finite 2.00 2  
  
spent or 
spending 2.00 2  needed 3.00 2  
  needed 2.50 2    SR 30  
    SR 28           
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 50    TR 47  
Time- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Snail slow 1.00 15 2.53 slow 1.00 17 2.53 
  small 1.33 3  steady 2.33 3  
  long 2.33 3  ugly 2.00 2  
  steady 2.00 2  slimy 3.00 2  
  slimy 2.50 2    SR 23  
  never-ending 3.00 2       
    SR 23           
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 50    TR 49  
Time- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Thief steals 1.50 5 1.72 fast 1.43 14 4.15 
  fast 1.80 5 4.15 steals 1.00 3  
  quick 1.33 3  deceptive 2.33 3  
  short 2.00 3  sneaky 2.33 3  
  bad 2.00 2  mean 2.50 2  
  money 2.50 2    SR 24  
  taking 2.50 2       





  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 55    TR 52  
Tongues- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Fire hot 1.33 9 1.35 red 1.71 7 2.11 
  red 2.00 5 2.11 dangerous 2.00 7 3.56 
  burning 1.50 4  hot 1.67 6 1.35 
  spicy 2.33 3  burning 1.75 4  
  warm 1.50 2  hurtful 2.00 3  
  angry 2.50 2  warm 2.00 2  
  hurtful 2.50 2    SR 23  
  damaging 3.00 2       
    SR 26           
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 43    TR 55  
Tree Trunks- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Straws long 1.75 8 2.06 long 1.55 11 2.06 
  thin 1.40 5 1.90 cylindrical 1.60 4  
  tall 1.25 4  straight 1.80 4  
  hollow 2.33 3  round 1.33 3  
  drink 1.00 2  narrow 1.67 3  
  colourful 2.50 2  circular 2.00 3  
  weakening 2.50 2  useful 2.67 3  
    SR 17  thn 1.50 2  
       tall 2.00 2  
       hollow 2.50 2  
            SR 18   





    TR 52    TR 52  
Trees- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Umbrellas protects 1.64 14 3.23 protects 1.46 13 3.23 
  covers 1.60 5 2.03 covers 1.60 5 2.03 
  big 1.67 3  open 1.00 3  
  shading 1.67 3  shelters 2.00 3  
  useful 3.00 3  round 2.33 3  
  wide 1.50 2  colourful 2.67 3  
  rainy 2.00 2  useful 2.67 3  
  refuge 2.50 2  branch-out 1.00 2  
  open 3.00 2  water-resistant 2.50 2  
    SR 16  wide 2.50 2  
            SR 13   
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 48    TR 50  
Trust- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Glue sticky 1.38 13 1.79 sticky 1.40 10 1.79 
  binds 1.00 5 2.72 binds 2.40 5 2.72 
  lasting 2.67 3  strong 1.75 4  
  strong 2.67 3  binding 1.67 3  
  holding 1.50 2  useful 2.33 3  
  forever 2.00 2  foundation 1.50 2  
  important 2.00 2  stays 2.00 2  
  permanent 2.00 2  cohesive 2.50 2  
  tough 2.00 2    SR 19  
  unifying 2.00 2       





  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 51    TR 51  
Typewriters- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Dinosaurs old 1.36 11 2.84 ancient 1.36 11 2.79 
  ancient 1.33 6 2.79 old 1.10 10 2.84 
  extinguished 2.17 6 2.60 extinct 2.50 4  
  big 2.00 2  out-dated 2.00 3  
  antiques 2.50 2  replaced 2.33 3  
    SR 24  huge 1.50 2  
       dead 2.00 2  
       obsolete 2.00 2  
       useful 2.50 2  
            SR 12   
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 59    TR 57  
Winter- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Death cold 1.13 15 3.61 cold 1.13 15 3.61 
  darkness 2.00 4  lonely 2.00 4  
  end 1.00 2  depressing 2.00 3  
  white 2.50 2  lifeless 2.33 3  
  unwelcomed 3.00 2  scary 3.00 3  
    SR 34  ending 2.00 2  
       dark 2.50 2  
       isolated 3.00 2  
            SR 23   
  Metaphor       Simile       





Wisdom- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Ocean vast 1.38 9 2.07 deep 1.38 8 1.78 
  huge 1.80 8 2.26 vast 1.75 4  
  wide 1.33 3  huge 1.00 3  
  deep 2.00 3  old 2.33 3  
  infinite 1.00 2  calm 1.50 2  
  flowing 2.00 2  endless 1.50 2  
  mysterious 2.00 2  infinite 2.00 2  
  powerful 2.00 2  large 2.50 2  
    SR 21  serene 2.50 2  
       blue 3.00 2  
            SR 28   
  Metaphor       Simile       
    TR 60    TR 58  
Women- Response Sal Freq Conn Response Sal Freq Conn 
Cats independent 2.00 5 4.26 independent 2.29 7 4.26 
  soft 1.75 4  affectionate 1.00 2  
  lovable 2.33 3  elegant 1.00 2  
  playful 1.00 2  beautiful 1.50 2  
  sneaky 1.50 2  cute 1.50 2  
  beautiful 2.00 2  graceful 1.50 2  
  sly 2.00 2  sneaky 1.50 2  
  aggressive 2.50 2  soft 1.50 2  
  smart 2.50 2  warm 1.50 2  
  cuddling 3.00 2  funny 2.00 2  
  intelligent 3.00 2  smart 2.00 2  





       loving 3.00 2  






Table 2C: Properties written for Topics and Vehicles in Isolation 
 
      
       
 
       
Legend       
Conn = Average Connotativeness Rating    
Sal = Average Saliency Rating     
Freq = Frequency      
TR = Total Responses      
SR = Single Responses      
       
Topic- Properties for Topic Properties for Vehicle 
Vehicle          
  Topic   Vehicle     
    TR 128   TR 91 
Alcohol- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Crutch dangerous 2.29 7 helpful 1.33 6 
  addictive 2.00 6 injured 4.25 4 
  drunks 2.00 5 hard 3.00 3 
  depressant 1.00 2 dependent 1.50 2 
  death 3.00 2 annoying 2.00 2 
  bitter 4.50 2 broken 4.50 2 
    SR 104   SR 72 
  Topic   Vehicle   





Anger- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Fire emotions 3.40 5 dangerous 3.71 14 
  dangerous 3.00 3 burns 4.13 8 
  fearful 2.50 2 destructive 3.71 7 
  aggressive 3.00 2 death 4.00 5 
  dark 4.50 2 flames 2.00 3 
  controlled 5.00 2 bright 4.00 3 
    SR 101   SR 74 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 117   TR 111 
Anger- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Heart emotions 3.40 5 beating 3.13 8 
  dangerous 3.00 3 bloody 3.00 6 
  fearful 2.50 2 big 3.00 3 
  aggressive 3.00 2 broken 3.33 3 
  dark 4.50 2 cards 1.00 2 
  controlled 5.00 2 attack 4.50 2 
    SR 101   SR 87 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 111   TR 104 
Beauty- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Passport nature  1.75 4 booklet 4.33 3 
  desired 2.00 3 blue 5.00 3 
  inner 2.00 2 customs 2.50 2 
  good 4.00 2 descriptive 2.50 2 
  peaceful 4.00 2 freedom 2.50 2 





    SR 96   SR 90 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 117   TR 121 
Bible- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Sword faithful 2.83 6 dangerous 3.33 12 
  book 2.75 4 death 4.67 6 
  black  2.00 3 hard 2.50 2 
  christianity 1.50 2 fight 3.00 2 
  educative 2.50 2 cutting 4.00 2 
  hard cover 5.00 2 dectrotive 5.50 2 
    SR 98   SR 95 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 111   TR 99 
Billboards- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Warts big 2.50 12 big 3.80 5 
  colourful 3.43 7 gross 2.20 5 
  advertize 2.00 5 contagious 3.00 4 
  catchy 2.00 2 disgusting 1.00 3 
  black 2.50 2 bumpy 3.00 2 
  attention 4.00 2 embarassing 4.00 2 
    SR 81   SR 78 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 109   TR 115 
Christ- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Door faithful 2.00 4 closed 2.75 8 
  bible 1.50 2 hard 1.75 4 





  believers 2.50 2 glass 2.00 2 
  forgiving 4.00 2 entrance 2.50 2 
  christianity 4.50 2 heavy 5.00 2 
    SR 95   SR 94 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 86   TR 124 
Christians- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Salt faithful 1.29 7 dry 3.00 3 
  believing 1.50 2 crystallize 3.33 3 
  friendly 2.00 2 edible 4.67 3 
  church 3.00 2 cooking 5.33 3 
  biblical 4.00 2 fattening 2.50 2 
  biased 4.50 2 cubic 3.00 2 
    SR 69   SR 108 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 127   TR 86 
Cigarettes- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Time Bombs addictive 2.91 11 dangerous 2.33 9 
  bad 2.20 5 destructive 1.75 4 
  dangerous 1.60 5 death 2.33 3 
  cancerous 2.50 4 black 4.33 3 
  cylindrical 3.00 3 clocks 2.00 2 
  burning 2.50 2 big 2.50 2 
    SR 97   SR 63 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 126   TR 117 





Jungles crowded 2.00 8 dangerous 4.57 7 
  big 2.14 7 animals 3.50 6 
  busy 2.14 7 big 1.25 4 
  dangerous 3.00 3 beautiful 4.33 3 
  eventful 3.50 2 crowded 1.50 2 
  cultural 4.50 2 dark 3.50 2 
    SR 97   SR 93 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 125   TR 119 
Clouds- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Cotton fluffy 2.50 10 fluffy 2.83 12 
  big 3.50 6 comfy 4.17 6 
  beautiful 2.00 2 light 3.67 3 
  blue 2.00 2 clean 4.33 3 
  darkness 3.00 2 clothes 4.67 3 
  cold 4.50 2 natural 5.50 2 
    SR 101   SR 90 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 108   TR 99 
Debt- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Disease dangerous 3.20 5 death 2.43 7 
  bad 1.50 4 contagious 2.25 4 
  credit cards 3.50 4 dangerous 2.00 3 
  annoying 1.00 2 inevitable 3.00 3 
  banks 2.50 2 cures 5.00 3 
  anxious 5.00 2 bad 1.50 2 





  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 125   TR 111 
Deserts- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Ovens dry 2.20 10 big 2.33 6 
  delicous 1.00 4 dangerous 2.00 4 
  fattening 1.67 3 dirty 4.33 3 
  cold 1.50 2 burn 2.00 2 
  chocolatey 3.00 2 black 3.00 2 
  barren 3.50 2 bake 4.00 2 
    SR 102   SR 92 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 116   TR 107 
Desks- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Junkyards hard 1.89 9 dirty 2.50 12 
  flat 2.29 7 big 3.00 4 
  brown 2.33 6 cars 2.00 3 
  big 3.17 6 crowded 1.50 2 
  chairs 4.00 3 cluttered 2.50 2 
  computer 5.50 2 dangerous 4.00 2 
    SR 83   SR 82 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 112   TR 124 
Dreams- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Water funny 2.00 5 cool 3.38 8 
  confusing 3.00 3 clear 1.80 5 
  imaginative 3.00 3 clean 4.80 5 





  exciting 3.50 2 drinkable 3.67 3 
  informative 4.00 2 dirty 2.00 2 
    SR 94   SR 97 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 124   TR 106 
Education- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Stairway good 2.00 3 dark 3.33 3 
  expensive 3.00 3 exercising 3.67 3 
  fun 3.00 3 descending 2.00 2 
  helpful 4.67 3 height 3.00 2 
  enlightening 4.00 2 hard 3.50 2 
  growth 4.50 2 healthy 5.50 2 
    SR 108   SR 92 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 117   TR 76 
Exams- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Hurdles easy 5.00 4 hight 1.50 6 
  difficult 3.33 3 hard 3.50 4 
  boring 4.33 3 annoying 1.33 3 
  grades 4.33 3 challenging 3.00 3 
  challenging 2.50 2 important 2.50 2 
  educative 3.00 2 difficult 4.00 2 
    SR 100   SR 56 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 106   TR 114 
Eyelids- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 





  darkness 3.50 4 closure 3.00 6 
  beautiful 2.00 2 darkness 3.17 6 
  covering 2.50 2 decorative 3.00 4 
  black 3.00 2 drapy 3.33 3 
  colourful 4.00 2 blocking 3.67 3 
    SR 88   SR 82 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 99   TR 90 
Faith- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Raft hopeful 3.17 6 floats 2.00 5 
  believing 2.80 5 dangerous 3.50 4 
  important 1.00 3 big 1.67 3 
  blinding 1.00 2 fun 4.33 3 
  intangible 2.50 2 flat 2.50 2 
  inspiring 4.00 2 buoyant 3.50 2 
    SR 79   SR 71 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 124   TR 95 
Families- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Fortresses caring 3.33 6 big 2.50 6 
  big 2.00 4 defensive 4.00 3 
  close 2.33 3 castle 1.50 2 
  children 2.67 3 ancient 3.50 2 
  divorced 2.50 2 gray 3.50 2 
  annoying 3.50 2 cold 4.00 2 
    SR 104   SR 78 





    TR 92   TR 104 
Fingerprints- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Portraits different 2.00 3 beautiful 3.25 8 
  black 3.50 2 colourful 2.67 6 
  finger 3.50 2 artistic 4.00 6 
  dirty 4.00 2 drawn 3.00 3 
  distinction 4.00 2 familiar 1.50 2 
  csi 5.00 2 family 2.00 2 
    SR 79   SR 77 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 113   TR 109 
Friendship- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Rainbow caring 3.20 5 colours 1.25 20 
  helpful 3.80 5 curvy 3.00 3 
  fun 4.00 4 beautiful 2.50 2 
  comforting 3.50 2 bright 3.00 2 
  happy 4.00 2 gay 3.50 2 
  endearing 4.50 2 blue 5.00 2 
    SR 93   SR 78 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 108   TR 93 
Genes- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Blueprints biology 2.33 3 blue 2.38 8 
  dna 2.67 3 big 2.00 3 
  chromosomes 3.33 3 construction 4.33 3 
  different 2.50 2 descriptive 2.00 2 





  evolutionary 3.50 2 exact 3.00 2 
    SR 93   SR 73 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 119   TR 100 
Giraffes- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Skyscrapers brown 3.00 5 glassy 3.83 6 
  big 1.00 3 big 1.50 4 
  animals 2.00 2 business 5.00 3 
  colourful 2.50 2 expensive 4.00 2 
  african 4.00 2 busy 4.50 2 
  cute 5.50 2 beautiful 5.50 2 
    SR 103   SR 81 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 102   TR 114 
God- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Fire almighty 1.60 5 dangerous 3.71 14 
  beliefs 3.33 3 burns 4.13 8 
  forgiving 4.00 3 destructive 3.71 7 
  existant 1.50 2 death 4.00 5 
  faithful 2.50 2 flames 2.00 3 
  creator 4.00 2 bright 4.00 3 
    SR 85   SR 74 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 102   TR 135 
God- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Parent almighty 1.60 5 caring 3.20 10 





  forgiving 4.00 3 authority 2.67 3 
  existant 1.50 2 family 2.50 2 
  faithful 2.50 2 home 5.00 2 
  creator 4.00 2 believing 5.50 2 
    SR 85   SR 111 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 94   TR 41 
Greed- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Buzzard selfishness 2.67 9 loud 2.20 5 
  bad 2.00 5 annoying 2.00 3 
  money 1.50 4 flying 4.33 3 
  powerful 3.00 4 birdy 1.00 2 
  sinful 1.67 3 ominous 5.50 2 
  mean 2.50 2   SR 26 
    SR 67     
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 90   TR 110 
Health- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Glass important 1.67 12 breakable 1.89 9 
  good 1.57 7 clear 1.67 6 
  bad 2.25 4 colourless 3.33 6 
  fragile 3.00 2 broken 1.00 2 
  happy 3.00 2 big 4.50 2 
  disease 3.50 2 bright 4.50 2 
    SR 61   SR 83 
  Topic   Vehicle   





Hearts- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Closests beating 3.13 8 closed 1.67 6 
  bloody 3.00 6 clothes 3.00 5 
  big 3.00 3 big 2.00 4 
  broken 3.33 3 claustrophobic 4.33 3 
  cards 1.00 2 cold 4.50 2 
  attack 4.50 2 cluttered 5.00 2 
    SR 87   SR 86 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 112   TR 105 
Heaven- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Treasure angels 3.14 7 golden 2.63 8 
  beautiful 3.50 4 expensive 2.75 4 
  bright 3.00 3 burried 3.00 3 
  blue 1.50 2 chest 1.00 2 
  belief 2.00 2 box 3.50 2 
  blissful 3.50 2 exciting 4.00 2 
    SR 92   SR 84 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 112   TR 124 
Highways- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Snakes dangerous 2.43 7 dangerous 3.00 8 
  cars 3.00 5 death 3.75 4 
  annoying 2.50 2 colourful 5.00 2 
  busy 2.50 2 fast 5.00 2 
  direction 4.50 2 big 5.50 2 





    SR 92   SR 104 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 114   TR 108 
Insults- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Daggers hurtful 1.33 15 dangerous 3.00 13 
  funny 3.67 3 death 5.00 3 
  hateful 3.67 3 hurtful 2.00 2 
  emotions 4.00 3 blade 3.00 2 
  bad 2.50 2 cutting 3.50 2 
  bullying 5.00 2 ancient 5.00 2 
    SR 86   SR 84 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 117   TR 119 
Job- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Jail boring 3.38 8 cold 2.50 6 
  demanding 1.67 3 dangerous 3.00 6 
  challenging 2.50 2 confining 3.00 4 
  daily 3.50 2 criminals 4.00 4 
  educative 3.50 2 cells 3.00 3 
  benefit 4.50 2 bars 2.50 2 
    SR 98   SR 94 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 105   TR 108 
Knowledge- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Light important 1.67 6 bright 1.41 17 
  educational 3.83 6 clear 3.00 4 





  acquired 1.67 3 strong 1.00 2 
  informative 2.33 3 electricity 3.50 2 
  experience 4.50 2 low 4.00 2 
    SR 80   SR 78 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 105   TR 109 
Knowledge- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Money important 1.67 6 green 2.25 8 
  educational 3.83 6 desired 4.00 4 
  intelligent 3.00 5 good  1.00 3 
  acquired 1.67 3 dirty 1.67 3 
  informative 2.33 3 bills 2.50 2 
  experience 4.50 2 death 4.00 2 
    SR 80   SR 87 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 105   TR 101 
Knowledge- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Power important 1.67 6 authority 3.67 3 
  educational 3.83 6 bad 2.00 2 
  intelligent 3.00 5 commandor 2.00 2 
  acquired 1.67 3 big 2.50 2 
  informative 2.33 3 abused 4.50 2 
  experience 4.50 2 bossy 4.50 2 
    SR 80   SR 88 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 105   TR 110 





River important 1.67 6 blue 3.00 5 
  educational 3.83 6 cold 2.33 3 
  intelligent 3.00 5 deep 3.33 3 
  acquired 1.67 3 fast 3.00 2 
  informative 2.33 3 beautiful 4.00 2 
  experience 4.50 2 dangerous 5.50 2 
    SR 80   SR 93 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 118   TR 117 
Lawyers- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Sharks deceptive 3.33 6 dangerous 2.50 16 
  argumentative 2.25 4 big 3.14 7 
  determined 2.67 3 death 3.75 4 
  convincing 2.50 2 blood 4.00 3 
  clever 3.00 2 blue 4.00 3 
  defense 4.00 2 black 5.00 2 
    SR 99   SR 82 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 118   TR 124 
Lawyers- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Snakes deceptive 3.33 6 dangerous 3.00 8 
  argumentative 2.25 4 death 3.75 4 
  determined 2.67 3 colourful 5.00 2 
  convincing 2.50 2 fast 5.00 2 
  clever 3.00 2 big 5.50 2 
  defense 4.00 2 frightening 5.50 2 





  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 114   TR 123 
Life- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Beach beautiful 3.20 5 fun 3.29 7 
  entertaining 3.00 3 beautiful 3.67 6 
  death 3.67 3 calming 3.75 4 
  eventful 2.00 2 bright 3.00 2 
  exciting 2.00 2 breezy 4.50 2 
  adventurous 3.00 2 crowded 5.00 2 
    SR 97   SR 100 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 114   TR 115 
Life- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Bottle beautiful 3.20 5 big 3.75 4 
  entertaining 3.00 3 broken 3.00 3 
  death 3.67 3 alcohol 3.00 2 
  eventful 2.00 2 clear 3.00 2 
  exciting 2.00 2 container 4.00 2 
  adventurous 3.00 2 breakable 4.50 2 
    SR 97   SR 100 
  Topic   Vehicle   
Life-   TR 114   TR 112 
Dream Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
  beautiful 3.20 5 funny 2.00 5 
  entertaining 3.00 3 confusing 3.00 3 
  death 3.67 3 imaginative 3.00 3 





  exciting 2.00 2 exciting 3.50 2 
  adventurous 3.00 2 informative 4.00 2 
    SR 97   SR 94 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 114   TR 117 
Life- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Joke beautiful 3.20 5 funny 1.35 20 
  entertaining 3.00 3 entertains 3.80 5 
  death 3.67 3 boring 2.50 4 
  eventful 2.00 2 embarassing 2.50 2 
  exciting 2.00 2 corny 3.00 2 
  adventurous 3.00 2 creative 3.00 2 
    SR 97   SR 82 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 114   TR 104 
Life- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Journey beautiful 3.20 5 adventurous 1.80 5 
  entertaining 3.00 3 eventful 3.75 4 
  death 3.67 3 exciting 4.25 4 
  eventful 2.00 2 endless 3.50 2 
  exciting 2.00 2 destination 4.00 2 
  adventurous 3.00 2 entertaining 4.50 2 
    SR 97   SR 85 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 114   TR 110 
Life- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 





  entertaining 3.00 3 cold 2.33 3 
  death 3.67 3 deep 3.33 3 
  eventful 2.00 2 fast 3.00 2 
  exciting 2.00 2 beautiful 4.00 2 
  adventurous 3.00 2 dangerous 5.50 2 
    SR 97   SR 93 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 119   TR 126 
Love- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Child beautiful 2.67 6 annoying 2.75 4 
  happy 1.33 3 adorable 3.25 4 
  caring 3.00 3 dependent 3.33 3 
  feeling 3.50 2 cute 4.33 3 
  giving 3.50 2 curious 3.00 2 
  deep 4.00 2 energetic 3.50 2 
    SR 101   SR 108 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 119   TR 112 
Love- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Drug beautiful 2.67 6 addictive 2.13 8 
  happy 1.33 3 dangerous 2.50 8 
  caring 3.00 3 bad 1.00 4 
  feeling 3.50 2 death 2.75 4 
  giving 3.50 2 destruction 2.50 2 
  deep 4.00 2 exciting 5.00 2 
    SR 101   SR 84 





    TR 119   TR 120 
Love- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Flower beautiful 2.67 6 colours 2.85 13 
  happy 1.33 3 beauty 2.56 9 
  caring 3.00 3 blossom 1.00 2 
  feeling 3.50 2 dirt 2.50 2 
  giving 3.50 2 bees 5.50 2 
  deep 4.00 2 gift 5.50 2 
    SR 101   SR 90 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 119   TR 121 
Love- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Gold beautiful 2.67 6 expensive 2.79 14 
  happy 1.33 3 heavy 3.43 7 
  caring 3.00 3 jewlery 3.75 4 
  feeling 3.50 2 beautiful 2.50 2 
  giving 3.50 2 desired 4.00 2 
  deep 4.00 2 discovery 4.50 2 
    SR 101   SR 90 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 119   TR 103 
Love- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Melody beautiful 2.67 6 harmony 3.25 4 
  happy 1.33 3 beautiful 1.67 3 
  caring 3.00 3 happy 2.67 3 
  feeling 3.50 2 entertaining 3.67 3 





  deep 4.00 2 beat 3.50 2 
    SR 101   SR 86 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 119   TR 109 
Love- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Rainbow beautiful 2.67 6 colours 1.25 20 
  happy 1.33 3 curvy 3.00 3 
  caring 3.00 3 beautiful 2.50 2 
  feeling 3.50 2 bright 3.00 2 
  giving 3.50 2 gay 3.50 2 
  deep 4.00 2 blue 5.00 2 
    SR 101   SR 78 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 119   TR 123 
Love- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Rose beautiful 2.67 6 flowery 2.20 5 
  happy 1.33 3 beauty 2.75 4 
  caring 3.00 3 colourful 2.75 4 
  feeling 3.50 2 blue 3.00 2 
  giving 3.50 2 black 4.00 2 
  deep 4.00 2 gifts 4.50 2 
    SR 101   SR 104 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 107   TR 110 
Memory- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
River forgetful 3.67 3 blue 3.00 5 





  happy 3.50 2 deep 3.33 3 
  cognitive 4.00 2 fast 3.00 2 
  emotional 4.00 2 beautiful 4.00 2 
  brain 4.50 2 dangerous 5.50 2 
    SR 93   SR 93 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 123   TR 107 
Memories- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Sponges forgottent 3.25 4 absorption 1.82 11 
  emotions 2.00 2 cleaning 2.67 6 
  far 2.00 2 porous 2.33 3 
  bad  2.50 2 dirty 4.33 3 
  fond 3.50 2 dishes 3.00 2 
  fading 4.00 2 green 4.00 2 
    SR 109   SR 80 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 117   TR 119 
Men- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Fish hairy 2.00 3 big 3.60 5 
  friendly 2.00 2 colourful 3.75 4 
  handsome 2.50 2 cold blooded 4.67 3 
  big 4.00 2 blue 2.00 2 
  hard working 4.00 2 cute 4.50 2 
  attractive 5.00 2 animal 5.00 2 
    SR 104   SR 101 
  Topic   Vehicle   





Minds- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Computers brainy 4.60 5 fast 3.17 6 
  different 2.33 3 expensive 4.50 4 
  beautiful 3.50 2 complex 2.00 2 
  complex 3.50 2 entertaining 4.00 2 
  emotions 3.50 2 black 5.00 2 
  believes 4.00 2 frustrating 5.00 2 
    SR 86   SR 101 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 109   TR 100 
Money- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Oxygen green 2.25 8 air 1.83 6 
  desired 4.00 4 breathing 2.67 6 
  good  1.00 3 gaseous 2.25 4 
  dirty 1.67 3 essential 2.00 3 
  bills 2.50 2 carbon dioxide 2.33 3 
  death 4.00 2 available 1.50 2 
    SR 87   SR 76 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 118   TR 113 
Music- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Medicine artists 4.00 4 good 1.33 3 
  beautiful 2.25 4 heals 1.00 2 
  creative 3.67 3 cure 1.50 2 
  beat 2.50 2 bitter 2.00 2 
  boring 4.50 2 doctor 3.00 2 





    SR 101   SR 100 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 89   TR 83 
Obligations- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Shackles dutiful 1.33 3 heavy 3.00 7 
  boring 4.33 3 chains 1.00 3 
  frustrating 1.00 2 cold 3.00 3 
  annoying 1.50 2 confined 1.50 2 
  fulfilled 2.50 2 dark 3.50 2 
  family 3.50 2 jails 4.50 2 
    SR 75   SR 64 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 107   TR 110 
Peace- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
River calmness 2.13 8 blue 3.00 5 
  friendship 4.25 4 cold 2.33 3 
  desired 2.67 3 deep 3.33 3 
  hippies 3.00 2 fast 3.00 2 
  beautiful 3.50 2 beautiful 4.00 2 
  happy 3.50 2 dangerous 5.50 2 
    SR 86   SR 93 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 126   TR 124 
Pets- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Kids cute 2.80 5 annoying 1.67 6 
  company 3.33 3 cute 3.25 4 





  animals 2.00 2 curious 3.00 3 
  cats 2.00 2 friendly 2.50 2 
  comforting 3.50 2 caring 5.00 2 
    SR 109   SR 104 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 103   TR 110 
Rage- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Volcano angry 2.00 12 dangerous 3.18 11 
  dangerous 2.00 4 big 1.50 4 
  destructive 2.33 3 destructive 3.33 3 
  emotional 5.33 3 active 4.00 3 
  aggressive 3.00 2 death 4.67 3 
  harmful 4.50 2 ashy 5.50 2 
    SR 77   SR 84 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 114   TR 86 
Runners- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Torpedoes fast 1.10 10 dangerous 2.43 14 
  athletic 2.57 7 fast 2.63 8 
  energized 2.75 4 explosive 3.29 7 
  determined 4.00 3 destructive 3.43 7 
  dedicated 3.50 2 black 3.50 2 
  fit 3.50 2 death 5.00 2 
    SR 86   SR 46 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 115   TR 101 





Bulldozers annoying 2.00 10 big 2.63 8 
  convincing 2.00 4 destructive 2.43 7 
  conniving 1.00 2 dangerous 2.80 5 
  friendly 1.50 2 constructive 3.50 4 
  helpful 2.00 2 expensive 5.67 3 
  dishonest 2.50 2 hardhats 5.00 2 
    SR 93   SR 72 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 122   TR 112 
Schools- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Zoos big 1.75 8 big 2.86 7 
  bright 3.67 3 animals 1.00 6 
  children 2.00 2 crowded 3.00 4 
  books 3.00 2 colourful 3.00 3 
  crowded 3.50 2 children 4.50 2 
  discipline 4.00 2 beautiful 5.50 2 
    SR 103   SR 88 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 109   TR 113 
Science- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Politics complicated 2.20 5 boring 1.00 3 
  educational 2.00 4 democratic 1.67 3 
  experimental 4.25 4 corrupted 2.67 3 
  biology 2.00 3 complicated 3.00 3 
  chemistry 3.00 2 confusing 5.67 3 
  difficult 3.00 2 annoying 3.50 2 





  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 80   TR 110 
Sermons- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Sleeping Pills long 1.78 14 addictive 2.22 9 
  boring 2 11 dangerous 2.67 6 
  religious 3 5 hard 2 2 
  priestly 3 2 drugs 2.5 2 
  preechy 3.5 2 colourful 4 2 
  faithful 4 2 death 5 2 
    SR 44   SR 87 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 117   TR 114 
Skating- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Flying cold 3.22 9 birds 2.40 5 
  dangerous 3.40 5 cold 3.75 4 
  fast 2.25 4 dangerous 1.33 3 
  challenging 4.00 2 exciting 2.00 3 
  exciting 4.50 2 adventurous 3.00 2 
  blades 5.50 2 beautiful 4.00 2 
    SR 93   SR 95 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 99   TR 40 
Smog- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Shroud cloudy 2.17 6 dark 2.50 4 
  dark 2.25 4 cloudy 3.00 3 
  black 2.75 4 mysterious 1.00 2 





  city 1.50 2   SR 29 
  annoying 3.50 2     
    SR 77     
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 132   TR 64 
Soldiers- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Pawns brave 2.14 7 small 1.36 11 
  courageous 3.20 5 chess 1.00 3 
  army 2.33 3 used 2.00 2 
  armed 3.00 2 blakc 2.50 2 
  brainwashed 3.00 2 dirty 3.00 2 
  athletic 4.00 2 strategy 3.00 2 
    SR 111   SR 42 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 122   TR 112 
Store- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Zoo big 1.67 9 big 2.86 7 
  clothes 3.33 3 animals 1.00 6 
  buy 3.00 2 crowded 3.00 4 
  cheap 3.50 2 colourful 3.00 3 
  clean 3.50 2 children 4.50 2 
  charming 5.50 2 beautiful 5.50 2 
    SR 102   SR 88 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 132   TR 104 
Teachers- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 





  caring 3.40 5 creative  2.00 9 
  boring 3.75 4 clay 1.50 2 
  demanding 2.50 2 crafty 1.50 2 
  dedicated 3.00 2 dedicated 2.50 2 
  friendly 3.50 2 creators 5.00 2 
    SR 109   SR 75 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 127   TR 128 
Television- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Candy colourful 3.33 6 colourful 3.00 9 
  big 3.60 5 edible 4.33 3 
  boring 3.60 5 crunchy 2.50 2 
  black 3.75 4 delicious 2.50 2 
  addictive 1.50 2 fattening 4.50 2 
  box 2.50 2 fruity 4.50 2 
    SR 103   SR 108 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 127   TR 112 
Tv- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Drug colourful 3.33 6 addictive 2.13 8 
  big 3.60 5 dangerous 2.50 8 
  boring 3.60 5 bad 1.00 4 
  black 3.75 4 death 2.75 4 
  addictive 1.50 2 destruction 2.50 2 
  box 2.50 2 exciting 5.00 2 
    SR 103   SR 84 





    TR 105   TR 109 
Time- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Money fast 2.56 9 green 2.25 8 
  fleeting 1.33 3 desired 4.00 4 
  clocks 1.00 2 good  1.00 3 
  inescapable 1.50 2 dirty 1.67 3 
  life 2.00 2 bills 2.50 2 
  late 2.50 2 death 4.00 2 
    SR 85   SR 87 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 105   TR 103 
Time- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Snail fast 2.56 9 cute 3.67 3 
  fleeting 1.33 3 boring 4.33 3 
  clocks 1.00 2 funny 5.00 3 
  inescapable 1.50 2 brown 3.00 2 
  life 2.00 2 edible 4.00 2 
  late 2.50 2 gooey 4.50 2 
    SR 85   SR 88 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 105   TR 112 
Time- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Thief fast 2.56 9 dangerous 4.57 7 
  fleeting 1.33 3 bad 2.00 5 
  clocks 1.00 2 criminal 2.20 5 
  inescapable 1.50 2 dishonest 1.50 2 





  late 2.50 2 fast 3.50 2 
    SR 85   SR 89 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 103   TR 114 
Tongues- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Fire long 2.33 6 dangerous 3.71 14 
  pierce 2.33 3 burns 4.13 8 
  bumpy 2.00 2 destructive 3.71 7 
  fleshy 2.50 2 death 4.00 5 
  organic 3.50 2 flames 2.00 3 
  lick 6.00 2 bright 4.00 3 
    SR 86   SR 74 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 114   TR 112 
Tree Trunks- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Straws brown 2.17 12 funny 2.17 6 
  big 2.29 7 colourful 3.60 6 
  barky 2.25 4 cylindrical 1.67 3 
  dark 3.00 2 bendy 4.00 3 
  circular 4.00 2 drinking 2.50 2 
  age 5.00 2 empty 3.00 2 
    SR 85   SR 90 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 124   TR 107 
Trees- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Umbrellas big 2.13 8 colourful 1.60 5 





  beautiful 1.00 3 big 2.00 3 
  environmental 2.00 2 dry 3.00 3 
  colourful 2.50 2 black 3.00 2 
  branchy 4.50 2 annoying 5.00 2 
    SR 100   SR 88 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 98   TR 113 
Trust- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Glue important 1.80 10 liquid 2.80 5 
  friendship 1.86 7 artsy 4.40 5 
  honesty 3.33 3 crafty 3.67 3 
  hard 4.33 3 annoying 5.33 3 
  broken 1.00 2 hard 3.50 2 
  fragile 3.00 2 gooey 4.00 2 
    SR 71   SR 93 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 107   TR 118 
Typewriters- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Dinosaurs fast 2.00 3 ancient 1.36 11 
  clicking noise 1.50 2 extinct 1.75 8 
  heavy 2.50 2 big 2.43 7 
  ink 2.50 2 dangerous 3.83 6 
  fun 3.50 2 carnivorous 5.33 3 
  black 4.50 2 dead 3.50 2 
    SR 94   SR 81 
  Topic   Vehicle   





Winter- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Death cold 1.38 20 dark 4.00 4 
  dark 3.60 5 final 3.67 3 
  depressing 4.40 5 cold 2.00 2 
  freezing 4.67 3 heaven 2.00 2 
  christmas 5.00 3 impending 2.50 2 
  boring 4.50 2 endings 3.00 2 
    SR 84   SR 89 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 104   TR 114 
Wisdom- Response Sal Freq   Sal Freq 
Ocean educative 3.00 4 blue 2.00 15 
  experienced 3.00 3 big 2.25 4 
  beautiful 2.50 2 beautiful 3.50 4 
  acquired 3.00 2 calm 4.33 3 
  deep 3.50 2 boats 4.50 2 
  advice 5.00 2 clean 4.50 2 
    SR 89   SR 84 
  Topic   Vehicle   
    TR 123   TR 123 
Women- Response Sal Freq Response Sal Freq 
Cats caring 4.09 11 fat 4.00 4 
  beautiful 2.83 6 black 3.67 3 
  curvy 3.20 5 cuddly 4.00 3 
  complicated 1.67 3 friendly 4.33 3 
  emotional 2.33 3 fluffy 2.00 2 












Table 3B: Topic-Vehicle pairs and Words Used in Explanation 
Topic-Vehicle Pair   Figurative Property  Literal Property  
Anger-Heart    Red    Organ 
Bible-Sword    Sharp    Weapon 
Clouds-Cotton    Soft    Fibers 
Dreams-Water    Fluid    Liquid 
Education-Tree   Grows    Plant 
Hair-Rainbow    Colourful   Visionary Creation 
Heaven-Treasure   Golden   Precious Thing 
Lawyers-Sharks   Dangerous   Fish 
Life-Beach    Relaxing   Full of Sand 
Love-Child    Young    Person 
Love-Melody    Soothing   Song 
Memory-River   Fluid    Water 
Men-Fish    Slippery   Aquatic Animals 
Music-Medicine   Healing   Drug 
Perjury-Boomerang   Returns   Weapon 
Television-Candy   Sweet    Sugar 
Tongues-Fire    Hot    Flames 
Typewriters-Dinosaurs  Old    Reptiles 
Wisdom-Ocean   Vast    Water 






Table 5B: Senior Interpretation Norms for Metaphors 
    Salient Properties  Less Salient Properties 
Apt and Familiar 
Alcohol is a crutch  relied upon, addictive  numbing 
Cigarettes are time-bombs cause death, dangerous  
Education is a stairway Leads to better things  eternal 
Exams are hurdle  Challenging, allows progress 
Knowledge is power  empowering    
Life is a journey  unpredictable, enjoyable short, goes from life to death 
Mall is a zoo   chaotic, dangerous people crowded 
Time is money  valuable   limited, wasted 
More Apt than Familiar 
Anger is fire   uncontrollable, destructive 
Genes are blueprints  defines your identity 
Knowledge is light  enlightening   bright 





More Familiar than Apt 
Cities are jungles  crowded   dangerous 
Families are Fortresses strong, protective  Safe, united 
Lawyers are sharks  ruthless   sharp 
Neither Apt nor Familiar 
Anger is a heart  very emotional  dangerous 
Deserts are ovens  hot 
Hair is a rainbow  colourful   a crown, beautiful 
Life is a bottle   Encased   can be empty or full 
Men are fish   catchable   slippery, gullible 
